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Abstract 
Scholars identify the early 1960s as the moment when Americans rediscovered poverty – 
as the time when Presidents, policymakers, and the public shifted their attention away from 
celebrating the affluence of the 1950s and toward directly helping poor people within the culture 
of poverty through major federal programs such as the Peace Corps and Job Corps.  
This dissertation argues that this moment should not be viewed as a rediscovery of 
poverty by Americans. Rather, it should be viewed as a paradigm shift that conceptually unified 
the understanding of both foreign and domestic privation within the concept of a culture of 
poverty. A culture of poverty equally hindered poor people all around the world, resulting in 
widespread illiteracy in India and juvenile delinquency in Indianapolis. Policymakers defined 
poverty less by employment rate or location (rural poverty in Ghana versus inner-city poverty in 
New York) and more by the cultural values of the poor people (apathy toward change, disdain 
for education, lack of planning for the future, and desire for immediate gratification). In a sense, 
the poor person who lived in the Philippines and the one who lived in Philadelphia became one. 
They suffered from the same cultural limitations and could be helped through the same remedy. 
There were not just similarities between programs to alleviate poverty in either the Third World 
or America; the two became one in the mid-1960s. Makers of policy in the War on Poverty 
understood all poverty around the world as identical and approached it with the same remedy.  
President John Kennedy inspired the paradigm shift. After reading about the culture of 
poverty in Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael Harrington’s book The Other America: 
Poverty in the United States, Kennedy began to bring together experts within a new mentality to 
discuss a program to end poverty. The experts had been working for separate programs that 
focused on seemingly disparate issues—juvenile delinquency, poverty in New England, and 
Third World development—but they now realized that they were all working on the same 
problem, namely, the culture of poverty. The understanding that cultural values created poverty 
led them to unify their programs and approaches as they created the War on Poverty in 1964. The 
discovery was not the beginning of national attention on poverty but a culmination that brought 
together prominent people, ideas, and programs already in existence within a new paradigm. 
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Introduction - Kennedy’s Paradigm Shift: From Alleviating Poverty 
through Employment to Reforming Cultural Values 
In February 1962 President John Kennedy sat down at his desk to read a book review in 
the New Yorker. According to historian and special assistant to the president Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., Kennedy read “partly for information, partly for comparison, partly for insight, partly for the 
sheer joy of felicitous statement.”2 He read in the typical places, such as at his desk or in bed, but 
also in the bathtub, while walking, during meals, and while dressing in the morning. In this 
instance, Kennedy was reading Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael Harrington’s book The 
Other America: Poverty in the United States.
3
 The Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, Walter Heller, passed the review to Kennedy that same month and asked him to read 
it.
4
  
                                                 
2
 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965), 105. 
3
 Kennedy never recorded when or where he read the review. He also never stated that he read The Other America. 
This has spawned an ongoing debate among historians and Kennedy’s contemporaries as to whether Kennedy 
actually ever read the review or the book. The vast majority are convinced that Kennedy read one or both. Charles L. 
Schultze, the assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget from September 1962 to February 1965 claims: “I 
suspect Michael Harrington’s book on poverty [The Other America] got a lot of stir. Kennedy had read it, and it 
impressed him.” Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. stated that “Kennedy read both [John Kenneth] Galbraith and Harrington; 
and I believe that The Other America helped crystallize his determination in 1963 to accompany the tax cut by a 
poverty program. Sargent Shriver, the director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1966 and the director of the Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) from 1964 to 1968, said: “That was one of the really great things about Kennedy; 
when he was president somehow or other he found the time to read a thoughtful book by Michael Harrington, or ‘a 
take-out essay’ in the New Yorker magazine.” I rely on such accounts when I state that he read the review.  
4
 Maurice Isserman, The Other American: The Life of Michael Harrington (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 208. 
Other accounts reported that Presidential Adviser Ted Sorensen passed the review to Kennedy. The Office of 
Economic Opportunity, “The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, November 1963 – January 1969,” Folder: Administrative History of The Office of Economic Opportunity, 
Box 1, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-1969; Administrative History; Office of Economic 
Opportunity, Volume I, The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, 12. Hereafter listed as LBJ. 
xi 
 
The review informed Kennedy that Harrington’s book had two essential points about 
poverty. First, poverty continued to exist in America despite the arrival of the “affluent society” 
of the 1950s and 1960s.
5
 Forty to fifty million Americans lived in poverty— including the urban 
poor, the aged, migrant workers in California, small farmers in the Midwest, coal miners in 
Appalachia, African Americans in southern towns, Native Americans on reservations in Arizona, 
Latinos in the small towns of Texas, Asian laborers in San Francisco, people with little 
education, and the children of female-headed households. These poor Americans were 
“invisible” because they lived in rural isolation or in crowded urban slums, where few middle-
class people ever ventured.
6
 Harrington wrote that “they are not simply neglected and forgotten 
as in the old rhetoric of reform; what is much worse, they are not seen.”7  
Second, Harrington claimed that poverty was a culture. He explained poverty as a set of 
cultural values and personality traits rather than solely as an economic condition. He saw a 
person’s lack of income more as an effect of poverty rather than as the underlying cause of it. He 
argued that “Poverty should be defined psychologically in terms of those whose place in the 
society is such that they are internal exiles who, almost inevitably, develop attitudes of defeat 
and pessimism and who are therefore excluded from taking advantage of new opportunities.”8 He 
claimed that “because of the sheer, grinding, dirty experience of being poor, the personality, the 
spirit, is impaired. It is as if human beings dilapidate along with the tenements in which they 
live.”9  
Harrington argued that poverty was a “separate culture, another nation, with its own way 
of life.”10 Harrington asserted that unlike what was experienced by previous generations of poor 
people who lived in immigrant ghettos while working to gain financial mobility the “new 
poverty” consisted of people immune to progress because of their cultural values and lack of 
aspiration. In short, what started as deprivation of opportunities to escape poverty turned into a 
                                                 
5
 Term coined by Galbraith; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1958), 1. 
6
 Maurice Isserman, The Other American: The Life of Michael Harrington (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 195. 
7
 Quoted in Isserman, 195. 
8
 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Touchstone, 1962), 179. 
9
 Ibid., 126. 
10
 Ibid., 180. 
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self-perpetuating and stifling culture with individuals who focused on individual wants rather 
than on community needs, a culture that saw nuclear families as a liability to personal 
advancement, proved uninterested in completing school, remained fatalistic and apathetic toward 
change, found planning for the future useless, and valued immediate gratification that bred 
delinquency. The cultural values, attitudes, and behaviors of the poor, when shared by others in 
the community, formed a culture of poverty, a web of interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
values that trapped all in a life of deprivation. Even if one value changed, the others remained 
and compromised any gain. Harrington explained that “being poor is not one aspect of a person’s 
life in this country; it is his life. Taken as a whole, poverty is a culture.”11 
Few Americans saw the full extent of or understood poverty in the 1950s and early 
1960s. Sargent Shriver, who directed the Peace Corps and War on Poverty in the 1960s, 
described Americans’ understanding of poverty as tantamount to “giving an American sports 
page to an Englishman.”12 However, Kennedy knew that poverty existed in America. He did not 
fully understand the cultural aspects of poverty, but he had personal experience. Kennedy had 
developed part of his interest in helping the poor during the 1960 Democratic primary in West 
Virginia. He spent a month before the primary in the state discussing what West Virginians saw 
as their most pressing concerns. Kennedy’s chief goal in the state was to prove that he could 
carry a heavily Protestant state as a Roman Catholic. Many doubted that a Catholic in the late 
1950s could attain enough votes to become the President. Although Kennedy’s purpose centered 
on the issue of religion, the time he spent in West Virginia opened his eyes to entrenched and 
pervasive poverty in Appalachia. Special Counsel and Adviser to the President Ted Sorensen 
explained that, for Kennedy, the Democratic primary gave poverty a human face and instilled in 
him a personal desire to help poor people. Kennedy eventually won the primary in West Virginia 
and carried his concern about poverty into his time as President. Kennedy mentioned poverty 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 162. 
12
 The Office of Economic Opportunity, “The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963 – January 1969,” Folder: Administrative History of The Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Box 1, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-1969; Administrative History; 
Office of Economic Opportunity, Volume I, 135, LBJ. 
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three times in his inaugural address. He claimed that, “If a free society cannot help the many who 
are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”13  
Harrington’s book enabled Kennedy to see poverty in a new light. The book reoriented 
Kennedy’s assumptions about why people were poor and how to help them. Prior to this, 
Kennedy viewed poverty in much the same way as Franklin Roosevelt had during the Great 
Depression. He identified the poor as those who happened to be unemployed. FDR described the 
poor as “The ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished . . . lacking the means to buy the products of farm 
and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions.”14 In 
short, poor people were merely out of work. Providing jobs would cure their poverty. However, 
Harrington’s book explained to Kennedy that poverty existed on a deeper level. It resided in the 
psychology of the poor person. Jobs could not solve the problem. Sargent Shriver explained later 
in an oral interview:  
You don’t make them employable simply by giving them a job. You give them a job, 
they come to the job, they don’t perform. You give them the job, they’re there for three 
days a week, and they don’t show up for the next two. You give them a job and they have 
no idea of time, they don’t have any idea that during a two-hour period you’re supposed 
to produce X amount of product. That’s not their fault. They’ve never lived in an 
economy where time is important, production is important, showing up regularly is 
important, keeping to a schedule is important; all those things are bourgeois, middle-class 
ideas.
15
 
 
By growing up in poor communities, individuals were socialized and acculturated with 
values and priorities that inhibited their ability to overcome poverty. More than just money, poor 
people lacked the will to achieve, the motivation, and the ability to overcome poverty because 
the repeated blockage of opportunities taught them to distrust that life would get better.  
Harrington’s book enabled Kennedy to understand poverty in a new way. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. recalls Kennedy saying, prior to this, that “In England…the unemployment rate 
goes to two per cent, and they march on Parliament. Here it moves up toward six, and no one 
                                                 
13
 John Fitzgerald Kennedy, “Inaugural Address”; available from 
http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm; Internet; accessed 6 June 2012. 
14
 Quoted in Schlesinger Jr., 1009. 
15
 Transcript, Sargent Shriver Oral History Interview II, 10/23/80, by Michael L. Gillette, 
Electronic Copy, LBJ Library, 27. 
xiv 
 
seems to mind.”16 Now it made sense. Blockage of opportunities created a distinct culture of 
poverty. The poor adapted to their lives and viewed them as normal. No need existed to fight for 
a way out of poverty. Poverty was life. Poverty was their lot. Poverty was not unemployment. It 
was a way of life, a culture. 
Kennedy’s new awareness of the form and prevalence of domestic poverty inspired him 
to do something about it. Shriver recalls Kennedy saying to Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers Walter Heller:  
Look, these guys [Harrington and Macdonald] said that there’s a big poverty problem…. 
I want you to investigate this and make some recommendations to me. If this situation 
exists as they say it does, we have a significant social problem in our country, then 
perhaps we at the federal government ought to do something about it. It doesn’t mean that 
we have to do it all; maybe the states should do it, maybe private enterprise should do it, 
but something should be done about it. So make me some recommendations.
17
  
 
Shriver identified this as the discovery of the poor and the start of the War on Poverty. 
Kennedy began to bring together policymakers from the federal and state levels, social scientists, 
and volunteers over the course of the 1963. They began to discuss poverty and to design a 
national service corps, essentially a domestic Peace Corps, to combat poverty in America. The 
national service corps never passed Congress; however, after Kennedy was assassinated, Lyndon 
Johnson expanded the War on Poverty. On the day after Kennedy’s assassination Johnson met 
with Heller. Heller explained to Johnson that “the very last substantive conversation that I had 
had with Kennedy was about a [domestic] poverty program.”18 Heller continued: “[H]is reaction 
immediately was, ‘That’s my kind of program. I’ll find money for it one way or another. If I 
have to, I’ll take money away from things to get money for people.’”19 Johnson, in his State of 
the Union address on 8 January 1964, just forty-seven days after Kennedy’s assassination, 
declared that “This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in 
America.”20 In his proposed Great Society, Johnson zealously stressed the need for programs to 
                                                 
16
 Schlesinger Jr., 1011. 
17
 Shriver, Oral Interview, 16. 
18
 Quoted in Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 15.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Lyndon Johnson, “State of the Union”: available from 
http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbj1964stateoftheunion.htm; Internet; accessed 6 June 2013. 
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combat poverty. Once passed by Congress, Johnson’s Great Society included programs such as 
Head Start, Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited 
(HARYOU), Medicare, Medicaid, Upward Bound, and Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA).
21
 All these programs functioned on the logic that cultural values created poverty. 
Bertrand M. Harding, the Acting Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity under 
Johnson, identified the moment when Kennedy read Macdonald’s review of Harrington as the 
discovery of poverty in America.
22
 Several scholars, including James T. Patterson, agree with 
Harding and identify this point as the discovery of the new, cultural understanding of poverty as 
well. This was the moment when Presidents, policymakers, and the public shifted their attention 
away from celebrating the affluence of the 1950s and toward directly helping poor people. 
Patterson argues that “his [Harrington’s] powerful, passionate book, The Other America, exposed 
the misery of a ‘new,’ specially deprived poor….Within the next few years a virtual avalanche of 
books and articles on poverty rolled off the presses. President Kennedy read both Harrington and 
Macdonald and set his advisers to study the problem.”23 
 Scholars argue that the discovery of poverty had two major components. It entailed 
making poverty a political issue. Both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson made the 
alleviation of poverty a major priority of the federal government. The second component of the 
discovery was to view poverty as something new. The “old poverty” was unemployment. The 
“new poverty” was a self-perpetuating culture that trapped generation after generation. The “new 
poverty” came from cultural values, not solely from an absence of income. 
However, the moment when Kennedy read the review was not a rediscovery in either 
sense of the word. The cultural understanding of difference had been the dominant analytical 
framework within the social sciences since the mid-1950s, including Margaret Mead’s culture 
and personality school in anthropology, Erik Erikson’s psycho-social theories of personality in 
                                                 
21
 The Office of Economic Opportunity, “The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963 – January 1969,” Folder: Administrative History of The Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Box 1, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-1969; Administrative History; 
Office of Economic Opportunity, Volume I, 1, LBJ. 
22
 Ibid., 13. 
23
 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty in the Twentieth Century, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 97. 
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psychology, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin’s sub-group theory of gang culture in sociology, 
and economist Walt Rostow’s cultural explanation of the propensities affecting economic 
development in the Third World. More than that, several governmental programs, including the 
Peace Corps, Gray Areas Project, President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, Mobilization 
for Youth, and Alliance for Progress, already operated based on the logic that cultural values and 
distinct personalities accounted for economic inequality.  
I argue that Kennedy’s reading of the review should be understood as a paradigm shift. I 
argue that Kennedy’s reading Macdonald’s review marked the point when the policymakers and 
intellectuals began to view distinct cultures and personalities as responsible for all poverty rather 
than to put the blame on a lack of jobs or on a national economic structure that was preventing 
certain segments of people from gaining economic mobility. The shift came not only from 
Kennedy being exposed to ideas about the new forms of poverty. It came also from Kennedy 
bringing together people who, previously, had been working on separate programs. As Kennedy 
began to address the problem of domestic poverty, and Johnson continued the government-led 
attack on poverty, groups that had been working on seemingly disparate issues came together 
and realized that they were all working on the same problem, the culture of poverty.  
The understanding that cultural values created difference led them to unify their programs 
and approaches. Frank Mankiewicz and Sargent Shriver had been working on the development 
of the Third World through the Peace Corps. Adam Yarmolinsky worked for the Gray Areas 
Project in New Haven, addressing inner-city poverty. Saul Alinsky led the Back of the Yards 
Movement in Chicago, organizing community action teams to increase common people’s sense 
of political empowerment. Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan addressed 
unemployment thought the Department of Labor. David Hackett, Richard Cloward, and Lloyd 
Ohlin worked for Mobilization for Youth, combating juvenile delinquency in Lower East Side 
settlement houses in New York City.
24
 All reformers now came together and viewed their task in 
                                                 
24
 The people brought together in the War on Poverty within the United States and around the world are far too 
numerous to list completely here. However, they include: Walter Heller, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, 
speechwriter and political aide for Kennedy and Johnson Richard Goodwin, Undersecretary for Health, Education, 
and Welfare Wilbur Cohen, aide Paul Jacobs, author of The Wasted Americans Edgar May, Ted Sorensen, 
Kennedy’s domestic policy chief of staff, Richard Boone from programs on juvenile delinquency, and political 
scientists James Sundquist. 
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this new light. Harding described it as “a time of chaos and exhaustion when energies were 
fueled by excitement and exhilaration—itself, at times, the product of a kind of hysteria.”25 
Kennedy brought together reformers who unified national and international programs within a 
new mentality. The rediscovery was not the beginning but a culmination that brought together 
prominent people, ideas, and programs already in existence.  
Washington insiders dubbed the group the “Poor Corps.”26 As they came together 
because of prompting from Kennedy and then from Johnson, policymakers and social scientists 
realized that they were all working on the same concept, a culture of poverty. Norbert A. Schlei, 
the assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, described it as everyone 
“grab[bing] hold of a different part of the elephant.”27 The new mentality allowed them to see 
that they were all working on the same elephant, the culture of poverty. The culture of poverty 
created distinct values and personalities. It created specific ways of understanding the world. It 
manifested in rural poverty in Appalachia, juvenile delinquency in inner-city New York, political 
apathy in Chicago, a stagnant national economy in Peru, lawlessness in Micronesia, low 
educational achievement in Ghana, and broken families in Oklahoma City. Since the new 
paradigm of a culture of poverty assumed that the poverty had essentially the same cause 
everywhere, it unified reformers’ approach to the poor in America and abroad. They applied the 
same approach to inhabitants of the Third World and poor people in America. The reformers 
shared an understanding of all poverty and a common approach to its cure. 
To be sure, the paradigm of these men and women in the 1960s had flaws. First, it 
assumed weakness.  They claimed that the poor resigned to a life of misery, lacked motivation, 
                                                 
25
 The Office of Economic Opportunity, “The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963 – January 1969,” 28. 
26
 Ibid. The official Task Force members were the following: Andrew Brimmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce; William Capron, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers; Ronald Goldfarb, Justice 
Department; Richard Goodwin, International Peace Corps Secretariat; David Hackett, Justice Department; Harold 
Horowitz, Associate General Counsel, HEW; Frank Mankiewicz; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of 
Labor; Anne Oppenheimer, analyst, Bureau of the Budget; Norbert Shlei, Assistant Attorney General, Department 
of Justice; Milton Semer, General Counsel, CFA, HHFA; James L. Sundquist, Deputy Undersecretary of 
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failed to join social movements, and shunned political participation. The social movements 
during the 1960s, often carried out by poor and marginal people, proved these assumptions 
wrong.  Caeser Chavez’s fasting to rally support for the National Farm Workers Association, 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s March on Washington for civil rights for African Americans, Betty 
Freidan’s campaign for gender equality, and Native Americans’ occupation of Alcatraz, all 
showed the strength and political fervor of poor and marginalized people. Second, the paradigm 
assumed cultural uniformity among the poor. The poor person in Ghana and West Virginia 
suffered from the same debilitating cultural values. From the late 1960s on, people’s recognition 
of diversity revealed the many forms of lifestyles within the United States and around of world.  
In a way similar to the way in which Jane Jacob’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
(1961) revealed the vibrancy and complexity of life when viewed from the sidewalk to challenge 
the assumed universalism of Modernist architecture, Americans in the late 1960s, such as Hylan 
Lewis, fought to reveal the diversity of people who were poor.
28
  
Despite its weaknesses, the mentality about culturally created economic inequality had 
national and international importance beyond both the 1960s and policies toward poverty. It 
became part of the in the way in which policymakers understood marginalized Americans, how 
marginalized Americans differed from others, what caused that disparity, and what repercussions 
resulted. In the same way that blockages of opportunity created a culture of poverty, later in the 
1960s liberals explained that blocking African Americans from opportunity created distinct 
cultural values and personality types. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who worked on the War on 
Poverty, wrote an attention-grabbing report entitled “The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action (1965).” He relied on historian Stanley Elkins’ Slavery: A Problem in American 
Institutional and Intellectual Life.
29
 Elkins argued that the closed system of the plantation, 
without opportunities to escape, created distinct cultural patterns and personalities in African 
Americans that continued all the way into the 1960s. Elkins’ “Sambo” characterization of 
African Americans resulted from the plantation’s closed and total system of oppression. He 
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asserted that “Absolute power for [the slaveowner] meant absolute dependency for the slave—
the dependency not of the developing child but of the perpetual child.”30 The environment of 
blockages of opportunity and oppression created a “gay, care-free black clown.”31 Moynihan 
accepted Elkins’ contention that the system damaged African Americans.32 For African 
Americans, slavery broke up families, destroyed confidence, and broke their will in a way that 
lasted until the present. Federal action had to aim at reforming this “tangle of pathology.” Much 
like the idea of a culture of poverty, historian Peter Novick asserts, the notion of a “tangle of 
pathology” prevented “those caught in its coils from taking advantage of formal equality of 
opportunity.”33 Also as with the culture of poverty that prevented an escape from poverty even 
when opportunities opened, Moynihan said, the pathology was “capable of perpetuating itself 
without assistance from the white world.”34 
The cultural understanding of difference influenced conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s 
as well. Conservative Republicans such as Ronald Reagan used the idea of a culture of poverty 
to justify cutting aid to the poor. Historian Bruce Schulman argues: “The president truly lacked 
sympathy for the downtrodden, accepting the canard that the poor deserved and even desired 
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their own misery.”35 Reagan believed that the culture of poverty did not result from adapting to 
blockages of opportunities. Rather, it proved that poor people desired their way of life. No aid 
could help them. Reagan accepted the concept of the culture of poverty, but, unlike Kennedy and 
Johnson in the 1960s, he contended that it could not be remedied. In fact, Reagan argued that 
governmental programs actually aggravated the problems of the poor, further trapping them in a 
cycle of dependency and poverty. 
In the 1990s American policymakers, social critics, and the public fought “Culture 
Wars.” People such as sociologist James Davison Hunter and Republican Presidential candidate 
Pat Buchanan argued that Americans divided along cultural lines rather than the traditional lines 
of political party, religion, ethnicity, or social groups. Culture determined Americans’ stance on 
issues such as separation of church and state, privacy, recreational drug use, abortion, gun 
control, homosexuality, and censorship.  
But the belief in the all-pervasive power of culture can be traced back to the 1960s. The 
way in which Kennedy’s actions created a paradigm shift in policies toward poverty was evident 
in Shriver’s experience.  Kennedy appointed Shriver to design the Peace Corps, secure 
Congressional approval for the program, and administer the program once in existence. Shriver 
accomplished all of these objectives. He served as the Director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 
1966. Historian Michael Latham has pointed out that the Peace Corps was founded on the idea 
that cultural differences accounted for the disparity in economic development around the 
world.
36
  For example, the lesser development of the Philippines’ economy stemmed less from 
international trade or politicians’ decisions, and more from Filipinos’ absence of motivation to 
accumulate money, their laid-back approach to work, low prioritizing of punctuality, and 
acceptance of a life of poverty. All such cultural traits would be attributed to the American poor 
later in the 1960s during the War on Poverty.  
But Shriver did not immediately recognize the connection of ideas about development in 
the Third World to a program against domestic poverty when he reluctantly accepted the task of 
running Johnson’s War on Poverty in America. Shriver’s reluctance stemmed partly from his 
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fear that the American anti-poverty program would take time away from the Peace Corps, his 
successful and popular international anti-poverty program. Shriver told Johnson: “I’ve just 
traveled the world trying to get volunteers charged up, what kind of message will it send if I 
leave now?”37  
Shriver also objected because he felt that he knew nothing about domestic poverty. He 
explained to Johnson that “I didn’t know beans about it, because I’ve been overseas.”38 Johnson 
responded: “Well, you don’t need to know much….You’ll have an international Peace Corps—
one abroad and one at home.”39  
It would seem that Shriver, as someone simultaneously conducting a war on foreign and 
domestic poverty, ought to have instantly recognized the connection made possible by the 
concept of a “culture of poverty.” He didn’t. He met with Michael Harrington and discussed the 
culture of poverty, but the meeting failed to leave an impression. Shriver still believed that he 
knew nothing about domestic poverty.  
He continued the process started by Kennedy to gather together experts on various 
subjects relating to poverty, including juvenile delinquency, community development, and the 
development of the Third World.
40
 Shriver set up weekly informal seminars in a suite in the 
Mayflower Hotel in Washington D.C. to discuss domestic poverty with social scientists, authors, 
and members of other governmental agencies. Shriver biographer Scott Stossel described the 
meetings as “a beautiful hysteria.”41 Sociologist Daniel Bell remembered: “When the poverty 
issue arose, nobody was really prepared, nobody had any data, nobody knew what to do.”42  
However, through these meetings Shriver came to be convinced that the concept of a 
culture of poverty did unify the Peace Corps abroad and the War on Poverty in America. When 
appointed by Johnson in February 1964 to run the War on Poverty, Shriver honestly claimed that 
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he understood international poverty but knew nothing about poverty in America. But, within a 
few short months, Shriver experienced a paradigm shift and came to realize that his effort in the 
Peace Corps had been the same as what his effort would be in the War on Poverty. He previously 
separated home from abroad, exhibited in his “scrambling” for experts on poverty although he 
was the head of the Peace Corps. Now he realized that he was the expert. He elaborated during 
an oral interview in 1980 with historian Michael Gillette: 
Now in fact, doing community development in Ecuador is, philosophically and 
substantially, no different than doing the same thing in some West Virginia hollow. Now 
I’m not trying to say West Virginia hollows are like Ecuador, but the concept of going 
into Ecuador to try to help people decide their own problems, and to energize them, 
motivate them, assist them to be able to handle their own problems themselves, is no 
different than the psychology you take into West Virginia or to the South Bronx. In the 
Peace Corps one called this process community development; in the war against poverty, 
we called it Community Action.
 43 
 
Shriver explained: “In fact, [domestic] community action—which the people in 
community action thought was so revolutionary—was something that we had been running in the 
Peace Corps for four years before it ever got into the War on Poverty. So I thought community 
action was absolutely sort of normal. To me it was routine; to them it was a giant revolution.”44 
In short, the War on Poverty in America, originally instigated by Kennedy’s reading of 
Macdonald’s review, implemented a paradigm shift that unified foreign and domestic poverty. 
The Peace Corps already existed when Kennedy read the review. Community development 
already existed, in the Peace Corps, Mobilization for Youth in New England, and the Back of the 
Yards program in Chicago. The cultural understanding of difference existed in policies toward 
juvenile delinquency in the Mobilization for Youth, urban poverty in the Gray Areas Program, 
and the development of the Third World through the Peace Corps. But suddenly all were brought 
together into a unified approach. Although many viewed the culture of poverty and community 
development as revolutionary, Shriver’s experience shows that they were not. Both already 
existed in the social scientific literature and in governmental programs. Kennedy’s reading of the 
review unified them within a new paradigm.  
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I am not attempting to cover the growth, spread, entrenchment, retreat, or stasis of the 
welfare state. By contrast, the typical account of policies in the 1960s pertaining to poverty, such 
as historian Gareth Davies’s From Opportunities to Entitlements, tells the tale of expansion of 
the welfare program with the inauguration of Johnson’s Great Society and then its retreat as the 
neo-conservative movement develops in the late 1960s.
45
 Davies argues that the perspectives 
about welfare shifted in the late 1960s from its being seen as providing opportunities for the poor 
to promising entitlements to anyone who lacked money. Rather, I am examining a unique period 
in America when policymakers believed that all poverty, despite its location, stemmed from 
cultural values or, to use the more familiar term, it stemmed from the culture of poverty.  
My argument solves many historiographical problems. In her dissertation, “‘A Different 
Kind Of People’: The Poor At Home and Abroad, 1935-1968,” historian Sheyda Janhanbani 
argues that the concept of development unified foreign and domestic poverty.
46
 She claims that 
the concept of development required an understanding of progress. It separated proper from 
inadequate development. She writes that “these chapters chart the ways that ideas about poverty 
in developed societies and underdevelopment in ‘developing’ ones first came entangled, then 
became intertwined, and eventually became one.”47 However, she fails to acknowledge that 
development came in many forms and changed over the course of the postwar period. It was not 
just that the poor at home and abroad were put on the same continuum in the postwar era; they 
did not actually come to be viewed as one until after the shift to viewing poverty as cultural had 
come about. No major figure in the 1940s and 1950s had proposed that poverty at home and 
abroad were the same thing. President Harry Truman spoke separately about needing to end 
poverty in the Third World and needing to maintain abundance in America. He viewed the two 
as separate. Poverty in the Third World stemmed from a lack of economic development that 
showed itself in poor healthcare, low agricultural production, and widespread illiteracy. 
Americans could avoid poverty by consuming more radios, cars, magazines, televisions, houses, 
and clothes. Poverty in America differed sharply from poverty in the Third World. Yes, poverty 
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in both America and the Third World concerned Truman, but the two still were not conceived as 
one phenomenon until Kennedy’s and Johnson’s administrations. Development had many forms, 
but the poor at home and abroad only became one within the shared mentality of cultural 
difference in the 1960s. 
Second, my argument demonstrates that Americans’ treatment of people in the Third 
World did not differ from their treatment of poor Americans in places such as Harlem or 
Appalachia. My contention that policymakers understood all poverty as the same challenges 
scholars who claim that Third World development is nothing more than Americanization, 
paternalism, or, as historian Fritz Fisher states, “Making them Like Us.”48  
Third, my argument demonstrates that there was no divide between foreign and domestic 
spheres. Scholars who focus exclusively on either domestic or foreign poverty, such as James T. 
Patterson, Michael Katz, Odd Arne Westad, or Gabriel Kolko, falsely view anti-poverty 
programs as unique creations with unique solutions for unique problems.
49
 They were not.  
Lastly, my argument that a single mentality about poverty existed corrects the inaccurate 
characterization of the 1960s as an era of fragmentation, polarization, and contradiction. Scholars 
often focus on lines of social cleavage: non-violence versus black separatism; liberal feminists 
versus radical feminists; military critics of the policy in Vietnam versus anti-war protesters at 
home; or neo-conservatives versus socially active liberals. But how reformers approached 
poverty actually shows an essential uniformity in how Americans understood and sought to help 
the poor at home and abroad.   
 This understanding of poverty as having the same dynamics at home and abroad may 
serve as an organizing principle for scholars studying various aspects of the 1960s. Whether it 
was people trying to alleviate poverty or the groups who suffered deprivation, poverty was a 
component in nearly all social movements of the decade. Protesters called the Vietnam War a 
“Poor Man’s War” while Lyndon Johnson created a plan for a Mekong River Project to improve 
South Vietnam’s economy and end Vietnamese poverty. Martin Luther King founded and 
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conducted the Poor People’s Campaign, a program to help poor African Americans find jobs. 
Malcolm X recruited poor African Americans in Harlem to fight America’s oppressive system of 
racial segregation. Women’s rights activist Betty Friedan fought to secure jobs for middle-class 
housewives. Radical feminists helped poor single mothers find jobs and earn money to raise their 
families. Although all had specific causes, their efforts all related to poverty. 
This study will explain the way in which Kennedy’s reading of Macdonald’s review 
initiated a paradigm shift and created a unique moment when programs for foreign and domestic 
poverty operated under a common mentality. Governmental programs and social scientific 
literature that had developed separately in the 1950s suddenly came together under the concept 
of the culture of poverty. The new mentality saw foreign and domestic poverty as essentially one 
phenomenon, because they had the same structural origin and the same supposed remedy. It 
proposed that all poverty, despite its location, stemmed from cultural values and that the remedy 
for poverty was to change those values.  
Chapter One argues that Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower both believed that 
poverty existed in many distinct forms and that the solution for each differed. The chapter argues 
that Truman and Eisenhower sought to end poverty by inducing consumption in America, 
reconstructing European industry, and developing the Third World. Neither of them discussed 
cultural values and their relation to poverty. Foreign and domestic poverty were not one. A 
single mentality about poverty did not exist yet. Truman argued that European poverty differed 
from poverty in the Third World. European poverty stemmed from World War II and the 
physical destruction of buildings, roads, lines of transportation, communication, and trade. All of 
this hurt the economy. By contrast, the poverty in the Third World came not from the destruction 
of preexisting structures and lines of transportation but from the fact that they had never existed 
on a satisfactory scale. Rather than pressing for the reconstruction of Europe or development of 
the Third World, postwar Americans needed to consume more products to continue to grow the 
economy. In short, America needed consumption, Europe needed reconstruction, and the Third 
World needed development. In policymakers’ minds, three separate forms of poverty existed in 
the 1940s and 1950s.  
 Chapter Two argues that several major fields in the social sciences experienced 
important intellectual shifts in late 1940s and 1950s that were pivotal to unifying the 
understanding of foreign and domestic poverty in the 1960s. Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict 
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led the field of anthropology to embrace the theory that personality hinged on culture. Mead and 
Benedict argued that the culture of any given society determined each member’s values, 
behaviors, attitudes, and aspirations. In short, culture, not biology or race, accounted for 
difference in the world. Among psychologists, Erik Erikson developed a highly influential theory 
that attributed the development of personality to psycho-social factors, such as parenting style 
and peer influence. Erikson’s theory became instrumental in understanding how parents 
socialized their children into the culture of poverty. Within the field of sociology, Richard 
Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin, and Walter B. Miller proposed that sub-cultures existed that differed from 
America’s mainstream culture and led to alternative behavior, such as gang violence and poor 
educational achievement. The theory of sub-cultures validated a culture of poverty that existed 
apart from America’s mainstream culture and the middle-class culture. Finally, an inter-
disciplinary theory of Third World development, known as modernization theory, developed and 
proposed that the underdevelopment of the Third World stemmed from the conflict between 
traditional cultural values and modern industrialized society. In short, when a country 
industrialized, the institutions of the society mattered less than the attitudes and values of its 
people. 
Chapter Three argues that the intellectual shifts explained in Chapter Two served as the 
operational logic for new governmental programs in the 1950s and early 1960s. Such programs 
included the Mobilization for Youth, Gray Areas Program, and the Peace Corps. Administrators 
of the Mobilization for Youth sought to combat delinquency by changing the juveniles’ 
personality and cultural values. The idea of cultural change also formed the foundation of 
programs to end urban poverty in New England, specifically the Gray Areas Program in New 
Haven, Connecticut. Liberals in the late 1950s began to rely on the concept of culture and 
personality to understand poverty in the Third World as well. This chapter will explain the way 
in which policymakers’ focus on Third World development shifted from one based on economics 
to one based on cultural and psychological factors. The ascendency of modernization theory 
proved instrumental to this change in approach. I will highlight how the economic approach of 
the Point Four Program (1948 to 1952) transformed into modernization theory with its cultural 
and psychological dimensions, and formed the logic of the Peace Corps in the early 1960s.  
Chapter Four argues that Kennedy created a paradigm shift in the understanding of 
poverty by bringing together makers of policy and social scientists who had been working in 
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separate areas. The discussions between these men and women marked the shift when cultural 
poverty became universalized in the minds of American policymakers. They unified foreign and 
domestic poverty, juvenile delinquency and elderly neediness, urban and rural scarcity, and male 
and female deprivation. Separate programs, founded on the concept of cultural difference, 
already existed. Harrington was not the first to propose that cultural difference explained 
inequity. But the Peace Corps’, Grey Area Program’s, and Mobilization for Youth’s respective 
policymakers and social scientists did not view each program as part of a single approach to 
poverty. When Kennedy and Johnson brought together various social scientists and 
policymakers, all discovered that the idea of a culture of poverty unified them all in a common 
approach. All experienced a paradigm shift.  
Chapter Five argues that, after 1964, the development of the Third World and War on 
Poverty in America became founded on the universal concept of the culture of poverty. A 
common mentality about the causes of poverty and about the best method to remedy it shaped 
programs at home and abroad. All poverty stemmed from cultural values that prevented poor 
people from seizing opportunities to achieve upward economic mobility. Poor people throughout 
the world lacked motivation, a belief in and desire for change, trust that the future would be 
better, and a wish to plan for that future. In the new understanding of how to cure poverty, both 
programs for the development of the Third World and ones to end domestic poverty used 
community development as the remedy. All programs used the same method, community 
development, to change poor people’s values and to energize them—to transform a person who 
valued immediate gratification into one who valued planning for the future, to make a person 
who only cared from him or herself, into one that valued community, and to make a person who 
once feared change embrace and initiate it. 
Chapter Six argues that, by the late 1960s, the liberal conviction that cultural values 
accounted for poverty was challenged by a view that poverty stemmed from deficiencies in the 
economy—including unfairness in its basic structure. Social and political movements around the 
world discredited claims that marginalized groups suffered from cultural values that enervated 
their will to fight for a better future. Social and political movements showed the power of 
marginalized groups who suffered poverty. Rather than victims of blocked opportunities who 
needed help to change, they were powerful people who fought against the system despite their 
oppression. Martin Luther King, Jr. declared “We shall overcome” and adroitly led protesters for 
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civil rights. Instead of accepting that all African Americans lived in a “tangle of pathology” with 
cultural values that compromised them, African-American social leaders from Stokely 
Carmichael, the leader of the Black Panthers, to host of Soul Train Don Cornelius proclaimed 
“black power” and asserted that black was beautiful. Historians Lawrence Levine in Black 
Culture and Black Consciousness and Eugene Genovese in Roll Jordan Roll demonstrated the 
power of the African American community, not its weakness. Internationally political 
movements in areas as diverse as Algeria, Vietnam, South Africa, Peru, Indonesia, Ghana, and 
Czechoslovakia showed the will and power of marginalized people. By the late 1960s liberals 
including Andre Gunder Frank and Raul Prebisch attributed poverty to an unfair economic 
structure rather than to the values of poor people. 
The Conclusion argues that, despite challenges to the culture of poverty and the assertion 
of cultural strength, the terms remained largely unchanged as policymakers and social scientists 
continued to discuss difference in terms of culture. Cultural discussions continued to be primarily 
over those of biology (race), economics (progressives and haves versus have-nots), or politics 
(political system or voter participation). All discussions held a larger, more complex cultural 
dimension that reoriented the source of problems and their cure. Extending the vote through the 
Voting Rights Act of 1964 was not enough to ensure equality. Providing income through welfare 
was not enough to overcome poverty. Providing full racial equality before the law through the 
Civil Rights Act of 1963 did not eliminate all difference in treatment. Cultural values withstood 
all. Policymakers and social scientists in the early-to-mid 1960s first attempted to grapple with 
such issues in terms of poverty. The lens of cultural difference has remained ever since.  
 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Distinct Poverties, Distinct Cures: Consumption, 
Reconstruction, and Development 
Poverty held national attention in the 1960s. In his Presidential Inaugural Address on 20 
January 1961, John F. Kennedy pledged to “assist free men and free governments in casting off 
the chains of poverty.”50 Five days after assuming office in November 1963, Lyndon Johnson 
declared that “We will carry on the fight against poverty, and misery, and disease, and ignorance, 
in other lands and in our own.”51 In his State of the Union address in 1964 Johnson proclaimed 
that “This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in 
America.”52 Although the attention was being given to it as something rediscovered, poverty had 
never left the minds of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s. It was true that America had emerged 
from World War II with a strong national economy. Observers such as John Kenneth Galbraith 
characterized Americans as being the “Affluent Society.” Americans prospered in their 
professions, bought houses in newly built suburbs, purchased and drove cars on recently paved 
roads, and shopped at recently constructed shopping malls. But many nonetheless believed that 
poverty always lingered in the background.
53
 Historian Lizabeth Cohen wrote: “The United 
States came out of World War II deeply determined to prolong and enhance the economic 
recovery brought on by the war, lest the crippling depression of the 1930s return.”54 A 
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depression as bad as the Great Depression could happen again and cause national and class 
divisions. Poverty also threatened to help communists win important inroads in war-torn Europe 
and gain an advantage in the Cold War. Finally, combined with the press for decolonization, 
poverty in countries in the Third World presented the possibility of new communist governments 
that would produce gaps in American’s containment of the Soviet expansion. Presidents Harry 
Truman and Dwight Eisenhower both focused on maintaining America’s prosperity, retaining a 
non-communist Western Europe, and steering newly independent countries in the Third World 
toward democratic capitalism. In short, each thought that poverty invited communism, and both 
sought to eliminate deprivation all over the world.  
Whereas the paradigm shift initiated by Kennedy created a common mentality that 
asserted that all poverty, despite its location, stemmed from cultural values, Truman and 
Eisenhower believed that different forms of poverty existed. Truman and Eisenhower sought to 
end poverty by inducing consumption in America, reconstructing European industry, and 
developing the Third World. In short, each believed that poverty existed in many unique forms 
and that the solution for each kind of poverty differed. America needed consumption, Europe 
needed reconstruction, and the Third World needed development. In contrast, what scholars such 
as Galbraith and political scientist Michael Harrington called the “new poverty” of the 1960s 
conceptually unified the condition of poor people at home and abroad. All poor people, despite 
their location, suffered from cultural values that limited their ability to prosper. A poor person 
might lack motivation, fail to plan for the future, value immediate gratification, hold a disdain for 
school, or seek solutions through violence and aggression. Accordingly, all poverty, in America, 
Europe, and the Third World, could be alleviated through changing poor people’s system of 
values. Neither consumption, reconstruction, nor development alone could remedy poverty-
producing values. Anti-poverty programs in the 1960s were designed to make the poor person 
value education, seek change, plan for the future, settle disputes amicably, defer gratification in 
favor of long-term goals, sustain motivation, and be self-reliant. Kennedy and Johnson made no 
distinction between poor people in America and around the world. Truman and Eisenhower did.  
Truman argued that poverty in Europe differed from poverty in the Third World. 
European poverty stemmed from World War II and the destruction of buildings, roads, lines of 
transportation, communication, and trade. The loss of such structures hurt the economy. By 
contrast, poverty in the Third World came less from the destruction of preexisting structures and 
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lines of transportation than from the fact that they had never existed. For example, Lima was 
unlike London in that it did not have a large thriving commercial center that military conflict had 
destroyed, leaving its reconstruction as the only obstacle to creating a thriving economy and 
returning the country to an era of prosperity. Rather Peru had never had a thriving commercial 
center. It had to be built from the ground up. This meant that American aid had to go to the first 
steps toward industrialization—including widespread literacy and education, higher crop yields 
to produce a surplus that could be sold internationally and serve as a national source of income, 
and better health care that could enable teachers and students to be healthy enough to remain in 
school and workers to consistently work. In short, poverty in Peru differed from poverty in 
Britain. The Marshall Plan for Europe and the Point Four Program for the Third World focused 
on what Truman and Eisenhower saw as two separate and distinct sources of economic 
deprivation. Rather than reconstruction as in Europe or development as in the Third World, 
postwar Americans needed to consume more products to continue to grow their economy. The 
larger consumer-based economy enabled all people—men and women, black and white, old and 
young, white collar and blue collar—to participate through purchasing in what Roland Marchand 
described as the “democracy of goods.”55 Consumption increased America’s wealth and 
eliminated the threat of communist solutions of redistribution.   
The major way in which policymakers attempted to create wide-spread prosperity in 
America was through consumption. Federally induced consumption dated back to the latter years 
of the New Deal. Led by Franklin Roosevelt, the early New Deal focused on increasing 
production. Roosevelt maintained that government-facilitated competition would bring 
prosperity to a wider swath of the population by eliminating concentrated power and profit. Once 
government successfully operated as the “broker” among economic interests, Roosevelt and his 
advisers on economic matters maintained, the private sector and market would be able to 
revitalize an economy stuck in a lull. He oversaw the creation of the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) to achieve this end. The NRA attempted to create fair competition 
between companies by codifying rules and regulation. It also attempted to help workers by 
setting a minimum wage. Roosevelt intended to achieve what he termed the Four Freedoms: 
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freedom of speech; freedom of religion; freedom from want; and freedom from fear. Breaking up 
monopolies and providing opportunities for competition dominated Roosevelt’s efforts between 
1933 and 1935. However, 1935 in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States the Supreme Court 
deemed the NRA unconstitutional on the grounds that it delegated too much power from the 
Legislative to the Executive branch. It also violated the Commerce Clause by giving a 
disproportional amount of authority to Congress for regulating state matters. Roosevelt needed a 
new method to help his country overcome the national economic crisis.  
In 1937 Roosevelt switched from focusing on production to trying to induce 
consumption.
56
 Historian Alan Brinkley argues that Roosevelt embraced Keynesian economics 
to spur consumption. British economist John Maynard Keynes’ theory afforded government an 
enlarged role. Government spending, such as for public works projects, was to be the catalyst 
that would spur consumption and therefore economic growth.
57
 The labor required for the 
projects would provide employment and income for thousands of unemployed citizens. The 
citizens would spend their salaries on various goods and services within the community, 
increasing consumption, thereby improving other sectors of the economy. Keynes’ “multiplier 
effect” stated that the effects would continue to radiate outwards, until the entire economy had 
been jumpstarted back into growth.
58
 Economist Leon Henderson succinctly stated that, “when 
farmers and laborers, that is consumers, have funds to spend, the merchants do more business, 
factories receive large orders, and soon find themselves compelled to add new equipment and so 
the spiral of recovery is set into high gear.”59  
In 1938, faced with a nation-wide Depression, Keynes advised Roosevelt to take 
measures to immediately stimulate consumption.
60
 According to Brinkley, the economists who 
subscribed to the Keynesian approach contended that “consumption, not investment, was now 
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the principal engine driving the industrial economy and hence the principal social goal toward 
which public efforts should be directed.”61 Consumption was more important than investment. 
Consumption drove production rather than the inverse. Increasing consumption rather than 
production provided the best route to prosperity and growth. 
 Poverty occurred not because of the lack of production but because the economy failed 
to widely distribute consumer products and the profits they generated. The federal government 
needed to stimulate consumption. Consumption would allow companies to prosper and expand 
their distribution, which would increasingly spread products and profits to poverty-stricken 
areas. The poor would be integrated into the consumer economy and all segments and sectors 
would prosper. Consumption could narrow the gap between the haves and have-nots and reduce 
class tensions.  
America emerged from WW II determined to maintain the economic recovery brought on 
by the war and to prevent depression from returning. Military spending during WW II helped to 
spread prosperity by employing millions of people in the military and in factories that supported 
the war effort. But once the war ended, new consumer products and markets had to be found if 
personal consumption was to replace military spending and the same level of economic activity 
was to continue. Historian Lizabeth Cohen has observed: 
Beginning during the war and with great fervor after it, business leaders, labor unions, 
government agencies, the mass media, advertisers, and many other purveyors of the new 
postwar order conveyed the message that mass consumption was not a personal 
indulgence. Rather, it was a civic responsibility designed to improve the living standards 
of all Americans, a critical part of a prosperity-producing cycle of expanded consumer 
demand fueling greater production, thereby creating more well-paying jobs and in turn 
more affluent consumers capable of stoking the economy with their purchases.
62
 
 
Historian Eric Rauchway has noted: “Consumption replaced production at the center of 
economic thought, and “[a]s the concept of the ‘consumer’ gained resonance in American 
politics, it became the basis of an almost universal political language.”63 Everyone’s duty could 
                                                 
61 
Ibid., 66. 
62 
Lizabeth Cohen, “A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America,” 236. 
63 
Eric Rauchway, “No Remedy Against This Consumption,” review of A Consumers’ Republic, by Lizabeth Cohen, 
Reviews in American History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sept. 2003), 450. 
6 
 
be defined, every policy could be framed, in terms of what it did for consumers and their ability 
to consume.
64
  
However, increased consumption by consumers was not a given. A great pent-up demand 
for consumer goods existed. Americans desired a plethora of goods after experiencing two 
decades of depression and rationing. But if a mass consumer economy helped the nation and its 
people prosper, Cohen argued that the experience of the WW II and the Depression caused 
Americans to hesitate before spending their savings and war bonds.
65
 Many continued to distrust 
banks, economic recovery, and non-essential spending. The federal government needed to build 
trust in the economy and enhance consumer spending. Historian Charles McGovern wrote that 
the “federal government abandoned price and production controls and made other, quieter 
commitments to enhance consumption. Government policies made consumption a ‘state project’ 
through programs that promoted private, family-centered consumption to enhance the economy 
and mange social conflict.”66  
The federal government intended to unleash pent-up purchasing and consumption 
through initiatives such as the G.I. Bill of Rights. The G.I. Bill passed Congress in 1944 and 
offered income tax deductions for mortgage payments to veterans and their families. It helped 
buyers by giving loan insurance to lenders and developers through the Federal Housing 
Administration. The G.I. Bill stimulated the purchase of houses and the many consumer products 
used to fill homes including televisions, barbeque grills, refrigerators, stoves, record players, 
chrome-leg tables, and backless stools. 
 The housing industry exploded. 25% of the homes that stood in America in 1960 had 
been constructed in the 1950s. During the Depression, by contrast, most Americans lived in 
apartments, flats, or small houses in the city. Suburban housing projects such as Levittown 
dominated the housing markets of the 1950s. William and Alfred Levitt organized the 
construction of 10,000 identical, prefabricated homes on a 1,200-acre plot in New York State, 
formerly occupied by potato fields. By 1960 62% of Americans owned homes.  
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The federal government constructed highways and roads that linked cities, made 
commuting reasonable, and helped transform farmland bordering cities into vast suburban tracts. 
The automobile industry grew to new proportions. In 1956 nearly seventy-five million cars and 
trucks were being driven on American roads.  
Economists began to use Gross National Product (GNP) as the primary indicator of a 
healthy national economy. In these terms, the United States thrived after WW II. From 1945 to 
1970 the United States’ GNP rose from $200 billion to $1.1 trillion. Historian Eric Foner wrote 
that “the 1950s represented the culmination of the long-term trend in which consumerism 
replaced economic independence and democratic participation as central definitions of American 
freedom.”67 Americans began to understand their definitive characteristics as consumption and 
abundance.  
Advocates of consumption-created abundance argued that consumption erased class 
divisions in many ways. It led all groups in society to intermingle in the centers of mass 
consumption, including shopping malls, sporting arenas, movie theaters, and musical concerts. In 
such places men and women, working- and middle-class people, those born in America and 
immigrants, all occupied the same space. Historian John Kasson points out that Coney Island, 
one of the definitive centers of American consumption and entertainment, drew people from all 
social classes and all ethnic backgrounds.
68
 Little attention was paid to the fact that 
commodification separated classes based on seating at stadiums and distanced affluent from poor 
Americans by locating malls nearer the suburbs. 
There is no doubt that consumption separated segments of the population based on their 
means and taste, but it brought people together by challenging many of traditional sources of 
authority that had divided the country in the past. Parents, family, class, community, religious 
leaders, and even managers in the workplace had separated Americans in the past. All lost a 
degree of power in the new consumer society. McGovern argues that “Leisure and play, youth 
and novelty, possession and accumulation, individuality and desire gained great influence in 
American life as cornerstones of the new culture.”69 Those advocating consumption argued that 
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it eliminated many obstacles to escaping poverty for poor people. Advocates of consumption 
argued that consumption made class lines less rigid and mobility more attainable.  
A consumer society was ostensibly more inclusive because every person could freely 
participate and benefit from it. Cohen writes: “For its promoters, this mass-consumption-driven 
economy held out the promise of political as well as economic democracy. Reconversion after 
World War II raised the hopes of Americans of many political persuasions and social positions 
that not only a more prosperous but also a more equitable and democratic American society.”70 
Politicians rarely tired of identifying as a key proof of America’s superiority over the Soviet 
Union the more democratic distribution of goods.  
Women constituted one group who had previously suffered poverty but who were 
included in the new consumer economy. Older forms of American freedom, democracy, and 
citizenship excluded women. Suffrage was denied to women until 1920 and lower wages 
compromised women’s economic independence throughout the twentieth century; but 
consumption included women in a way difficult to deny. In the 1950s women did 85% of the 
household spending, giving her a tremendous amount of power over the consumer economy. In 
1953, one advertiser claimed, “frozen and prepared meals offered housewives freedom from 
tedium, space, work, and their own inexperience.”71 By indulging her desires, the housewife 
helped the entire national economy and helped bring prosperity to all Americans. Purchasing 
dresses and make-up, appliances and shoes, Tupperware and cling-wrap, all propelled the 
economy, helped America prosper, and ensured that democracy triumphed over communism. 
Rauchway writes: “She had only to stoop—and rummage through her purse—to conquer.”72 An 
advertisement in Printer’s Ink concisely stated, “The proper study of mankind is man . . . but the 
proper study of markets is woman.”73  
A second, traditionally poor group who experienced inclusion in the consumer society of 
the 1950s was African Americans. To be sure, African Americans endured harsh exclusion 
because of Jim Crow laws, political disenfranchisement, and restrictive covenants that prevented 
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them from purchasing houses in certain neighborhoods. In 1957, a neighbor of the first black 
family to move into Levittown explained to a reporter from Life magazine: “He’s probably a 
nice guy, but every time I look at him I see $2,000 drop off the value of my house”74 Racial 
exclusion cloaked in the language of property rights would become the dominant form of 
segregation after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, but consumerism was an important 
area of freedom that could never be completely denied to African Americans in the postwar.
75
 
Even when whites attempted to block African Americans from the consumer society by deeming 
certain lunch counters, department stores, buses, and movie theaters as “whites only,” African 
American were able to create their own markets, albeit it smaller than those comprised of 
businesses owed by whites. “Buy black” campaigns existed throughout the postwar years and 
were intended to help black producers, store owners, and consumers.  
Historian Ann Douglas writes: “With material and political power out of reach, black 
New Yorkers chose culture as a palpably important form of politics.”76 African Americans 
helped create and took part in the thriving consumer economy through movies, music, fashion, 
and food. Local community markets arose in neighborhoods such as Harlem, Watts, the Bronx, 
and throughout the South. But African Americans also connected to and were included in the 
national consumer market through the production and consumption of music. Chuck Berry’s 
“Johnny B. Goode,” Chubby Checker’s “The Twist,” Fats Domino’s “Blueberry Hill,” and Little 
Richard’s “Good Golly Miss Molly” all sold a huge number of records throughout the country. 
Although some African Americans criticized such musical figures for “selling out” to white 
tastes, few could deny that the performers were included as part of the mass consumer society. 
The rise of rock ‘n’ roll also ushered in another group who experienced inclusion through 
consumption—youth.  A distinct “youth culture” developed in the 1950s. Teenagers purchased 
their own clothes, cosmetics, records, food, cars, and recreational equipment. McGovern writes: 
“Victorian culture had celebrated children for their innocence and purity, even as the idea of 
                                                 
74 
Quoted in Cohen, 357 
75
 Derek S. Hoff, “The Original Housing Crisis: Suburbanization, Segregation, and the State in Postwar America,” 
Reviews in American History, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 2008). 
76
 Ann Douglas, Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1995), 
17. 
10 
 
childhood as a separate stage of life had taken firm hold in the nineteenth century. In the 
consumer era, commentators began to see children as differing from adults through the precise 
qualities celebrated in the new leisure: energy, boundless enthusiasm, imagination.”77 Youth 
culture contained a plethora of new markets that connected children and teenagers to America’s 
consumer culture. Historian Jessie Bernard recorded that during the 1950s, teenagers spent $20 
million annually on lipstick, $25 million on deodorants, 9 million on home permanents, and $75 
million on music records.
78
 By 1960, nearly 11 million teenagers owned their own cars. 
Teenagers’ spending expanded the economy and helped the nation financially.  
In addition to women, African Americans, and teenagers, laborers experienced inclusion 
through consumption, too. Blue-collar laborers had historically earned less than white-collar 
workers in America. McGovern writes: “workers fashioned a critique of the uneven and 
inequitable distribution of goods and abundance that they endured under industrial capitalism. 
They demanded justice in wages and working conditions by claiming their rights to consumer 
goods and entertainment.”79 Cohen argues that from the 1930s on owners and workers agreed on 
slightly higher wages. Workers in the steel, meat-packing, and agricultural industries agreed to 
reduce strikes if the owners provided high enough wages to enable them to consume 
products.Workers enjoyed more money and the ability to consume while owners avoided larger 
labor disputes that could have ended in strikes.
80
 Historian Rudolph J. Vecoli contends: “They 
avidly embraced mass culture, since it provided an opportunity to participate in mainstream life 
in ways otherwise denied them.”81 In short, consumption in the 1950s muted labor disputes, 
raised workers’ wages, satisfied owners and managers, and helped the national economy.  
The major point is that there were reasons for Truman and Eisenhower to believe that 
consumption helped all Americans. The consumer society appeared inclusive, open to racial and 
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ethnic distinctiveness, beneficial to all, and America’s best chance for avoiding another 
depression. Accordingly, Truman, Eisenhower, and other policymakers in the federal 
government believed that there was no need to offer federal assistance directly to poor people. 
When on the presidential campaign trail in West Virginia in 1960, Nixon told Eisenhower that 
seventeen million people in America went to bed hungry every night. Nixon recalled that 
Eisenhower responded: “Now look, I go to bed hungry every night, but that’s because I’m on a 
diet. The doctor won’t let me eat any more.”82 
To the many people who had this old understanding of why poverty persisted that 
differed from what was to come in the 1960s, the poor did not possess cultural values that kept 
them in poverty. Rather they were the same as other Americans; they simply lacked money to 
consume. Direct aid was not needed. Widespread consumption would cure poverty. Policies to 
increase consumption did not expressly aim to change poor people’s culture or psychology; that 
goal only appeared in the anti-poverty programs of the 1960s.  
If consumption had the purpose of helping Americans win the Cold War domestically by 
strengthening the American economy through capitalism and of reducing the risk that 
communism would seem like a good idea, the reconstruction of Europe was intended to win the 
war in Europe. Governmental programs to combat poverty in Europe, including the Marshall 
Plan, relied on reconstructing buildings, factories, roads, railroads, and harbors that had been 
destroyed during WW II. Countries in Western Europe already had representative governments 
and skilled workers. Truman believed that avoiding economic depression and widespread 
poverty in Europe required only the rebuilding of structures that had made it possible to create 
and sustain prosperity in the past.  
Reconstruction was intimately linked to winning the Cold War. Truman feared that 
stagnant national economies created the conditions that led to the fall of representative 
governments and to the expansion of communism. In 1951 Truman tersely proclaimed that 
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“economic stagnation is the advance guard of Soviet conquest”83 and that the seeds of totalitarian 
regimes “spread and grow in the soil of poverty and discontent.”84  
On 5 June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a comprehensive plan 
to rebuild the economies of all European countries willing to allow democratic capitalist forms of 
reconstruction. In a speech at Harvard University, Marshall declared that the United States would 
contribute billions of dollars to finance the economic recovery of Europe.
85
 Marshall proclaimed: 
“Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, 
desperation, and chaos.”86 Historian Diane Kutz succinctly states that, “providing the seed 
money for the recovery of Western Europe, the Marshall Plan transformed its beneficiaries from 
poverty cases into partners.”87 
In line with Truman and Marshall’s logic, the European Economic Recovery Plan, or 
Marshall Plan, proposed that poverty created the conditions that weakened capitalism and 
strengthened the appeal of communism. To contain communism, the United States must end 
poverty in Europe.  
Kennedy and Johnson proposed that the culture of poverty could be solved only by 
transforming the individual poor person’s system of values. Only then could he or she seize 
opportunities to escape poverty and remain prosperous. The people must change, not the 
infrastructure. In short, contrary to what was possible to do in Europe with successful results, the 
construction elsewhere, or reconstruction, of factories, apartments, roads, and rail lines could not 
solve a people’s poverty.  
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Truman thought it could. His administration designed the Marshall Plan to do exactly 
that—to cure poverty by reconstructing structures important to the community. Truman argued 
that European poverty differed from that in Africa or on reservations of Native Americans in 
Arizona. European citizens already had the beneficial cultural values that enabled them to sustain 
prosperity; they only needed a limited amount of financial aid to return to their former financial 
success. By contrast, Kennedy and Johnson believed that all poverty was the same. Truman 
thought that many forms of poverty existed.  
Truman and Marshall contended that Europe had a distinct form of poverty created by the 
destruction of the economy in WW II. In 1945 and 1946, freezing British officials—experiencing 
some of the harshest winters in the twentieth century—worked without heat. Because 
transportation networks had been destroyed, bountiful coal supplies piled up at their sources. By 
1947 Britain had dropped from being the world’s biggest creditor to the world’s biggest debtor. 
Inflation ran rampant. In 1948 the price of wholesale goods in Austria stood 200% higher than 
before the war. In France the cost of wholesale goods was 1,820% higher than before WW II. 
Aerial bombing and heavy artillery had destroyed entire cities throughout Europe, creating 
thousands of displaced persons and refugees. Immobilized train cars froze on their destroyed 
tracks all over Europe. General Lucius Clay, the U.S. military commander in occupied Germany, 
“concluded that Germany’s predicament was truly appalling.”88 Allied bombing had destroyed 
around 25% of Germany’s urban housing. Germany’s gross national product (GNP) dropped by 
70%.  
European poverty could be cured by reconstructing the structures instrumental to 
restoring a thriving economy. Historian George Herring has stated: “The essential goal was to 
spark economic recovery and relieve the vast human suffering.”89 Under the assumption that 
human suffering caused by poverty led to communism, policymakers intended the Marshall Plan 
to stop the leftward drift of European politics. Socialist sentiment pervaded much of Europe both 
before and after WW II. Officials became concerned about this sentiment in the context of the 
Cold War. Policymakers such as Acheson feared that communism had gained even stronger 
                                                 
88 
Ibid., 163. 
89 
George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 618. 
14 
 
inroads in France and Italy after WW II. In November 1946, the Parti communiste français, 
France’s communist party, earned 28.3% of the vote and 182 seats in the newly created French 
Fourth Republic. Communist members of la résistance won more French respect for 
communism during WW II; national voting patterns suggested that the postwar economic 
tribulations increased the French attraction to communist solutions. Acheson feared that the 
French would democratically vote to install a communist government in their country. 
 The April 1948 elections in Italy to install the First Republican Parliament also revealed 
strong support for communist candidates. The Italian Communist Party, united with the Italian 
Socialist Party as the Popular Democratic Front Party, gained 31% of the vote and 183 seats. 
Truman, Acheson, and Marshall intended to use the European Economic Recovery Plan to end 
widespread poverty, thereby reducing the appeal of communism and containing the influence 
and spread of the Soviets. Prosperity was expected to ensure that representative governments 
friendly to democratic capitalism would survive. This goal was concisely captured in the 
Marshall Plan’s slogan, “Prosperity Makes You Free.”90 
The Marshall Plan achieved great success. By 1952 Western Europe’s aggregate GNP 
had risen 32 percent, agricultural production increased 11 percent above prewar levels, and 
industrial manufacturing stood 40 percent higher than in 1938. Most important for the policy of 
containment, none of the Western European countries had adopted communism. Kunz writes: 
“Fortunately, the fathers of the Marshall Plan had aimed their economic weapons at economic 
problems that were susceptible to an economic solution.”91 
The most important aspect was that the policymakers of the Marshall Plan never included 
changing Europeans’ cultural values as a prerequisite to ending poverty. It was taken as a given 
that the destruction of WW II alone had created the poor economic conditions. Values mattered 
little. In whole, the argument was that rebuilding structures could accomplish great and far-
reaching results, including unifying Western Europe, bolstering the United States’ economy, and 
preventing the spread of communism. The Truman administration did not believe that European 
poverty stemmed from values that handicapped people financially or that prosperity, when 
restored, would be difficult to sustain. In this regard, European poverty differed from American 
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poverty. Europe had physical destruction. Americans lacked consumption that—through the 
multiplier effect—would introduce prosperity all over the country and to all segments of the 
population. 
European poverty after WW II also differed from poverty in the Third World. European 
poverty could be remedied by rebuilding previously existing structures. Poverty in the Third 
World required building structures that had never existed. In short, the United States helped to 
reconstruct Europe, but had to develop and fully industrialize the Third World.  
Although Truman gave priority to European poverty, he considered ending poverty in the 
Third World as a vital step in containing communism. In his inaugural address on January 20, 
1949, he announced “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”92 
Introduced as the fourth policy Truman intended to follow in foreign relations during his second 
term, it eventually became known as the “Point Four Program.”93 It signaled the first time that U. 
S. policymakers championed the economic development of the Third World as a strategy within 
the Cold War.  
In line with the logic of containment and the Marshall Plan, the policymakers of Point 
Four, including Truman, Dean Acheson, and the U.S. ambassador to India from 1951 to 1953, 
Chester Bowles, assumed that prosperity supported democracy and conversely that economic 
stagnation threatened it. Like Truman and Eisenhower in developing consumption-stimulating 
policies in America, Acheson, and Bowles based their theory about the development of the Third 
World on the economic ideas of Keynes. Within the context of the Third World, Keynes argued, 
government spending in agriculture, education, and health would stimulate and improve the 
economy. All projects within Point Four focused on improvement in each of these areas to lay 
the foundation for industrialization—which they considered to be the goal of development. 
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Truman intended the Point Four Program simultaneously to bring prosperity to the entire 
Free World while preventing “unstable” countries from becoming communist. The policymakers 
of Point Four assumed that political instability resulted from a lack of industrialization and 
economic prosperity. They argued that all countries of the world could and should become 
industrialized. They believed that unindustrialized and economically stagnant societies were at 
risk of turning to communist methods to stimulate development and economic growth. In his 
1951 State of the Union Address, Truman declared that “[communists] deliberately try to prevent 
[capitalist] economic improvement,” persuading stagnant countries that only communist methods 
were able to spur their economy.
94
 Convinced that Germany’s interwar economic tribulations 
caused World War II, both Truman and Acheson believed that economic stagnation was the 
principal cause of war. Acheson articulated the program’s aim as the “use of material means to a 
non-material end.”95 He thought that global peace and democracy could be achieved if the 
United States successfully used the Point Four Program to spur economic improvement, raise the 
standard of living, and end poverty within Third World nations.  
The policymakers of Point Four envisioned three types of objectives—foundational, 
economic, and strategic. Foundational efforts, in concert with Keynesian economics, included 
technical assistance to improve the quality of food, health, and education in a given Third World 
nation. American experts would provide the training and education so that workers could 
effectively build modern structures and manage modern techniques and operations. These efforts 
would lay the base for industrialization, leading to the policymakers’ second objective, economic 
progress. Economic progress meant augmenting industrial production and maintaining global 
free trade for the benefit of all participating countries. The improved economies and increased 
global cohesion through augmented trade would in turn strengthen the non-communist world. 
Finally, strategic efforts included securing democratic governments, especially those in countries 
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with raw materials vital for military or security purposes, and containing the spread of 
communism.
96
  
In order to avoid charges of imperialism, the original Point Four procedure did not seek 
out recipient countries but required them to request assistance. The Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA)—one of the agencies within the State Department that administered the 
program—instructed countries to submit requests for assistance to the State Department in 
Washington D.C.
97
 Upon receiving the request, the TCA staff in Washington evaluated the 
request’s feasibility, Point Four’s budget, and the capability of the technicians who worked for 
the program. If the staff accepted an original or modified request, it then secured and transferred 
the qualified personnel. The TCA paid the technicians’ salaries and a small portion of the 
project’s cost. The State Department required recipient countries to finance the remaining cost, 
gradually assuming the entire financial burden in subsequent years.  
Activities varied widely from exhibitions to expose the Bolivians to the current literature 
on growing corn in their region and projects meant to offer an elementary-level education to 
Iranians living in rural areas to building a medical school in Burma and demonstrating the way in 
which to use DDT to kill Anopheles mosquitoes and control malaria in Indonesia.
98
 Typically 
each project focused on a single field, such as education or agriculture. 
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Bowles administered and shaped the newly-created Point Four Program in India. He 
enthusiastically championed economic development as the best method to end poverty and 
maintain a democratic and friendly India. He distanced himself from the more military-oriented 
policy set forth by National Security Council in NSC-68, which Truman approved in June 1950. 
Whereas NSC-68 outlined a policy to contain the spread of communism, enforced by the 
military, Bowles advocated a policy stressing the economic development of the Third World. 
Bowles declared that it was time “for Point Four, in Asia, Africa, and South America to become 
Point One, to rank equally with our program for military defense.”99 Bowles believed that only 
economic development and an end to poverty could provide a solid foundation on which to build 
lasting amicable relations.
100
  
Bowles created a program in India unlike any other project of Point Four. His method 
differed from that used in other Point Four projects because he combined agriculture, education, 
and health improvement into one integrated approach known as a community development 
project. Bowles derived the idea from Dr. James Y. C. Yen, a Chinese citizen and Yale graduate. 
Dr. Yen had discovered, as Bowles put it, “that far more could be accomplished in each of these 
fields if these three workers (food, health, and education) went as a team, entering the villages 
together and developing a broad, coordinated development program.”101  
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The community-development concept reappeared in the 1960s in the Peace Corps, War 
on Poverty, and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). Roy Hoopes, an author and Peace 
Corps volunteer, estimates that about 25 percent of all Peace Corps volunteers worked on 
community development assignments.
102
 Volunteers working on community development 
assignments in the Peace Corps and VISTA were instructed to promote modernization at the 
town or village level, help the local population recognize a common need, coordinate collective 
action, and help the people complete self-help tasks.  
Community development models unified anti-poverty efforts within the United States and 
abroad in the 1960s. The appearance of the model at home and abroad revealed not only the 
influence between foreign and domestic but also that the two areas relied on the same logic and 
assumptions about the cause of and cure for poverty. In short, both volunteers from the Peace 
Corps and VISTA used community development for the same reasons. Both viewed poverty as 
the result of cultural values (e.g., desire for instant gratification, fatalism, and fear of change) and 
believed that community development could best introduce a new value system. Both people in 
Lima’s barrios and those in Montana’s rural expanses could learn to plan for the future, take 
initiative, gain motivation, trust in a better future, and seize economic opportunities. The primary 
goal of community development in the Peace Corps and VISTA was the same -- to change 
people’s cultural values. 
Yet the logic of how community development alleviated poverty in the 1960s differed 
sharply from community development projects in the 1940s and 1950s under the Point Four 
Program. Later in the 1950s Bowles wrote books that included sections about the fact that 
cultural values could either accelerate or hinder economic development. He wrote about the fact 
that programs such as Point Four could reform deleterious cultural values and take advantage of 
values that helped develop foreign economies. However, Bowles, during the Truman 
administration, did not address the impact of cultural values on development or the impact of 
programs on cultural values. He exclusively focused on the economic considerations while 
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administering projects of community development under Point Four in India.
103
 From 1951 to 
1953 he did not consider cultural values to be the cause of poverty. Nor did he consider changing 
those cultural values as the avenue out of poverty. He considered economic development—in the 
form of improvement in agriculture, education, and health—to be the only remedy for poverty. 
Bowles’ projects for community development in India revealed that the understanding of poverty 
and ways to alleviate it differed markedly between the early 1950s and the 1960s.  
Bowles’s opportunity to apply his theory came on January 5, 1952, when Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Truman signed the Indo-American Technical Agreement, approving the Community 
Development Program (CDP).
104
  The Community Development Program divided India into 
regional units, to be developed independently. Each area included between 150,000 and 300,000 
people and centered on a central town of 5,000 to 10,000 people that acted as a nucleus. The 
central town housed an administrative headquarters, a hospital, and a center for agricultural, 
educational, and health improvement. Each center employed around 125 Indian workers and 
housed a rotating group of about three to five American experts with various specialties, paid for 
by the State Department. As a way to replicate America’s development, Bowles ordered the 
construction of roads and telecommunication systems linking the entire development area to the 
central town. On 2 October 1952, fifty-five community development projects were launched 
covering 17,000 villages and nearly 11 million people.
105
 
Bowles viewed economic improvement in agriculture, education, and health and 
sanitation—spurred by investment from the U. S. government and facilitated by technical 
assistance—as the first steps in the modernization process. He believed that the second stage 
would consist of industrialization. The Indo-American agreement itself stated that Community 
Development was “to lay the proper foundation for the industrial and general economic 
development of the country.”106 As Acheson stated in a memorandum to Truman on 14 March 
1949, “In those areas where economic life is primitive and stagnant, a basic improvement in 
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health and education may well be prerequisite to increased production and improved standards of 
living.”107 In Bowles’s mind, as improvement in each area occurred, industrialization would start 
at the local level.  
Given sufficient time and money, Truman and Bowles believed, the Point Four Program 
could strengthen Third World economies. However, the initial objectives of the program were 
limited because it was a small self-help program. Policymakers agreed that a substantial amount 
of investment in agriculture, education, and health and sanitation would accelerate Third World 
nations toward industrialization; but they also recognized that both the United States’ financial 
resources and the unindustrialized nations’ absorptive capacity, or ability to use financial aid to 
good effect, were limited.
108
  
Bowles’s community development projects in India had been in operation for only three 
months when Eisenhower took office in January 1953. The ascendency of an administration 
more conservative than Truman’s put Bowles on the defensive. Eisenhower believed that foreign 
aid cost money that could be used to help Americans domestically. In June 1953, Eisenhower 
terminated the Point Four Program. Throughout his first term, Eisenhower called for a balanced 
budget and an end to foreign aid programs that he considered expensive. Eisenhower claimed 
that “it is not easy to convince an overwhelming majority of free people, everywhere, that they 
should pull in their belts, endure marked recessions in living standards, in order that we may at 
one and the same time develop backward countries and relieve starvation.”109  
During his first four years as president, Eisenhower rejected programs of development in 
favor of his “New Look” policy. His version of containment emphasized nuclear competition, 
alliance building, covert operations, and psychological warfare.
110
 Eisenhower believed that it 
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was necessary to reduce governmental spending in order to avoid inflation and to sustain 
America’s high standard of living. Eisenhower thought that, because both domestic and 
international expenditures came out of the same national budget, spending money abroad would 
automatically reduce the money spent domestically. In this way, spending money internationally 
would hurt America domestically. Because he gave a low priority to military spending—in his 
final address as President he even warned Americans about the way in which such military 
spending could damage the American economy and create a military-industrial complex—
Eisenhower assigned even less importance to programs aimed to develop the Third World. He 
claimed that such programs “could alter the very nature of American society, either through the 
debilitating effects of inflation or through regimentation in the form of economic controls.”111 
Gaddis has argued that Eisenhower believed that a costly defense strategy, which included 
programs to develop the Third World, ran the risk of ruining the sole thing it was meant to 
sustain: the American way of life.
112
 In short, Eisenhower valued domestic consumption over 
international development.  
Eisenhower linked foreign and domestic in a way different from Kennedy and Johnson 
the 1960s. He believed that foreign and domestic poverty differed. Also, helping one was 
thought to limit the success of the other. In the 1960s Kennedy and Johnson viewed foreign and 
domestic poverty as intimately linked. The conditions that caused a person to be poor was the 
same at home and abroad.  
The community-development approach that existed under Point Four also demonstrated 
that the way in which the programs were conducted varied from country to country. 
Policymakers understood the origins of poverty and the ways to end it differently depending on 
where they encountered it. They aimed to promote consumption in America, reconstruction in 
Europe, and development in the Third World. In short, three forms of anti-poverty programs 
existed during Truman’s and Eisenhower’s administrations. None of the approaches unified 
foreign and domestic poverty. All three—consumption, reconstruction, and economic 
development—also differed from anti-poverty programs in the 1960s. According to the 
policymakers of the 1940s and 1950s, enhancing consumption in America, reconstruction in 
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Europe, and development in the Third World, did not require a transformation in cultural values. 
Increasing Americans’ consumption required expansion and distribution of domestic products, 
European reconstruction required the construction of buildings and infrastructure, and 
development in the Third World required increased agricultural and industrial production. None 
included provisions that addressed cultural values. In the 1960s, such provisions formed the 
foundation of the Peace Corps, VISTA, Job Corps, Alliance for Progress, Head Start, and 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD). The attention to the cultural and 
psychological dimensions of poverty made anti-poverty programs of the 1960s distinct. Attention 
to cultural and psychological dimension also unified approaches to foreign and domestic poverty 
in ways never before considered in American history. Social scientists in the 1960s viewed anti-
poverty programs of the 1950s as addressing only the surface of deprivation without 
contemplating the deep forces that created and sustained poverty around the world. Programs in 
the 1950s viewed poverty as a temporary problem that could be overcome; programs during the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations deemed poverty to be a pervasive, multi-generational, and 
entrenched worldview.  
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Chapter 2 - “The Major Role Played by Culture in Determining 
Behavior”: The Triumph of Culture in the Social Sciences 
In late 1940s and 1950s several major fields in the social sciences, including 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, and economics, experienced intellectual shifts. These 
shifts resulted in new understandings of what accounted for cultural, social, and economic 
difference throughout the world. Together, social scientists with these new understandings 
provided an explanation for why poor people differed from the rich, juvenile delinquents differed 
from law-abiding youth, and why the Third World relied on agricultural economies while the 
Western World created and sustained industrialization. Experts in each field revised previous 
theories by demonstrating the role of culture in shaping people’s behavior and countries’ 
economies. The cultural understanding of difference made possible the paradigm shift initiated 
by President John F. Kennedy. Social scientists made it possible to conceive of all poor people 
around the world as suffering from the same debilitating cultural values by providing a universal 
criterion to evaluate and explain their condition. Insurmountable biology or economics no longer 
divided people and made change impossible. Culture equally impacted a rich man in London and 
a poor girl in Lima. Both could be evaluated, changed, and measured using the same criterion of 
culture.  
The new theories also formed the foundation of anti-poverty programs and programs to 
develop the Third World in the early 1960s, notably the Peace Corps, Mobilization for Youth, 
and Gray Areas Program. The paradigm shift initiated by Kennedy unified these programs. It 
unified their policymakers’ understanding of the problem they faced and the approach to its 
solution.  
In the 1950s Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict led the field of anthropology to embrace 
the theory that culture shapes personality. Mead and Benedict argued that the given culture of a 
society determined each member’s values, behaviors, attitudes, and aspirations. A woman might 
value her extended family, show deference to her grandmother to behave properly, and aspire to 
work on the family farm. Conversely, a woman in a different cultural environment might value 
her immediate family only, move across the country to attend school, and aspire to be the CEO 
of a major business. In short, culture, not biology or race, accounted for difference in the world. 
Within psychology, Erik Erikson developed a highly influential theory that attributed the 
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development of the personality to psycho-social factors, such as parenting style and peer 
influence. Erikson’s theory explained how parents socialize their children to the culture of 
poverty. Within the field of sociology, Albert Cohen, Walter B. Miller, Richard Cloward, and 
Lloyd Ohlin proposed that subcultures existed that differed from America’s mainstream culture 
and led to negative behavior, such as gang violence and poor educational achievement. Later, in 
the 1960s, their theory of subcultures would support the idea of a tenacious self-sustaining 
culture of poverty—with values that prevented an escape from poverty and that existed separate 
from America’s middle- or upper-class culture. Sociologists’ studies of juvenile delinquency also 
influenced the War on Poverty by asserting that subcultures developed when blockages to 
opportunity prevented groups of people from succeeding in life and forced them to adapt to a life 
of poverty. Finally, an interdisciplinary theory of Third World development, known as 
modernization theory, developed and proposed that the underdevelopment of the Third World 
stemmed from traditional cultural values that conflicted with modern industrialization. In short, 
when a country industrialized, the institutions of the society mattered less than the attitudes and 
values of its people toward areas including education, work, change, and planning.   
Mead’s and Benedict’s concept—that cultural values and specific personalities accounted 
for nations’ present states of development and their individuals’ behavior—challenged previous 
intellectuals’ arguments based on biology. Scholars’ explanations in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries often relied on the concept of Social Darwinism.
113
 British philosopher 
Herbert Spencer was the chief proponent of Social Darwinism. Born in 1820 and influenced by 
Sir Charles Lyell’s discussion of million-year-old fossils in Principles of Geology (1830), 
Spencer sought a way to understand the development of humans from the ancient past to the 
present.
114
 After reading Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), Spencer published 
the Principles of Biology (1864) in which he applied Darwinism to human societies. In his book, 
Spencer coined the term “survival of the fittest” and proposed that by studying human biology he 
could explain the transformation from earlier forms of life to present-day humans.
115
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Accordingly, Spencer argued that people, as biological organisms, acted based on their physical 
make-up with little ability to overcome their genetic inheritance. Spencer’s understanding of 
humans led him to an uncompromising position toward the poor. He claimed: “The whole effort 
of nature is to get rid of such, to clear the world of them, and make room for better.”116 
Expanding on his opinion of the poor, Spencer contended that the differences among nations 
resulted from a struggle in which the strongest survived and the weak perished. Accordingly, 
Spencer advocated European imperialism over non-Western nations as the inevitable result of 
biologically based superiority. To Spencer, the economic development of non-Western nations 
was futile because their biology would always prevent success.  
Other scholars proposed theories based on biology that resembled Spencer’s Social 
Darwinism. In his Essay on the Inequality of Human Races (1854-1856), French noblemen 
Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau argued that race completely determined each human’s 
potential.
117
 He advocated the scientific measurement of physical characteristics such as skin 
color, bone structure, nose shape, and cranial capacity to determine the corporal dimensions that 
produced races he deemed superior. He explained that Europeans’ biology made them 
“intelligent, noble, and morally superior,” Africans were “unintelligent and lazy,” Asians “smart 
but docile,” and Native Americas were “dull and arrogant.”118 Gobineau claimed that biology 
and race were innate and ineradicable.  
Spencer’s biologically based theory of the survival of the fittest influenced Americans as 
well. William Graham Sumner, an American academic and the first professor of sociology at 
Yale, discussed the importance of struggle in laissez-faire economics, business competition, and 
immigration in industrial society. Throughout the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s, he contended that the 
white race’s triumph in the global struggle over colonization, imperialism, national expansion, 
and industrialization revealed that whites were biologically more “fit” than the “degenerate” 
races of other colors.
119
 Because biology, race, and evolution changed only gradually, Sumner 
proposed that the current state of the world occurred naturally and could not be altered in the 
short-term.  
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Spencer’s biologically based theory influenced some Europeans and Americans. 
However, over time, others came to dispute that biology determined the relative success or 
failure of humans and their societies. In 1904 and 1905 German sociologist Max Weber 
published a series of articles that were gathered into a book called The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism. Weber argued that humans cannot be studied with scientific tests in the 
same way that scientists examine the biology of animals and environmental occurrences in 
nature. He claimed: “While we can ‘explain’ natural occurrences in terms of the application of 
causal laws, human conduct is intrinsically meaningful, and has to be ‘interpreted’ or 
‘understood’ in a way which has no counterpart in nature.”120 In Weber’s opinion cultural and 
psychological matters influenced the world more than biology and economics.  
 He proposed that successful industrialization in Europe stemmed less from the biology 
of the continent’s inhabitants than from the cultural values of its people. Weber described those 
cultural values as the Protestant Ethic. According to historian Peter Watson, the Protestant Ethic, 
dating back to the Reformation, holds the “idea that the highest form of moral obligation of the 
individual, the best way to fulfill his duty to God, is to help his fellow men, now, in this 
world.”121 Although people all over the world throughout history have wanted to be rich, Weber 
claimed that only Protestants viewed helping others through a sober, industrious career as 
morally sanctioned and religiously virtuous. The Protestant Ethic inspired adherents to diligently 
work, reinvest accumulated profits in additional capital, and to help others through private 
initiative. Accordingly, the cultural values of the Protestant Ethic led to industrialization in 
Europe. In short, cultural factors rather than economic conditions or biology explained the 
emergence of capitalism, and they were the reason for the Industrial Revolution in Europe and 
Europeans’ successful imperialism around the world.  
In 1899, American Thorstein Veblen contributed to the view that cultural values 
determined the condition of individuals and nations with the publication of The Theory of the 
Leisure Class. Rather than biology or economic conditions, Veblen viewed cultural values such 
as pride in workmanship and physical industriousness as the sources of industrialization in 
America. Despite the benefits afforded by such cultural values, Veblen contended that the 
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resulting “money culture” in America contained the seeds that could eventually destroy 
American industry.
122
 Veblen identified “conspicuous consumption” and “pecuniary culture” as 
threats to American industry because each subtracted from the frugality and physical 
industriousness that originally helped start industrialization in America. Now, he contended, the 
conservative values of the upper class intended to preserve their wealth and social standing 
threatened to arrest further industrialization by blocking innovation that could lead the rich to 
lose their coveted position. Furthermore, those people aspiring to be wealthy would adopt the 
rich’s conservative values and lose the initiative that could help propel industrial innovation. 
Accordingly, Veblen viewed poverty and affluence as the result of cultural values, but feared that 
that same culture could hold the seeds to its own destruction.  
Weber and Veblen influenced anthropologists who were forming their intellectual 
positions in the early twentieth century. Arguably the most significant among those who were 
influenced by Weber and Veblen were Franz Boas, Benedict, and Mead. Started by the work of 
Boas, the culture and personality school, sometimes referred to as psychological anthropology, 
challenged biology-based theories by showing the way in which cultural values shaped societies 
and individuals. Boas, Mead, and Benedict all wrote accounts of “primitive” societies and 
cultures in order to show that diversity in people’s cultural environment accounted for 
differences in behavior. Boas studied the Pacific Northwest, Mead examined Samoa, and 
Benedict looked at Pueblo tribes in the American Southwest. Watson writes: “The aim of Boas, 
Benedict, and Mead was to put beyond doubt the major role played by culture in determining 
behavior and to argue against the predominating place of biology.”123 Watson continues that 
Boas’s book The Mind of Primitive Man (1911) “made clear his loathing of nineteenth-century 
ideas that took for granted the inherent superiority of white westerners.”124 Watson claims that 
Boas considered anthropology “a giant rescue operation to show the importance of culture”125  
Boas, Benedict, and Mead contended that societies were not better or worse, simply 
different based on their cultural values. Mead, Benedict, and Boas challenged Herbert Spencer’s 
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theory of Social Darwinism in which he claimed that a given country’s success or failure 
stemmed from the biology or race of its citizens. Born into a distinct race, non-Western people 
had little chance of overcoming their biology and achieving the level of civilization experienced 
in Europe and the United States. Mead, Benedict, and Boas disputed that biology determined the 
ultimate success or failure of anyone. They emphasized the need to examine the local cultural 
context and to abandon theories that credited certain groups of humans with superior biological 
characteristics. Pueblos might emphasize restraint, the Japanese obedience, Americans 
achievement, and Indians hierarchy; but one is not necessarily better than the other. In certain 
circumstances each has value. Japanese obedience and Indian hierarchy might provide better 
social stability than American achievement, but achievement may more likely lead to innovation. 
Makers of policy in the War on Poverty would use similar logic to identify certain cultural values 
suited to upward economic mobility and other values that sacrificed a professional and 
productive life and that trapped people in poverty.  
Psychologist Philip Bock contends that “Margaret Mead must be considered the major 
figure in the culture and personality school.”126 Mead was internationally known for her work on 
Samoa and she served as the curator at the American Museum of Natural History from 1946 to 
1969. Mead’s advancement came in putting forth a dynamic model of cultural processes that 
explained the way in which cultural patterning and expectations shape behavior. Her explanation 
would be used by liberal policymakers in the 1960s when they discussed the culture of poverty—
with values such as immediate gratification, a lack of future planning, a low priority given to 
education—developed in an environment of poverty and then was passed down to children.  
Mead discussed the way in which a child’s social interaction with his or her parents and 
peers passed down cultural values and determined his or her personality. Social interaction 
determined a person’s expectations of what his or her role should be in the community and 
shaped his or her actions to achieve that role. Actions that led to punishment would be avoided, 
such as disobeying filial piety in Japan. Actions that were rewarded would be repeated, such as 
sharing with others in British culture. In short, expectations of rewards and reprimands shaped 
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behavior. A person’s biological makeup or economic situation did not determine how he or she 
acted; social interactions and cultural expectations did.  
Mead famously stated that adolescence does not necessarily need to be full of anxiety and 
stress. No biological reason existed for humans to experience stress during those years. Rather, it 
was the specific turn in Westerners’ cultural values that caused the stress. Western society 
requires at that time that adolescents choose a career that will determine the remainder of their 
lives. This cultural expectation created stress and anxiety, not changes in the teenagers’ bodies. 
Mead demonstrated that, by contrast, in Samoan society adolescence was a time of ease and 
relaxation.  
Mead further explained her theory in a film entitled Four Families. The National Film 
Board of Canada released the film in 1950. Written and produced by Ian MacNeill, the film was 
intended to examine the way in which various cultures’ style of childrearing created distinct 
personalities with behaviors, attitudes, and aspirations that manifested in nations’ adults. 
MacNeill asked: “Does the way a baby gets its bath affect his character when he grows up? 
Making him too timid or aggressive? Can we take that a step further? Is the way a nation treats 
its children reflected in the national character of that nation, making it too timid or too 
aggressive? Or is it fair even to talk about national character?”127 MacNeill interviewed Mead 
throughout the film and relied on her insights to answer his questions.  
In the opening sequence of Four Families Mead explains: 
Human beings are born with the ability to be a member of any society. Be it an Eskimo, 
or a Russian, or a Hottentot, or Japanese, or a Frenchmen, or Canadian. At birth, they are 
equally able to be any type of person. It depends on the way they are trained or taught, 
loved and punished, whether they turn into one type of person or another. So if we make 
a study of this. To find out the steps by which each baby becomes one type of grown-up 
person instead of another, we learn a great deal about it. But still the details of a bath, or 
the way the baby is fed, the way it’s punished or rewarded, gives us a great many clues 
about the way character is formed.
128
 
 
In Four Families, MacNeill used footage of families’ childrearing styles in four nations, 
India, France, Japan, and Canada. Through the footage and discussions with Mead, he intended 
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to uncover the way in which different childrearing styles created distinct personalities, ultimately 
determining the nation’s economic structure, political system, and social relations.  
First Mead discussed the way in which an Indian mother gave her baby a bath. Mead 
claimed that the “mother was warm, took great care of the baby, but somehow didn’t expect the 
baby to respond to her movements. She did things to it and for it. And it remained rather 
passive.”129 Based on her observations of the bath, Mead suggested that adult Indians maintained 
the same relationship with the Indian government. They remained passive, waiting for policies to 
be done to them rather than independently and actively working to change their situation. Next, 
MacNeill and Mead observed a French family. Mead pointed out the French family’s “emphasis 
on food, and the delights of eating and drinking, and later talking, [are] combined with a pattern 
of living in which the children are led to carry out obediently and precisely.”130 She ascertains 
that this fascination with activities that involve the child’s mouth are directly responsible for why 
adult Frenchmen and Frenchwomen possess superior oratory skills and a refined sense of taste 
for fine foods. Third, the Japanese family displayed an “alternation between discipline and 
indulgence” where the boy adhered to Spartan discipline at school but leniency at home.131  In 
Japanese adults, this treatment manifested in a strong sense of duty and yielding to command, 
but also in a desire for impulse in private life. Lastly, in Canada Mead saw a “great deal of 
interest in the children being active, independent, self-reliant, learning not to show pain. Not to 
expect a lot of indulgence [and to] respect each other rights.”132 She identifies these tendencies in 
childrearing to account for the same characteristics in Canadian adults. 
Mead’s contention that cultural values shape children’s personalities, thereby creating 
characteristics in adults that are responsible for the nations’ economic structure, political system, 
and social relations, presages an understanding and approach that would become of major 
importance to American liberal policymakers during the rediscovery of domestic poverty in the 
1960s and the economic development of Third World nations during the Cold War. Mead and 
the school of culture and personality within postwar anthropology influenced several American 
liberals who began to understand the economic status of people and groups as being rooted in 
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their cultural values and personality rather than in biology, economic condition, or political 
system.  
Those who addressed poverty in the 1960s used Mead’s theories in a way that she never 
intended.  Mead asserted that a researcher could compare cultures, but that all cultures must be 
understood based on their local context.
133
 A researcher cannot equally apply oedipal fantasies, 
rejecting mothers, castration fears, initiatory rites, inner directedness, or mesomorphic emphases 
to all cultures.
134
 A cultural value such as aggressiveness may be a strength in a competitive, 
individualistic society while a liability in a communal society. Men and women in the 1960s 
directly judged cultures as bad—the culture of poverty—or good without considering the local 
context.  More, Mead argued that there should never be a single model used to evaluate all 
people around the world.  Social Darwinists had done that using biological categories. Men and 
women who addressed poverty in the 1960s argued that all societies could be understood based 
on a single set of criteria. That is, based on a search for certain values, a single culture of poverty 
could be found in all societies around the world.  
 In addition to anthropology, psychologists in postwar period began to embrace a cultural 
understanding of psychological development. Mead earned a Master’s degree in psychology in 
1925. She argued in her thesis that Italian-American children’s cultural and linguistic differences 
explained their lower scores on intelligence tests. Mead continued to use psychological insights 
in her work on anthropology. Her most influential book was Coming of Age in Samoa: A 
Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization (1928).
135
 Anthropologists 
embraced insights from psychology and psychologists embraced anthropological insights. 
Watson claimed that by the late 1940s an international network of psychologists and 
anthropologists had formed including Mead, Benedict, Boas, Erik Erikson, Geoffrey Gorer, 
Gregory Bateson, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Meyer Fortes.
136
 Throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s psychologists regularly encountered anthropologists’ insights in articles published in the 
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Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, the American Journal of Psychiatry, and Character 
and Personality.
137
  
Erik Erickson was arguably the most influential psychologist in postwar America. He 
incorporated anthropological insights into his work and proposed a cultural understanding of 
how personality developed. Historian David Hollinger notes: “Never was psychoanalysis more 
popular among educated Americans than in the twenty years after World War II, and no 
psychoanalyst won a greater following during that era than Erik Erikson.”138 Sociologist Robert 
Bellah confirmed that view: “If there is one book you can be sure undergraduates have read, it is 
Erikson’s first one. You can’t always be sure that they’ve read Shakespeare, but you know 
they’ve read Erikson.”139  
Bellah was referring to Erikson’s first book, Childhood and Society.140 Erikson’s book 
came out the same year as Mead’s Four Families. Mead and Erikson discussed their work with 
each other often.
141
 Mead’s insights provided Erikson with a way in which to explain how 
personalities develop from their surrounding cultures. Erikson argued that a child’s cultural 
environment, including the style of parenting he or she experienced and the influence of peers, 
determined who the child would become as an adult. Social and cultural influences would shape 
the child’s personality, including his or her values, behavior, aspirations, and expectations. For 
example, a child who had a disciplinarian for a father might be forced to submit to harsh and 
capricious discipline, experience affectional deprivation, and suffer from feelings of rejection. 
He or she might develop hostility and aggression, which, if poorly channeled, could lead to 
hatred toward the world and the people in it. He or she might never develop the ability to openly 
share feelings, negotiate solutions with others, or benevolently solve a social problem. 
Conversely, Erikson explained, a different child with a disciplinarian for a father might develop 
the opposite personality. He or she might end up becoming an adult who valued compromise and 
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tolerance. He or she might not be inclined toward harshness and discipline toward his or her own 
offspring. Erikson’s point was that parents’ style of childrearing shaped the attitudes and 
behavior of their child throughout the rest of his or her life. The personality that resulted from 
specific childrearing styles could not be exactly predicted, but Erikson was sure that biology was 
not responsible.  
Social scientists and makers of policy working on poverty in the 1960s used Erikson’s 
insights to understand the way in which parents and peers acculturated children into the culture 
of poverty. His theories helped to explain the mechanism by which the culture of poverty passed 
down from generation to generation. In short, how the children of people in the culture of 
poverty could learn from their parents to distrust authority, value immediate gratification, seek 
personal gain over community needs, find planning for the future useless, doubt the value of 
education, and seek illegal routes to get money rather than follow lawful measures.  
But, like Mead, Erikson had to overturn the prevailing theories that relied on biology to 
explain personality. Between about 1920 and 1950 the debate among psychologists whether 
biological makeup or cultural values accounted for each individual’s personality reached an 
unprecedented level. Historian Richard Pells explains that psychology as a discipline attained a 
higher degree of authority in the decades immediately following WW II than at any previous 
time in American history.
142
 Intellectuals and lay people alike trusted psychologists to explain 
behavior and action. In a way similar to the way in which the leading theories of development 
moved from the biologically based theories of Spencer, Gobineau, and Sumner to the culturally 
based theories of Weber, Veblen, Boas, Benedict, and Mead, the most influential theories in 
psychology explaining personality progressed from being biologically based before WW II to 
being culturally based after WW II.  
One of the chief proponents of the influence of biology in psychology was Sigmund 
Freud. Freud, the most influential psychologist in America before WW II according to historian 
Ellen Herman, claimed that biology explained human behavior.
143
 Psychologist David 
McClelland—who would be an influential expert in the Peace Corps—pointed out that “Freud 
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himself started out as a biologist and would, according to [serologist Hans] Sachs, have been a 
great research worker in this field, had his interest not turned to psychology.”144  
Freud asserted that humans’ most powerful internal drives came from the biological 
instincts of sex and aggression. Freud dismissed the cultural and social impacts of personality as 
“latent,” and instead focused on biological drives. Freud called the source of the most primal and 
original of the biological drives the Id. Synonymous with untamed, raw animal instinct, the Id 
sought total physical gratification regardless of social and cultural circumstances. He 
acknowledged that humans did not simply conduct themselves like ferocious animals; people had 
internalized social and moral codes (which he named the Superego) that restricted humans’ 
biological drive. The world served as the battleground between the Id and Superego, in which the 
Ego (somewhere between the Id and Superego) attempted to mediate the two. Accordingly, 
Freud saw humans’ inner biological drives and the attempt to control them as the basis of 
psychology. He claimed: “Psychoanalysis is the instrument destined for the progressive conquest 
of the Id.”145  He also viewed the attempt to control the Id as the rationale for people’s behavior 
and the basis for explaining their personality. Freud’s theory about stages of psychosexual 
development—including the stages of oral, anal, phallic, and genital—depended completely on a 
biological understanding of humans.
146
 
Although Erikson was Freud’s last pupil in Vienna, Erikson remained unconvinced by his 
biological explanation that the Id accounted for some part of a person’s behavior. After WW II, 
Erikson used Mead’s insights to put forth a systematic theory of how personalities develop from 
infancy to adulthood.  
Like Freud, Erikson developed universal normative stages of childhood development 
which some children timely met, thus maintaining “normal” development, while others fell 
behind. Erikson expanded Freud’s five-stage theory of psychosexual development into an eight-
stage psychosocial theory of personality development. Mead’s influence on Erikson led him to 
emphasize the larger social and cultural forces, as well as the deeper psychological pressures, 
that children faced when growing up and trying to adapt to the world in which they lived. In each 
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of his eight stages, he outlined conflicts that all humans must face. Children confronted the 
issues of “trust vs. mistrust,” “autonomy vs. shame,” “initiative vs. guilt,” and “industry vs. 
inferiority.”147 Adolescence dealt with “identity vs. diffusion.”148 Finally, as adults, humans 
faced “intimacy vs. isolation,” “generativity vs. stagnation,” and “integrity vs. despair.”149  
In the first stage, trust is achieved by realizing that a person or item continues to exist 
although it may not directly be visible. Hide and seek exhibits this process. The baby must trust 
that a person’s face still exists although it temporarily disappears behind his or her hands. More 
importantly, the baby must trust that his or her mother will return although she may not always 
be visible. Erikson writes: “The infant’s first social achievement, then, is his willingness to let 
the mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty 
as well as an outer predictability.”150 In the second stage, a person achieves autonomy by 
recognizing that he or she is separate from other people and can act based on his or her own will. 
Once an infant establishes autonomy, he or she attains initiative by learning to plan, act, and 
complete a task outside of others’ control. If the mother prevents the child by controlling him or 
her, or siblings complete the task first, a child feels guilt. Guilt comes from either not completing 
the task first or contemplating action without the mother’s permission to act alone. As with 
previous stages, all depends on upon interacting with other people, not controlling inner 
biological drives.  
In the fourth stage, occurring between ages six and eleven, the child attains industry over 
inferiority by producing things outside of personal play. Children learn skills at school from 
teachers and older children to become industrious. Erikson writes that “this is socially a most 
decisive stage: since industry involves doing things beside and with others.”151  
 Erikson asserted that adolescence was the pivotal moment in a person’s psychological 
development, not early childhood as Freud argued. In Erikson’s pivotal stage of identity versus 
role confusion adolescent share “primarily concerned with what they appear to be in the eyes of 
others as compared with what they feel they are, and with the question of how to connect the 
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roles and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational prototypes of the day.”152 A youth must 
ensure that “the inner sameness of continuity prepared in the past [is] matched by the sameness 
and continuity of one’s meaning for others, as evidenced in the tangible promise of a career.”153 
In short, a child must align previously developed skills and abilities with a career available in 
society so that he or she can fulfill others’ expectations. For example, if a girl possesses the skill 
to compute numbers superior to all other children in her class, she may become a mathematician 
or physicist. Others know her as talented at math and expect her to choose a career that aligns 
with her skill set. By comparing herself with others, she recognized her mathematical abilities 
and searches for a career that satisfies her self-identification and expectations she feels from 
others.  
Erikson’s final three stages, which occur in adulthood, also depend upon social 
interactions. An adult achieves intimacy by fusing “his identity with that of others” through 
concrete affiliations and partnerships.
154
 Marriage is an example. In the seventh stage 
generativity is achieved by “establishing and guiding the next generation.”155 In the final stage an 
adult acquires ego integrity by accepting his or her role in the world and continues to fulfill that 
role until death.  
What is important to note is that Erikson agreed with Freud that humans’ common 
biological development determined the onset of each stage, but Erikson’s major advancement 
was to assert that a positive or negative resolution to the crisis of each stage was determined by a 
person’s social and cultural environment. Erikson’s emphasis on culture and personality led him 
to highlight the benign and malign cultural forces impinging on a person’s psychological 
development. Erikson stated: “What the regression and growing, rebelling and maturing youths 
are now primarily concerned with is who and what they are in the eyes of a wider circle of 
significant people as compared with what they themselves have come to feel they are; and how 
to connect the dreams, idiosyncrasies, roles, and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational 
and sexual prototypes of the day.”156  
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Whereas Freud wrote about inner biological drives in books about the individual such as 
The Id and the Ego (1923), Erikson wrote on a person’s interaction with others within his or her 
community in his major work Childhood and Society (1950). In short, Freud focused on the inner 
Id and Erikson on the outer society. Directly contrasting his theory with Freud’s, he continued: 
“To condense it into a formula: the patient of today suffers most under the problem of what he 
should believe in and who he should—or, indeed, might—be or become; while the patient of 
early psychoanalysis suffered most under inhibitions which prevented him from being what and 
who he thought he knew he was.”157  
A person’s behavior stemmed not from conquering biological drives in the form of the Id; 
rather they came from a person’s attempt to satisfy others’ expectations of who he or she was 
and should become. Expectations came from the larger cultural values. A person in a culture that 
valued violence might act violently to satisfy the expectations of others and align behavior with 
what he or she sees in the larger community. Violence is not to conquer others and attain the 
power needed to satisfy the Id; rather a response to the larger cultural expectations on which a 
person models his or her behavior.  
Within the War on Poverty in the 1960s policymakers used Erikson’s insights to explain 
how a person acquired his or her personality from the culture in which he or she lived. In The 
Other America—the book that Kennedy read to start a paradigm shift—Michael Harrington 
explained that “within the slum, violence and disturbance are often norms, everyday facts of life. 
From the inside of the other America, joining a ‘bopping’ gang may well not seem like deviant 
behavior. It could be a necessity for dealing with a hostile world.”158 In short, violence and 
aggressiveness became norms in the jobless culture and environment of the ghetto.  
Accordingly, if a person lived in a culture of poverty, his or her child was born into the 
environment. Over the course of the child’s life, he or she got exposed to parents and peers (each 
potentially with values from a culture of poverty) and adopted the values of those groups. Parents 
actually passed the culture of poverty, with all its behaviors, values, and methods of dealing with 
the world, down to the next generation. They instilled values and behaviors that handicapped the 
next generation from escaping poverty. Children would acquire the cultural perspective and way 
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of life from their parents that there was little chance of future success. Parents would not preach 
the need for a full high school education, much less college. Those avenues to opportunity would 
not open up. Instead, parents would model the behavior they developed from poverty and 
blockages to opportunity. More than children living in a culture of poverty and acquiring its 
values from their parents and peers, the children actually developed personalities distinctly 
shaped by poverty and antithetical to prosperity and upward mobility.  
The postwar conception of culture and personality convinced American liberal 
policymakers that they could direct change. Conceptions of personality that relied on biology left 
little room for short-term change, psychosocial theories using culture to understand difference 
made rapid change seem possible.
159
 Accordingly, debates about the relative power of culture 
and biology were not completely new. However, the debate became particularly important in the 
1960s because it shaped the way in which liberal policymakers attempted to achieve their 
political goals of spurring economic development in the Third World and alleviating poverty in 
America by shaping individuals’ cultural values and developing their personalities. 
In addition to the intellectual shift in anthropology and psychology toward seeing culture 
as the main determinant of individual and social values, the embrace within sociology of the 
theory of subculture would prove vitally important to social scientists’ understanding of the 
culture of poverty in the 1960s. Anthropologists looked at cultures as a whole, psychologists 
looked at the impact of culture on the individual, and sociologists looked at the power of groups 
to create and maintain distinct subcultures. For psychologists’ studies, the subculture formed the 
cultural environment with influences that determined a person’s personality. For the 
anthropologist, a subculture marked a distinct manifestation of the national culture that 
determined behavior and expectations. The theory of subcultures would validate an enduring 
culture of poverty—itself a subculture—that existed separate from America’s middle- and upper-
class cultures.  
Several attributes could distinguish a subculture, including age (e.g., a gang of juvenile 
delinquents), sex (e.g., men), religion (e.g., Catholics), occupation (e.g., lawyers), class (e.g., the 
super-rich), and ethnic group (e.g., Italian Americans). Each subculture could hold unique 
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values. For example, money was important to various subcultures for different reasons: juvenile 
delinquents could look at money as something to steal and immediately spend; men could see it 
as a sign of status; Catholics as something to donate; lawyers as reparations for unlawful 
behavior; the super-rich as a distinguishing feature; and Italians as something worth saving. 
 The emergence of attention to subcultures was also important to the War on Poverty. The 
concept of subcultures explained that groups held tenacious sets of alternative values that were 
not easily changed. Men were unlikely to lose their masculinity, delinquents were unlikely to 
start valuing the law, Catholics were unlikely to stop valuing piety, and the poor in the slum were 
unlikely to adopt the cultural values of the affluent in the suburbs. 
Sociologists created the concept of subculture to define groups based on a psychological 
mindset rather than the typical methods used in national censuses, including income, age, race, 
and gender. For example, sociologists focused less on the ethnic make-up of men in a 
community and more on the behavior of those men when interacting with others in the 
community. How did these men view family compared to work, religion to social groups, and 
violence to legal recourse. Sociologists cared less about the number of Italian-Americans, and 
more about their values, behaviors, and attitudes. How did second-generation Italian-Americans 
simultaneously function in the social world of their immigrant parents and the new country? 
Accordingly, sociologists breathed new life into old categories by conceiving of them in a new 
and unprecedented way. More than that, they created and studied new categories such as the 
ghetto, the gang, and the organized-crime family. 
The concept of subculture rapidly gained academic influence after WW II. In 1947, 
sociologist Milton Gordon pointed out that the term subculture “has apparently not been 
extensive enough to merit it a place in the Dictionary of Sociology”160 He claimed: “A great deal 
could be gained by a more extensive use of the concept of the sub-culture, a concept used here to 
refer to a sub-division of a national culture, composed of a combination of factorable social 
situations such as class status, ethnic background, regional and rural or urban residence, and 
religious affiliation, but forming in their combination a functioning unity which has an integrated 
impact on the participating individual.”161 However, by 1960, sociologist J. Milton Yinger could 
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claim: “Current sociological work makes extensive use of the concept of subculture—in the 
analysis of delinquency, adolescence, regional and class differences, religious sects, occupational 
styles, and other topics.”162 The two quotations illustration that the theory of subcultures gained 
influence within a few short years after WW II. 
As Gordon saw it, the theory of subculture challenged studies of national character by 
uncovering the myriad of distinct cultures within any given national culture. In WW II 
anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists undertook the task of 
uncovering national characters. They sought to determine the common values, expectations, 
attitudes, and behaviors shared by all members of a particular nation. For example, Germans 
required strong authoritarian leaders, and British specialists on Asia referred to the Japanese as 
the “obedient herd” who lacked individuality and self-direction.163 According to historian Ellen 
Herman, studies claimed that, since “Individuals embodied their culture and cultures embodied 
the collective personality of their people, national character offered a way or turning 
psychological insight into policy directives.”164 In the context of WW II, the material on national 
cultures could be used to emphasize allied nations’ strengths and exploit Axis nations’ 
weaknesses.  
Studies of national character were not limited to foreign countries. Margaret Mead, in 
And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America, used the same 
anthropological techniques that she had developed in Samoa and New Guinea to examine 
American character. She concluded that Americans had a “cult of success,” fluid class structure, 
a high level of mobility, and “willingness to tackle any new task, learn any new skill, quickly, 
easily, without deep involvement.”165 
Mead’s description of the average hard-working, versatile, and upwardly mobile citizen 
appeared to Americans to have great merit as the United States won WW II and emerged into 
and age of affluence. But the characterization did not last unquestioned for long. By the mid-
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1950s a national wide-spread panic over juvenile delinquency griped American.
166
 Movies such 
as On the Loose (1951), Rebel without a Cause (1955) Live Fast, Die Young (1958), High School 
Hellcats (1958), and Date Bait (1959) portrayed the dangers of delinquency. Music stores sold 
out of Elvis Presley with his gyrating hips and bookstores copies of Catcher in the Rye with its 
phony-disparaging Holden Caulfield.
167
 Social critics feared that juvenile delinquents were not 
hard-working, balked at versatility, and never moved up socially. They appeared to enjoy their 
low status, shun professional lives, and embrace violence and immediate gratification.  
Within sociology, descriptions of “the” American culture became logically unacceptable 
as sociologists began to examine subcultures. Juvenile delinquents formed a subculture and 
appeared to live by a distinct set of values. Sociologists often compared and contrasted 
delinquents’ culture with that of the American middle class. The subculture of delinquency 
inhabited the same geographical region and shared many of the same values as the middle-class 
culture, but it differed markedly in its goals and the methods to achieve them. Both the middle-
class culture and a culture of gang delinquency valued money, but the subculture of delinquency 
viewed it as an occasional luxury to spend immediately, not as a steady income. Both middle-
class culture and subculture valued youth, but the mainstream did so for beauty, health, and 
promise, whereas the subculture of delinquency did to recruit, socialize, and exploit. In short, 
sociologists came to accept subculture as a useful concept.  
The sociological focus on the subculture of juvenile delinquency was vitally important 
because it most directly contributed to the War on Poverty.  Assistant Director of the Community 
Action Program Frederick Hayes succinctly stated: “What essentially happened was that the 
juvenile delinquency program thinking was subsumed into Community Action thinking by 
subsuming the main thinkers of the juvenile delinquency program.”168 In the 1950s and early 
1960s sociologists including Walter B. Miller, Richard Cloward, and Lloyd Ohlin wrote 
pioneering studies about subcultures of delinquency. Those studies formed the intellectual 
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foundation for Mobilization for Youth, a governmental program to combat delinquency. Cloward 
served as the unit’s Director of Research while both Ohlin and Miller served as subject-matter 
experts. In 1963 Kennedy called on Cloward and Ohlin to help to create a national war on 
poverty. Cloward and Ohlin expanded their program from solely focusing on juvenile 
delinquency to combating all forms of poverty.  
Studies of juvenile delinquency as a subculture were vitally important to the War on 
Poverty in the 1960s for many reasons. First, as with other studies of subcultures, sociologists 
argued that the subculture of delinquents shared similarities to the middle-class culture but 
differed in important ways. Delinquents’ attitudes toward money and youth demonstrated these 
alternative values. Second, the subculture of delinquency had tenacious values that were unlikely 
to change easily. A six-month sentence in jail, seven-month probation, or class on being self-
sufficient would not likely transform the delinquent into a law-abiding citizen. The problem 
resided deeper in the psychology of the delinquent. Third, and most importantly, sociologists’ 
studies of juvenile delinquency influenced the War on Poverty by providing an explanation of 
how subcultures develop. Social scientists and policymakers in the War on Poverty took as a 
given that a subculture of poverty existed, but they did not immediately recognize how that 
culture had developed. Studies of juvenile delinquency in the 1950s provided that answer.  
In brief, sociologists argued that the structure of the economy prevented certain segments 
of the population from gaining economic mobility, and hence they formed certain cultural values 
as adaptations to their situation. In the case of delinquents, they shared the American values of 
upward mobility and success. However, they often suffered from a poor education in run-down 
inner-city schools. If he or she earned a degree—which fewer than 50% did in the 1950s—few 
jobs awaited.
169
 As more people fled to the suburbs, the inner city became increasingly 
dilapidated and void of jobs. The inner-city kid competed for increasingly difficult-to-attain jobs 
with a sub-par education. Accordingly, he or she could not attain the valued upward mobility or 
success. He or she more likely worked a low-paying, part-time job. Without the ability to obtain 
their goals legally, a person might give up and accept his or her fate in poverty. Or he or she 
might try to acquire money and success through illegal means, including stealing cars, 
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racketeering, robbery, burglary, defrauding, and swindling others. When people lived and 
worked with others in these illegal ventures, a subculture of delinquency developed that 
indoctrinated newcomers and fixed those who had succeeded in the alternative lifestyle of crime.  
The major point was that the decision to commit crime was a personal choice, but the 
situation that led the person to that crux was not. The structure of the economy—including few 
well-paying jobs—created an environment that blocked opportunities to escape poverty. Stuck in 
that environment, an alternative set of values developed from each person’s adaption to his or her 
situation. An alternative culture, or subculture, developed that might have shared the same values 
as the middle-class (such as the quest for financial success, social distinction, and upward 
mobility) but sought to attain them in limited number of possible ways. A delinquent was a 
person who developed a distinct lifestyle from high aspirations but limited opportunities. 
This situation was not limited to inner-city kids. Rural Americans, too, often suffered the 
same fate of poor education and few career options. In the 1960s, when the concept was 
universalized in the worldwide fight against poverty, policymakers saw the same situation 
abroad. The poor in Manila and in the countryside of Luzon suffered from limited opportunities 
and adapted their lives, values, and behaviors to survive in an economically static region.  
As with the emphasis on culture in anthropology and psychosocial development in 
psychology, the theory of subcultures resulted from intense academic debate over several 
decades. Fellow sociologists proposed opposing explanations of delinquency that conflicted with 
all three of the areas that would be crucial to the War on Poverty—that subcultures resulted from 
blocked opportunities that created a tenacious set of alternative values. 
In the 1930s, Chicago-based sociologist E. Franklin Frazier argued that poverty and 
crime resulted from disorganization suffered by communities attempting to integrate new groups 
of people—such as immigrant groups or African Americans heading north in the Great 
Migration for job opportunities during World War I.
170
 Frazier asserted that the movement of 
these new groups into the community pushed the population up faster than jobs could be created 
for the new arrivals. Those without jobs fell into poverty and committed crimes, and their 
children took part in juvenile delinquency. No subculture or alternative set of values existed. All 
crime and poverty came only because the economy had not yet adjusted to reintegrate 
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newcomers. The situation was purely economic. Herman writes that Frazier “consistently 
attributed causal status to economic over psychological processes….Personal and even cultural 
factors were, in comparison, relatively insignificant.”171 The economy needed to adjust, not the 
people. The people did not form alternative systems of values as an adaptation to a life of 
poverty.  Those values were not the source of their continued poverty and lawlessness. Rather, 
Frazier viewed the best remedy as creating employment so newcomers could function as reliable 
breadwinners and contributing members of the community. Once the newcomers secured jobs, 
they would easily become productive members of society, shed delinquent behavior, and conduct 
their lives by the working community’s shared values.  
Sociologist Frederick Thrasher wrote a major study of juvenile delinquency prior to 
World War II.
172
 In his 1927 study, entitled The Gang, Thrasher explained delinquency as boys 
satisfying needs within an environment weakly controlled by adults. Thrasher claimed that, like 
everyone else in society, delinquent boys wanted security, response, recognition, and new 
experience.
173
 In an environment that suffered from disorganization and weak family and 
neighborhood controls, young boys spontaneously organized into play groups. The groups 
participated in new and exciting adventures. Sociologist David Bordua points out that “they 
swipe fruit from peddlers, turn over garbage cans, stay away from home all night and steal milk 
and cakes for breakfast, [and] play truant from school.”174 As the boys grew older and came into 
conflict with other play groups in areas with a high concentration of people and limited 
community resources, the boys formed gangs. Thrasher claims that the boys viewed delinquency 
as fun and excitement compared with the dull and boring lifestyle of proper schoolboys. Their 
acts did not come because they had no opportunities or because they were in a subculture with a 
tenacious alternative set of values. The actions came because the boys in the gangs wanted to 
have fun. Their excessively open environment enabled the boys to fulfill their desire for action, 
adventure, and delinquency.  
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After World War II, sociologists started to incorporate psychological and anthropological 
insights into studies of delinquency. Many sociologists, including Albert Cohen, had worked 
with psychologists and anthropologists during the war.
 175
 Cohen, in Delinquent Boys, argued 
that lower-class boys suffered from a sense of inadequacy and low self-esteem because they 
could not meet the “middle class measuring rod” of their teachers and community members.176 
According to Cohen, the middle class’s pattern of values “places great emphasis on ambition as a 
cardinal virtue, individual responsibility, the cultivation and possession of skills, the ability to 
postpone gratification, rationality, the rational cultivation of manners, the control of physical 
aggression and violence, the wholesome and constructive use of leisure, and respect for 
property.”177 The lower-class boy’s parents projected their failed aspirations onto him and failed 
to socialize him into these values. More than that, the lower-class boy could not economically 
compete with his middle-class classmates and repeatedly experienced failures while watching 
others experience success. When a number of lower-class boys with common problems and 
issues of adjustment interacted with each other, a subculture developed. The individual failure, 
sense of inadequacy, low self-esteem combined into a collective way of life of the lower-class 
group. Cohen argues that the delinquent subculture developed with alternative values. Its 
members were 
more likely to show restricted aspirations, a live-for-today orientation toward 
consumption, a moral view which emphasizes reciprocity within the kin and other 
primary groups and correlatively less concern with abstract rules which apply across or 
outside of such particularistic circumstances. In addition, the working class child is less 
likely to be surrounded with educational toys, less likely to be trained in a family regimen 
of order, neatness, and punctuality. Of particular importance is the fact that physical 
aggression is more prevalent and more valued in the working class milieu.
178
 
 
Compared to Frazier’s unemployed immigrants seeking work and Thrasher’s carefree 
kids looking for adventure, Cohen sees a destructive, malicious, and self-deprecating group of 
social misfits. Cohen views delinquency as the result of psychological issues that are transformed 
through the medium of a group into an alternative set of values. Neither jobs nor adventure could 
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stop such delinquency. The issues resided deeper. It was in the psychology of the individual and 
the culture of the subgroup.  
 The values within Cohen’s subculture of delinquents were nearly identical to those social 
scientists and policymakers would associate with poverty in the 1960s. Whereas Cohen 
determined that delinquents valued immediate gratification, lacked punctually, and resorted to 
violence, social scientists in the 1960s considered all poor people to hold such views. However, 
Cohen also identified low-self esteem as the causal factor leading to the subculture, but social 
scientists and policymakers in the 1960s identified blocked opportunities as the root of the 
problem.  
Sociologist Walter B. Miller first linked a lower-class system of values to blocked 
opportunities.
179
 Miller, in “Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency,” 
argued that the values of the poor developed from the local community, not from a feeling of 
inadequacy when being compared with the middle class.
180
 Miller asserted: “In the case of 
‘gang’ delinquency, the cultural system which exerts the most direct influences on behavior is 
that of the lower class community itself—a long-established, distinctively patterned tradition 
with an integrity of its own—rather than a so-called ‘delinquent sub-culture’ which has arisen 
through conflict with middle class culture and is oriented to the deliberate violation of middle 
class norms.”181 Rather than simply an aberration of the American middle-class culture, Miller 
argued, it signified a “set of practices, focal concerns, and way of behaving that are meaningfully 
and systematically related to one another.”182 He continued: “From these extremely diverse and 
heterogeneous origins (with, however, certain common features), there is emerging a relatively 
homogeneous and stabilized native-American lower class culture.”183 The focal concerns of 
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trouble, toughness, smartness, excitement, fate, and autonomy made up lower-class culture. 
Trouble is what life gets you into. Toughness is physical prowess, masculinity, fearlessness, 
bravery, and daring. Smartness is the ability to “con” others. Excitement comes from fighting 
foes and fleeing cops. Fate is the belief that life is controlled by forces out of your control. 
Finally, autonomy is the ability to remain free of legal sanctions.
184
  
Such behavior stemmed from lower-class female-centered households in which children 
lacked a masculine role model who could guide them through what Erikson explicitly called their 
adolescent “identity crisis.” Confused teenagers often turned to gangs for structure and guidance. 
He concluded that delinquency was not itself a subculture. Rather, it was the product of the all-
embracing lower-class culture. Lower-class culture remained deep inside “tenement holes of the 
big, dirty, and deteriorating city, so recently abandoned by those who have escaped to 
suburbia.”185 Thus, he argued, juvenile delinquency was the manifestation of values inherent in 
the lower-class cultural milieu that Americans were anxious to shed as they moved to the 
suburbs and embraced middle-class values.  
In the 1950s anthropologists came to embrace culture over biology to explain human 
differences in the world, psychologists supported social influences over biological drives, and 
sociologists focused on the subgroup over the national or mainstream. Scholars seeking to 
explain the development of the Third World also experienced an intellectual shift. Their new 
approach became known as modernization theory. The men and women who created the theory, 
known as modernization theorists, asserted that lesser-developed nations resulted from 
traditional cultures rather than biological or economic reasons. In short, when a country 
industrialized, the institutions of the society mattered less than the attitudes and values of its 
people.  
Modernization theory was the intellectual foundation for the Peace Corps. In 1961 
Kennedy started the Peace Corps to help Third World countries industrialize. After reading 
Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael Harrington’s book, Kennedy initiated the paradigm shift 
by inviting members of the Peace Corps to meet with experts on domestic poverty and 
delinquency. Together, they completed the paradigm shift by unifying foreign poverty and 
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domestic poverty within a single concept. Previously the experts on domestic and foreign 
poverty separately believed that their problems resulted from cultural values, but together they 
came to realize that they both were addressing a single issue, the culture of poverty. A single 
phenomenon, the culture of poverty, manifested in juvenile delinquency and poverty in America 
and in a lack of industrialization in the Third World.  
As with the triumph of culture over biology in anthropology, social factors over 
biological drives in psychology, and subcultures over national character in sociology, the cultural 
explanation within modernization theory had to displace previous models. The Point Four 
Program immediately preceded the emergence of modernization theory and the founding of the 
Peace Corps. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, President Harry S. Truman 
announced “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”186 It signaled the 
first time that U. S. policymakers championed the economic development of the Third World as 
a strategy within the Cold War.  
The policymakers who shaped Point Four, including Truman, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, and U.S. Ambassador to India Chester Bowles, were convinced that Germany’s 
interwar economic tribulations had caused World War II. Truman, Acheson, and Bowles 
believed that economic stagnation was the principle cause of war. Acheson articulated the 
program’s aim as the “use of material means to a non-material end.”187 He thought that global 
peace and democracy could be achieved if the United States successfully used the Point Four 
Program to spur economic improvement and raise the standards of living within Third World 
nations.  
They designed the program based on the economic ideas of John Maynard Keynes, who 
had argued that government spending in agriculture, education, and health would stimulate and 
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improve the economy. All projects within Point Four focused on improvement in each of these 
areas to lay the foundation for industrialization. 
Those who shaped Point Four intended the program to provide technical assistance to 
improve the quality of food, health, and education in a given Third World nation. American 
experts would provide the training and education so that workers could effectively build modern 
structures and manage modern techniques and operations. Activities varied widely from 
exhibitions to expose the Bolivians to the current literature on growing corn in their region and 
projects meant to offer an elementary-level education to Iranians living in rural areas, to building 
a medical school in Burma and demonstrating the way in which to use DDT to kill Anopheles 
mosquitoes and control malaria in Indonesia.
188
 Typically each project focused on a single field, 
such as education or agriculture. Policymakers agreed that an investment in agriculture, 
education, and health and sanitation would accelerate Third World nations toward 
industrialization by creating literate workers, healthy citizens, and money for developers from 
selling agricultural surpluses. 
Truman, Acheson, and Bowles failed to recognize the cultural and psychological 
dimensions of development, which put them out of line with emerging trends in psychology, 
anthropology, and sociology. The Point Four program had moderate success, but President 
Eisenhower ended it. During the interim period between the end of Point Four in 1953 and the 
inauguration of the Peace Corps in 1961, social scientists created modernization theory. 
Modernization theory became an important analytical tool to conceptualize change in the 
Third World. As opposed to rebuilding societies that had already attained industrialization, as 
was done with the Marshall Plan, or focusing exclusively on economic factors, as with Point 
Four, modernization theorists concentrated on creating a total theory that encapsulated the entire 
arc of economic, political, social, psychological, and cultural changes that occurred during 
development from a traditional agricultural society to a modern industrial one. Aware that a 
colonial relationship subordinating nations on the periphery to the West was impossible in the 
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post-colonial setting that emerged after World War II, modernization theorists sought to create 
an amicable bond based on consent. Among the ranks of modernization theorists were political 
scientists such as Lucian Pye and Cyril Black, sociologists including Daniel Lerner and Talcott 
Parsons, university presidents such as Clark Kerr, and economists such as Walt Rostow and Max 
Millikan. Although each modernization theorist constructed a distinct theory of development, 
they all centered on the same fundamental principles. All posited that societies develop along a 
common path from an agrarian-based traditional society to an industrial-based modern one. All 
agreed that the transition entailed change in technology, bureaucratic institutions, and social and 
political structures. More importantly for the paradigm shift initiated by Kennedy, all 
modernization theorists agreed that cultural and psychological differences primarily accounted 
for why some nations were poor while others were rich.  
Theorists who were convinced that all societies develop along a common path and 
converge at the exact same final model, known as modern society, were interested in what 
modernization theorist Daniel Lerner called “the historical sequence of Western growth.”189 
Lerner argued in 1964 that the “same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing societies 
on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed.”190 Only culture 
differed.  
Modernization theorists divided the world into categories of countries with traditional 
cultures and countries with modern cultures. They claimed that people with traditional cultural 
values modeled their behavior on their parents and local ways rather than on universal standards. 
They adhered to religious precepts when making both individual and collective decisions rather 
than relying on secular “rational” choices. They were unable or unwilling to adapt to any 
changes—professional or personal—in their lives. Traditional society was stratified along social 
and gender lines and respected age over merit. Few members of society participated in 
politics.
191
 In contrast, people within modern cultures were open and willing to change, sought 
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technological advancement, respected achievement over ascription, adhered to universal 
standards of conduct, and actively participated in the political system.  
Modernization theorists argued that cultural values determined the success of 
industrialization. Although industrialization could be imposed on traditional societies, modern 
cultural values could not. Modernization theorists claimed that previous theories about 
development—including those of Truman, Acheson, and Bowles—lacked a method to account 
for cultural values and non-rational individuals. Talcott Parsons and Walt Rostow argued that 
non-rational cultural propensities existed within each society and that these propensities dictated 
the penetration and effectiveness of industrialization. According to Rostow societies without the 
propensities to consume, accept innovations, seek material advance, or apply science for 
economic ends had little chance of achieving economic modernity.
192
 Historian Nils Gilman has 
explained that Rostow believed that “the economies of these largely peasants societies were 
inseparable from local cultures, social structures, and political institutions.”193 Theorists agreed 
with neo-classical economists that economic growth was vital to development, but, if they were 
to confidently direct growth, they required a theory that would account for non-economic factors 
that hindered or stimulated growth.
194
 Lucian Pye explained that “economic criteria are not 
unimportant and certainly should not be casually disregarded, but they are not adequate for. . . . 
our policy toward the underdeveloped areas.”195 Theorists required an omni-disciplinary 
approach to measure modernity, one that understood development as a conceptual whole 
including cultural, psychological, economic, and social factors.  
Psychologist David McClelland was a modernization theorist who placed particular 
emphasis on the impact of personality traits on economic development. In The Achieving Society, 
McClelland searched for a universal characteristic that could explain each country’s level of 
economic development. He studied Germany, Japan, England, India, Brazil, and the United 
Stated and argued that each country’s level of economic development directly corresponded to 
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its citizens’ need for achievement or “n Achievement.”196 He asserted that democracy, self-
reliance, success, competitiveness, and entrepreneurism directly derived from the achievement-
oriented type of personality. If a given country’s citizens had enough n Achievement, the country 
would prosper; without it, the country would become impoverished and even risk slipping 
backward into underdevelopment. McClelland located the source of n Achievement in 
childrearing practices and the mother-son relationship. Mothers who balanced warmth and high 
expectations and applied just the right amount of pressure to achieve would create the proper 
competitive and acquisitive economic drive. For McClelland, everything revolved around the 
formative period of childhood. He wrote: “It may come as something of a shock to realize that 
more could have been learned about the rate of future economic growth…by reading elementary 
school books than by studying such presumably more relevant matters as power politics, wars 
and depressions, economic statistics, or governmental policies governing international trade, 
taxation or public finance.”197  
A modernization theorist who directly used Erikson’s psychosocial model was political 
scientist Lucian Pye. In Guerrilla Communism in Malaya and Politics (1956), and Personality, 
and Nation Building: Burma’s Search for Identity (1962), Pye argued that the Malaysian and 
Burmese leaders lacked a clear national identity, a deficiency that made them emotionally 
unstable and therefore susceptible to communist subversion.
198
 Equating the leaders with at-risk 
American adolescents suffering an identity crisis, seeing them as being vulnerable to bad 
influences, Pye asserted that the United States should serve as a role model, similar to a 
teenager’s family, to guide Third World leaders in forming a strong and healthy national identity. 
Pye was not alone. Several fellow theorists argued that the colonial “mother” country or Western 
family of nations could properly guide and “raise” newly independent nations—treating them 
like adolescences—and avoid Third World revolution and rebellion, akin to domestic juvenile 
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delinquency.
199
 For Pye, gaining the advantage in the Third World entailed more than economic 
development; it required the emotional management of nation’s leaders and citizens to ensure 
proper psychological development and well-being to thwart communist subversion which fed on 
psychological insecurity and concomitant aggression and frustration.  
McClellend and Pye placed more emphasis on psychological factors than the majority of 
their fellow modernization theorists. However, their ideas served as examples of the shift in the 
approach to the development of the Third World that came to embrace cultural and psychological 
factors as the chief cause of difference in the world. Modernization theorists’ ideas aligned with 
the shifts occurring in other social sciences. Anthropologists embraced culture over biology. 
Psychologists focused on social influences over biological drives. Sociologists studied 
subcultures rather than national characters. Taken together, anthropology, psychology, sociology, 
and interdisciplinary theories of development made possible a new way to understand people’s 
behavior and why difference existed around the world. Although each area influenced the others 
to a certain degree, all four would not be brought together until Kennedy initiated a paradigm 
shift. The new ideas in the social sciences independently filtered into separate programs. 
Modernization theory formed the intellectual foundation for the Peace Corps. The new theories 
in sociology and psychology shaped the Mobilization for Youth. Anthropology, psychology, and 
sociology informed the Gray Areas Program. Once Macdonald’s review of Harrington inspired 
Kennedy to address poverty, Kennedy brought together policymakers from foreign and domestic 
programs as well as social scientists from anthropology, sociology, and psychology. As all of 
these men and women began to discuss the problem of poverty, they realized that they had all 
been addressing separate manifestations of a single culture of poverty. The paradigm shift 
initiated by Kennedy unified the conception of poverty all over the world. The cultural approach 
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would serve as the logic and foundation of several programs that would directly influence the 
War on Poverty and the universal approach to poverty that Kennedy started, Johnson continued, 
and Shriver fulfilled.  
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Chapter 3 - “Substitute Hope for Hopelessness”: Mobilization for 
Youth, Peace Corps, and the Gray Areas Program 
As the Democratic candidate in the Presidential election of 1960, John F. Kennedy 
promised to “get America moving again.”  Once he became President, Kennedy promised to act 
on the most pressing issues facing Americans. Three of those issues were the expansion of 
communism, juvenile delinquency, and the economic decay of urban centers. Kennedy’s 
administration created a program to address each issue. Kennedy, Sargent Shriver, Walt Rostow, 
and Max Millikan created the Peace Corps to develop the Third World and prevent the expansion 
of communism. Robert Kennedy, Richard Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin, and Walter Miller designed the 
Mobilization for Youth (MFY) to reduce juvenile delinquency. Finally, Paul Ylvisaker, Kermit 
Gordon, and Adam Yarmolinsky intended the Gray Areas Program to revitalize run-down inner-
city neighborhoods. This chapter argues three things. First, all three programs developed 
independently from each other. Second, those who shaped all three programs explained the 
plight of their target groups by using the social scientific theories that had developed in the 
1950s. Third, and arguably most important, those setting policy for each program, even though 
working independently, created community development projects intended to change people’s 
cultural values as the means for them to overcome their respective problems.  
Policymakers created and developed each program independently in 1961 and 1962. In 
February 1962, after reading Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael Harrington’s The Other 
America, Kennedy started to bring together members of each program to discuss poverty. As 
these men began to discuss poverty, they realized that they had all been addressing separate 
manifestations of a single culture of poverty. The traditional values of people within the Third 
World were international examples of the culture of poverty. Juvenile delinquents’ values of 
immediate gratification, physical aggression, and restricted aspiration came less from a 
subculture of delinquency envisioned as something that was not simply economic and more from 
an overall culture of poverty. Inner-city residents’ unemployment stemmed from the culture of 
poverty and the correlated lack of long-term planning.  
The policymakers and social scientists worked together and came to the agreement that 
the culture of poverty equally explained their respective issues. They also realized that each 
program (Peace Corps, MFY, and Gray Areas) had been using community development projects 
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to overcome their corresponding problems. Once brought together by Kennedy, those people, 
altered their distinct forms of community action to form a single unified approached that aimed 
specifically at addressing the culture of poverty. In short, because they believed the culture of 
poverty was the root of all their issues, the same community action approach to end it could stop 
juvenile delinquents, empower residents to revitalize their inner-city neighborhoods, and help 
foreign people develop their countries.  
The policymakers of the Mobilization for Youth defined juvenile delinquency using the 
social scientific theories that had developed in the 1950s. The program was important because it 
was the first one in which culture-based theories were incorporated into a governmental program 
to alleviate poverty. The policymakers also created a community-wide model to combat 
delinquency, orchestrating several different agencies at the same time with the intention to 
motivate youth and open up opportunities for economic success. Co-Director of MFY George 
Brager and Chief of Training Francis Purcell stated that “Perhaps the major contribution of the 
Mobilization program, and its primary source of innovation, stems from the rather simple idea 
that if services are to be organized meaningfully, social-class variables must be systematically 
taken into account in program planning.”200 The Mobilization for Youth Program served as a 
model for community action in the War on Poverty.
201
 
The President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD) funded Mobilization for 
Youth. Attorney General Robert Kennedy headed the PCJD. With a mentality in line with 
sociologists of the late 1950s, Robert Kennedy was deeply concerned that limited opportunity in 
the community created the conditions for juvenile delinquency. On February 19, 1963 Kennedy 
explained the plight of youth when he testified before the General Subcommittee on Education of 
the House Education and Labor Committee. He explained: “Our country from the beginning has 
been a land of opportunity. Above all, it has offered success to the man who is willing to work 
and opportunities to work in the United States have been unlimited. Throughout our history all 
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that has been needed has been a proper mixture of aspiration and ambition.”202 He continued: 
“[B]ut our nation’s prosperity has created a new condition. From a rich and virgin land has 
grown a vast, complex industrial civilization. The opportunities to work are just as great and 
challenging today as ever before. But to get the same chance today, requires greater knowledge 
and greater skill.”203 Robert Kennedy was concerned that “A whole new Lost Generation is 
growing up in our country, with no skills and little hope. Many of its members are turning to 
crime to get the things other youngsters get by hard study and work.”204 Accordingly, Americans 
needed a program to change the conditions of struggling communities, eliminating those 
conditions that led to delinquency. Kennedy viewed the situation as particularly dire because he 
estimated that of the 26 million young people who were forecasted to enter the workforce in the 
1960s, 7.5 million would not finish high school. He stated that in 1962 alone 700,000 youth 
between ages 16 and 21 were out of work and out of school.
205
 Few skills and limited 
opportunities to work created the conditions for crime and vice.  
The Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1961, which authorized the PCJD for three years, 
empowered Robert Kennedy and the PCJD to fund six to eight major demonstration projects 
aimed at changing the conditions that led to delinquency.
206
 The projects were to be spread 
around the country in both urban and rural communities. The project that was both the largest 
and most influential to the War on Poverty was Mobilization for Youth. MFY operated in the 
Lower East Side, a sixty-seven-square-block area in New York City. In an effort to coordinate 
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federal, local, and private efforts, MFY received funding from the PCJD, the government of New 
York City, and the Ford Foundation.  
Sociologists Richard Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin, and Walter Miller were three leading 
intellectual contributors to MFY. Cloward served as the unit’s Director of Research while both 
Ohlin and Miller served as subject-matter experts. All three men had worked with Robert Merton 
at Columbia while in graduate school. Merton pioneered the theory of subculture in the 1930s.
207
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s Cloward, Ohlin, and Miller focused specifically on delinquency 
as a subculture. Their use of subculture eased the transition to viewing delinquency as part of the 
subculture of poverty. MFY was founded and directly operated based on their sociological 
theories.
208
  
As discussed in Chapter Two, Miller explained delinquency subculture by seeing it as a 
part of a more comprehensive general culture of poverty. Cloward and Ohlin expanded upon the 
idea that poverty was a large subculture. They attempted to explain the way in which the 
subculture of delinquency as part of the culture of poverty had developed. Historian Alice 
O’Connor has explained that Cloward and Ohlin introduced a key concept into “community 
action and poverty knowledge: the idea that poverty and delinquency stemmed not simply from 
community ‘disorganization’ but from ‘systemic’ barriers to legitimate opportunity that kept 
lower-class neighborhood residents from realizing their middle-class aspirations.”209 Cloward 
and Ohlin, who would both become members of the Poverty Task Force in 1964, explained the 
theory of community action in their book published in1960 entitled Delinquency and 
Opportunity.
210
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Cloward and Ohlin offered two different explanations of juvenile delinquency: one, 
delinquency was actually lower-class culture by another name; two, delinquency was a structural 
problem that stemmed from youths’ aspirations and their limited means to achieve them. The 
authors claimed that the youth in poverty had two avenues, a nearly insurmountable legal route 
and more easily accessible illegal path. Juveniles committed delinquent acts when they chose the 
illegal route.  
Cloward and Ohlin suggested inspiring youth to take action, thereby creating their own 
opportunities.  The first step was to create jobs. Jobs could provide opportunities for the youth to 
earn money while working toward their aspirations in life. Next, using a phrase that would 
permeate discussions during the War on Poverty, Cloward and Ohlin asserted that communities 
needed to have “maximum feasible participation” of their members.211 They argued that 
participation would teach youth the value of community. Relying on their first definition of 
delinquency as a subculture, they argued that participation would break the “cycle” of 
generational poverty by replacing the poor people’s values of apathy and passivity with 
entrepreneurship and hard-work.
212
 They argued that youths’ perspectives on community, work, 
opportunity, and the future had to change it they were to secure employment and escape poverty. 
Participation, they contended, would instill these values in the delinquency-prone youth and 
break them out of their long-run fate while providing the jobs for them to move into after the 
slum was transformed. Cloward’s and Ohlin’s prescriptions entailed both neighborhood and 
personal transformations to change the values from a culture of poverty.
213
 
Without mentioning them by name, Robert Kennedy used Cloward and Ohlin’s argument 
when speaking to the House about MFY. He said: “In my work as Chairman of the President’s 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, I have been impressed by the need to see 
these problems of youth unemployment, school failure, and delinquency as related but different 
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reactions to barriers to opportunities.”214 He explained that “submerged populations. . . soon 
discover the decreasing market for unskilled labor, which is usually all they have to offer. Their 
hope turns to apathy and despair.”215 He continued: “It is especially devastating for the youth in 
urban slum areas. Many come to share the apathy and indifference of their parents, while other 
rebel in a variety of ways.”216 The youth, he claimed, dropped out of school and often 
unsuccessfully sought work as unskilled laborers.  
Three weeks after speaking to the House, Kennedy explained to the Advertising Council: 
“I’ve walked through the New York City slums and talked to idle youth who think the cards are 
stacked against them. Quite often they’re right.”217 Using Cloward and Ohlin’s argument again 
without attribution, he stated that the young people either give up and surrender to apathy, or 
“think that the only way they can ever achieve any success is by getting into the rackets. Their 
heroes are mobsters and racketeers.”218 
In line with both the theories of sociologists about subcultures and the theories of 
psychologists about the influence of parents and peers, the policymakers of MFY explained that 
conditions in the community created a distinct subculture with an alternative set of values. Staff 
members of MFY asserted that schools were overcrowded, poor children were ignored, and 
teachers knew little about the neighborhood of the Lower East Side. Assistant Executive Director 
of MFY Charles F. Grosser argued that the people in the neighborhood distrusted the possibility 
of improvement. Grosser conducted a survey and found that residents of the Lower East Side 
thought that local government would not become more efficient, schools would not further 
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education, race relations would not improve, and juvenile delinquency would not decrease.
219
 
Grosser also found a shared pessimism among residents. They thought that “people can’t be 
trusted,” and residents were unwilling to take a risk for the chance of a better job.220 Grosser also 
found that the residents’ long-term lack of power made them more accepting of authoritarianism.  
The Co-Director of MFY, George A. Brager, and Assistant Chief of Services to 
Individuals and Families Sherman Barr believed that local residents had a distinct perception of 
reality and set of values. People in the Lower East Side viewed themselves as victims of society 
who were not to blame for their predicaments. Residents viewed the world as dangerous, full of 
“social booby traps” set to “snare depressed, desperate, and unaware people.”221 Locals thought 
that all legal, law-making, and law-upholding institutions were corrupt, staffed by people 
interested only in self-protection and self-preservation. Residents believed that all people could 
be “bought” or corrupted. More, “A double standard of morality exists—one code for ‘uptown’ 
and another for ‘downtown.’”222 
Those who turned to delinquency in an attempt to break out of the community’s 
conditions embraced the distinct set of values corresponding to the lifestyle of mobsters. They 
robbed, stole, attacked, swindled, and conned others in the pursuit of money. People of the 
Lower East Side suffered from a violent and pessimistic culture with few opportunities to escape 
seemingly endless poverty.  
Kennedy, Cloward, Ohlin, Grosser, and fellow members of MFY sought to change the 
conditions in the neighborhood by recruiting locals to conduct projects to develop their 
neighborhood. Members of MFY called these community development projects. On the June 4
th
 
1962 Today Show on NBC, host Martin Agronsky helped Robert Kennedy pinpoint the purpose 
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of community development. Agronsky asked Kennedy, “So you substitute hope for 
hopelessness—is the secret?” Kennedy responded: “I think that’s the answer to a large part.”223 
Policymakers at MFY intended that its projects would coordinate every service in the 
community in order to open opportunities and simultaneously improve all areas of the residents’ 
life, including the prevalence of juvenile delinquency. In short, MFY worked to create new 
economic opportunities by inspiring residents and coordinating local services.
224
  Samuel 
Merrick, a staff member with the Senate Labor Committee, explained: “The key feature of the 
juvenile delinquency program was that there’s no point in giving money for schools alone unless 
you do something about housing and jobs and health and family structure, [which] are important 
deficiencies and all interrelated. But there’s no point in throwing money at one without dealing 
with the spectrum of social ills. The other key thing was being sure that you just didn’t have the 
established political heads but that you had community groups putting in their vision, their 
perception as to what is wrong at the local level.”225 Christopher Weeks, later the first member of 
Sargent Shriver’s Poverty Task Force, stated it slightly differently. He explained in an oral 
interview with historian Michael Gillette:  
The juvenile delinquency program found that the employment agencies and the probation 
agencies and the police agencies and so on in cities quite frequently were completely 
separate and not only didn’t work together but were sometimes warring with each other 
to see who could get responsibility. Before a juvenile delinquency grant could be made, 
the groups had to get together and form an umbrella organization to demonstrate that they 
would in some way work cooperatively together to eliminate juvenile delinquency, 
supposedly. That thesis—the umbrella thesis, a collective action thesis—carried 
specifically over into community action [in the War on Poverty].
226
 
 
Robert Kennedy made it clear that MFY would have a wide range of programs. He 
claimed that “The problem of juvenile delinquency—and this is so extremely important—is not 
just better policemen or better prisons—it’s a wide range of things. It’s more opportunities for 
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housing. It’s better education; it’s recreation; it’s family. It deals with law enforcement, deals 
with opportunity.”227 Accordingly, MFY attempted to orchestrate services from each area to 
create a broad attack on the sources that limited opportunities and led kids to delinquency.  
MFY staff attempted to address all sources of delinquency by mobilizing over twenty 
new services for a massive, community-wide campaign. The MFY staff created a subsidized 
urban work corps. The corps employed over 200 boys and girls in a variety of tasks. The kids 
repaired settlement house roofs, swept city streets, collected trash, cleared vacant lots, painted 
playgrounds, and repaired damaged floors and walls inside apartments. In 1962, a supervisor of 
the program was surprised to discover that he had former war counselors from three separate 
street gangs all working peacefully together repairing a roof.
228
 He declared with pride that the 
program’s emphasis on community unity was working.  
MFY also created the Homework Helper Program (HHP). HHP paid over 300 kids from 
New York City’s Lower East Side High Schools to tutor local elementary students who had 
failing grades. In the effort to instill community unity and understanding, the MFY staff initiated 
a program to bring school teachers together with students’ families. The staff believed that a 
cultural disparity existed between middle-class teachers and lower-class students. Accordingly, 
teachers visited the homes of their students to learn more about their family dynamic, 
background, and distinct problems. MFY staff believed that the program would simultaneously 
build residents’ trust in the schools and understanding by teachers of the students’ hardships. The 
conduct of a misbehaving student would make more sense when the teacher realized that the boy 
or girl had no supervision at home and never experienced rules for conduct.
229
 
Gertrude Goldberg co-supervised the Visiting Homemaker Program. She described it as 
an effort to mobilize women from the East Side to teach their less-experienced neighbors to 
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cook, sew, budget, and care for their children.
230
 Goldberg found that “the middle-class 
professional worker has difficulty both in developing rapport with lower-class clients and in 
offering them practical help with the everyday problems of slum life.”231 Consequently, the 
Visiting Homemaker Program (VHP) changed its approach and, rather than bringing in 
professional social workers from outside of the slum, employed fifteen women from the Lower 
East Side to teach skills to their fellow low-income neighbors. The women visited the homes for 
several full or half days each week and offered not only practical advice but also companionship 
and psychological support. MFY sought candidates to fill these jobs who were neither “upwardly 
mobile slum dwellers who tended to shun their less-striving neighbors” nor too deprived to be 
able to offer help to others.
232
 Several women who worked for VHP had close relatives (such as 
sons or brothers) who suffered from drug addiction, desertion, delinquency, or maladjustment to 
school. The workers faced a variety of experiences. Kennedy explained to the Advertising 
Council: “One of them recently encountered a 16-year-old mother who fed her baby bacon and 
eggs. She thought that was that the doctor meant when he said ‘solid food.’”233 Despite the 
problems they faced, the workers typically succeeding in helping their clients. The workers 
lacked training, not skill. The visiting homemakers showed families how to stretch leftovers, 
ways to cook canned meat, where to purchase inexpensive material to use when sewing attractive 
clothes, how to identify a bargain, which barber schools gave free haircuts, and who offered free 
health services.  
Another program in MFY helped residents of New York’s Lower East Side to improve 
their skill at writing and reading comprehension. MFY staff found that many locals could not 
complete a job application. Oscar Ornati, a professor of economics at New York University, 
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explained that “filling out questionnaires, passing tests, using the proper words are more the 
requirements for continuing participation in the economy” than physical prowess.234 Using 
concepts that would be central to the War on Poverty, Ornati described the goal of MFY as 
motivating, enabling, encouraging, persuading, enticing, and mobilizing the poor to better their 
situation.
235
 The program therefore attempted to teach residents not only how to accurately 
complete a job application but also how to gain confidence in their ability to learn and 
accomplish meaningful tasks.  
A final program set up an advocacy center at 199 Stanton Street. The staff painted 
“Neighborhood Service Center” on the front window and “WALK IN!” on the door. The center 
was accepted walk-ins and the staff allowed anyone to seek assistance for any matter. MFY 
intended to enable locals to identify their own grievances and seek solutions. Most people who 
entered the advocacy center sought help with paperwork pertaining to welfare. Richard Cloward 
and Program Consultant Frances Piven reported that the staff believed that the people who came 
to the center felt isolated and genuinely appreciated any help they received.
236
   
Although many of its programs appear to have had little to do with juvenile delinquency, 
the policymakers and staff of MFY contended that delinquency was part of a larger problem that 
must be holistically assessed and treated. In a statement to the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Kennedy explained that “we do not believe that isolated programs that deal with 
one small part of the problem can seriously affect this picture. We do believe that an intelligent, 
concerted, hard-hitting effort by local communities with help from the Federal and State 
governments can accomplish this job.”237 Ornati confirmed that, “According to the mobilization 
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philosophy, broadly conceived, poverty may be viewed as the problem, and power, in the hands 
of those suffering the consequences of poverty, as the solution.”238 The conception that 
delinquency was a problem that encompassed all of juvenile’s life and his or her surrounding 
slum made MFY’s community development projects amendable to the War on Poverty once 
President Kennedy began to bring together experts to discuss the issue. As previously stated, 
Cloward, Ohlin, and David Hackett, Robert Kennedy’s special assistant for the PCJD (and 
roommate while in college), all joined John Kennedy’s and Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty 
from working on MFY.  
MFY was not the only governmental program that used social scientific theories from the 
1950s to understand a problem in the slum and community development as a solution. The Peace 
Corps did too. The Peace Corps is arguably Kennedy’s best-known program. It signified the 
effort to change the United States’ foreign policy in the Cold War. President Dwight Eisenhower 
sought to maintain U.S. supremacy over the Soviet Union in the strategic sphere to deter conflict. 
His policy toward the Soviet Union had given consideration to nuclear competition, alliance 
building, covert operations, and psychological warfare.
239
 Eisenhower intended to reduce costly 
conventional military forces, balance the national budget, and end expensive open-ended foreign 
aid programs. He viewed programs to end poverty globally as financially wasteful. Eisenhower 
claimed that “it is not easy to convince an overwhelming majority of free people, everywhere, 
that they should pull in their belts, endure marked recessions in living standards, in order that we 
may at one and the same time develop backward countries and relieve starvation, while bearing 
the expenses and costs of battle in the more fortunate countries.”240 
Kennedy disagreed with Eisenhower’s policy because he thought that it proved 
inadequate in dealing with global conflicts that required less-than-nuclear warfare. Economist 
and later Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for Lyndon Johnson, Walt Rostow 
explained: “There was a good deal of thought in that period about the inadequacies of the so-
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called Eisenhower great equation, that is to say, a preponderant reliance on the nuclear threat. 
And a great many people were saying that in a world which the Soviets shared with us, 
thermonuclear weapons was not a very satisfactory stance and counseled a building up of our 
conventional forces.”241  
Kennedy implemented a policy of “flexible response” that could deal with all global 
crises ranging from decolonization in Africa to nuclear warfare in Europe. Kennedy wanted to 
keep a big military and to make it bigger in some areas while reducing some reliance on certain 
aspects of the nuclear force. In short, Kennedy sought to maintain balanced forces in the military. 
Also, differing from Eisenhower, Kennedy created programs to aid decolonizing countries. In his 
inaugural address Kennedy pledged: “To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe 
struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help 
themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not 
because we seek their votes, but because it is right.”242  
To achieve his goals, Kennedy took an active stance toward nations in the Third World, 
launching the “development decade” and programs such as the Peace Corps and Alliance for 
Progress. The Kennedy administration designed both programs to develop the economies of 
Third World nations in order to create democratic capitalist countries that would thwart the 
spread of communism.  
The idea for the Peace Corps came directly from the Point Four Program. In 1957, 
explicitly citing the connection between the two, Wisconsin Representative Henry S. Reuss 
secured passage of legislation to evaluate the feasibility of a “Point Four Youth Corps.”243 
Reuss’s idea gained popularity and Hubert Humphrey, a Democratic Senator from Minnesota, 
introduced a bill for a “genuine people to people program” to be known as the American Peace 
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Corps.
244
 When Humphrey ran for President in 1960, he promoted his idea for an American 
Peace Corps. He eventually withdrew from the Presidential race, but upon his withdrawal, he 
sent his ideas to Kennedy, his fellow Democratic Presidential candidate.
245
 Kennedy liked the 
idea and sent a letter to Rostow asking him and economist Max Millikan “to take on the 
responsibility of working up a Peace Corps idea into something I could implement in the winter 
of ‘61.”246  
Both Rostow and Millikan were leading modernization theorists. They connected the 
social scientific theories that had developed 1950s to the issue of decolonization and economic 
development. Together, in 1957, they authored A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign 
Policy.
247
 Russell Edgerton, a political scientist and Rostow’s and Millikan’s contemporary, 
explained that “nothing else on the scene in Washington rivaled the grand scale of the Millikan-
Rostow proposal nor the sophistication of its presentation….As the different parts of the 
Executive and Congress launched reappraisals of aid in different directions with different 
motives, Millikan and Rostow supplied them all with a common theme.”248 Rostow and Millikan 
wrote that “there is emerging from the intensive work of social scientists on the development 
problem recognition that there are common elements in the patterns of development of different 
countries which have implications for development policy everywhere.”249 The common 
elements were cultural values suited to economic development. Rostow and Millikan identified, 
as good for development, people who valued self-discipline, a commitment to education, the use 
and advance of science, participation in politics, saving money, and planning for the future. 
People who hinder development, they contended, valued immediate gratification, violence, rigid 
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class distinctions, and had a laid-back approach to time and schedules. John Kenneth Galbraith, 
an economist and adviser to Kennedy, explained: “First of all, we must see development not as a 
simple matter of investment in dams, irrigation ditches, power plants and fertilizer factories, 
however important these may be, it is, rather, a part of a larger social process.”250 He continued: 
“First, need effective government administration. Second, education to open men’s minds. Third, 
equal opportunity.”251 
In 1960, Rostow clarified his position by refining and expanding the argument of A 
Proposal and publishing his most influential study, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto.
252
 He explained that “the tasks of the preconditions period (e.g., in Black 
Africa) remain as they have long been: the buildup of infrastructure, the education of a 
generation of modern men, the creation of institutions which can absorb technology and mobilize 
capital; the expansion of agriculture to permit the growing cities to be fed; and the generation of 
increased export earning capacity.”253 But he added that these elements no longer could be 
separated from cultural values. Rostow proposed that six national cultural propensities 
determined the relative success or failure of economic development. Rostow identified: the 
propensity to develop fundamental science; the propensity to apply science to economic ends; 
the propensity to accept innovations; the propensity to seek material advancement; the propensity 
to consume; and the propensity to have children. Not all could be simultaneously maximized, 
and asymmetry could hinder development. That is, the propensity to have children could prevent 
one from attaining material advancement. In short, development required specific cultural values. 
Modernization theorists who worked with Rostow and Millikan helped explain the 
influence of cultural values on development. As discussed in Chapter Two, all modernization 
theorists agreed that developing a given country’s economy from being based on agriculture to 
being based on industry required specific cultural values and psychological dispositions. 
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Sociologists Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith identified specific values that they believed led to 
economic development. Inkeles earned his Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University—
attending when Richard Cloward and Walter Miller were also students and when Robert Merton 
was on the faculty. Inkeles and Smith created the Overall Modernity Scale (OM Scale) to 
measure the presence or absence of the cultural values that were needed to create and maintain a 
modern industrial society.
254
 Among the many values they examined, they claimed that modern 
men and women were open to new experience, ready for social change, exposed to a wide 
variety of information, adhered to schedules and time, planned for the future, controlled their 
environment, trusted others, valued technical skill, aspired both academically and professionally, 
held respect for others, understood production, and participated in politics.
255
 For Inkeles and 
Smith, the building a modern industrial factory in a traditional (non-modern) country could instill 
all of these values.  
But whereas Inkeles and Smith created the OM Scale, Sargent Shriver determined the 
methods were used in the Peace Corps to create the values needed to produce and sustain a 
modern, industrial society. John Kennedy’s brother-in-law, Shriver organized the Peace Corps 
and served as its first director. After Shriver had served three years as director, Lyndon Johnson 
appointed him in 1964 as the head of the President’s Task Force in the War on Poverty and 
subsequently as the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). From 1964 to 1966 
Shriver simultaneously served as the top official in the international Peace Corps and in the 
domestic War on Poverty. However, back in 1961 he focused exclusively on moving legislation 
to establish the Peace Corps through Congress and then administering the program. In February 
1961, Shriver started contact with Rostow and Millikan on international development in order to 
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create a report for Kennedy on the proposed Peace Corps.
256
 On March 1, 1961, Kennedy 
officially established the Peace Corps. 
Shriver designed the Peace Corps to focus on three primary areas—agriculture, 
education, and health and sanitation. Rostow and Millikan had identified the same three areas as 
the primary determinants of whether a society based on agriculture would start to industrialize. 
Shriver believed that agriculture, in addition to feeding the population, played a key role in 
development as a source of capital. The immense cost of launching the transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial society could not be met by profits from a nascent industrial sector 
but only through improvements in agriculture. He argued that the most efficient way to acquire 
the capital needed was to apply quick-yielding changes in agricultural productivity, including 
new seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation techniques. All would promptly increase crop yield and 
create exportable surpluses. He continued, claiming that permanent material prosperity could not 
be exported whole; education and the technical skills needed to maintain self-sustained 
prosperity must also be acquired. Accordingly, volunteers in the Peace Corps started by teaching 
reading with the hope of progressing to advanced training in subjects such as engineering, 
medicine, administration, and economics. Third, Shriver designed the Peace Corps to include 
programs to improve health and sanitation. Diseases—such as malaria, yellow fever, yaws, and 
dysentery—hindered development because they drained the physical and mental energy of the 
population and reduced their ability to work a full day.
257
  
Volunteers in the Peace Corps worked to increase crop yields, advance education, and 
improve national health, but the aspect of the Peace Corps that proved most influential to the 
War on Poverty was the concept of community development. Journalist Roy Hoopes estimated 
that about 25 percent of all Peace Corps volunteers worked on assignments to develop 
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communities.
258
 While the Peace Corps operated all over the world, the vast majority of 
Community Development Projects (CDs) took place in either India or South America. 
Volunteers working on community-level development addressed agriculture, education, and 
health, but they also were instructed to help the local population recognize a common need, 
coordinate collective action, and help the people complete self-help tasks. Tom Scanlon, a 
volunteer working on community development in Chile, explained the process. He claimed: 
The term “community development” is an extremely important one which is frequently 
not understood….It is the development of the most important resources a country has—
its personal resources. . . [the people’s] attitude of acceptance, lack of education and 
tradition of poor living conditions mean that they need a stimulus to work as a group for 
progress, and yet we must find a way to lead them to a solution without giving it to them, 
for it is the experience of a progressive step engineered by the community itself which is 
the important thing.
259
 
 
He continued: “I am convinced that the most important meaning of the word 
‘underdeveloped’ when applied to a segment of a country’s population is that the people 
themselves don’t realize their own potentialities. Community development is an attempt to get a 
very long process started. In this case, the first step is always the most difficult.”260  
When trying to build trust, inspire cohesion among members of the community, and 
motivate locals, the volunteer often found him or herself performing unexpected and unorthodox 
tasks. Scanlon detailed his experience at a dance on a hot afternoon at a local centro. He had to 
“Rock ‘n’ Roll” with every female under 40 and answer questions for six hours about Brenda 
Lee. His recently learned Spanish and microbe-filled intestines made it difficult, but he 
succeeded in gaining the trust of the community. A few weeks later, a local “jitterbug” from the 
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dance recognized him in Osorno and approached Scanlon about helping the community build a 
new school.
261
  
A brochure for community development in the Peace Corps attempted to capture the 
social and psychological social dynamics of development. Put succinctly, community 
development was a matter of “individuals getting together talking, suggesting, discovering and 
then utilizing their resources in an effort to achieve an objective.”262 The author of the brochure 
claimed that community development was also about converting a house into a home.
263
  
Everyone in the family must learn to manage the home’s appliances and equipment. 
Accordingly, the volunteer in the Peace Corps must explain the basic elements involved, 
including cooking, nutrition, sanitation, and hygiene. A home needed a head of the family who 
worked and earned money. That entailed learning a new trade and incorporating his or her 
service into the larger community. In this way, the entire family was to become “integrated into 
the pattern of society as a responsible social unit.”264 In a sense, volunteers functioned 
simultaneously as social workers, family educators, health assistants, sanitation experts, 
construction workers, and teachers of vocational arts. Through the joint efforts of the volunteers 
and the community members, locals were to learn to recognize the available resources and then 
to use them to improve their surroundings on a do-it-yourself basis.  
The process of community development was not just a matter of a man or woman getting 
a job and making some money. It was a matter of people coming to value in the community 
itself. If they did value community, they could work to improve it by maintaining parks, cleaning 
streets, forming neighborhood associations and watches, and working together to improve the 
place in which they live. Shriver designed the Peace Corps to develop entire national economies 
in the Third World. That could not occur with a population that valued only individual wants or 
distrusted change. National development started with motivating individuals to improve their 
communities. Together, hundreds of community development projects would create a nationwide 
                                                 
261
 Ibid. 
262
 Office of Public Affairs, Community Development—Opportunities for Junior College Graduates in the Peace 
Corps (Washington D.C.: Office of Public Affairs, 1961), 2. 
263
 Ibid. 
264
 Ibid. 
75 
 
effort and help develop the entire country. Developing Third World nations did not begin with 
installing a large steel mill. It began by motivating individuals to improve their communities and 
helping them overcome fatalism and fear of change. Valuing change, valuing community, and 
valuing self-motivation had far more significance than building a massive steel plant. The 
volunteer in the Peace Corps who helped locals change their values set the foundation for long-
term, self-sustained, and irreversible change. A factory could be shut down, but motivated people 
could not. Kennedy’s pledge in his inaugural address to “help people help themselves” held this 
message. 
The community-level approach held many similarities to the approach used in 
Mobilization for Youth. The staff of both intended to motivate locals to improve their entire 
community. The key to improving the community was to change the cultural values and the 
psychology of its residents. The same logic applied to a Visiting Mother who taught a neighbor 
to sew in order to prevent juvenile delinquency as to the volunteer who danced the jitterbug in 
order to create a democratic, industrialized nation. Once staff created trust, motivation, and 
community spirit, they could be put to any purpose.  
Those who set policy for the Gray Areas Program also designed the program using the 
same logic of the need for individual motivation, community coordination, and local leadership. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Ford Foundation funded a series of community-based 
programs to end juvenile delinquency and to combat the deteriorating conditions in American 
urban areas. The projects included both MFY and Gray Areas Program. Historian Alice 
O’Connor explained: “Based on ideas drawn from sociology and urban planning, these 
experiments combined institutional reform, citizen participation, and social scientific planning in 
an attempt to develop models for comprehensive, coordinated social intervention in poor urban 
communities.”265 Through the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Robert 
Kennedy, President John Kennedy devoted federal money to start Gray Areas Projects in 
Philadelphia, Boston, and New Haven. 
Economist Raymond Vernon coined the term “gray areas” to refer to the “zone[s] of 
deterioration,” or neighborhood slums, between the central city business district and the suburbs. 
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These areas consisted neither completely of business and manufacturing sites nor of residential 
homes. New immigrants (e.g., African Americans, Latinos, and white Appalachians) occupied 
these areas as they struggled to gain a foothold in the larger city. However, abandoned by both 
industry and the white middle class, these gray areas no longer were staging grounds for 
assimilation and upward mobility as they had for generations of European immigrants. Instead, 
the areas became stagnant backwaters, not completely commercial or residential, easy to move 
into but difficult to rise out of. In a sense they were areas in transition without the internal ability 
to complete the transformation. They were stuck in the middle, not black or white, but an in-
between shade of gray.  
Director of Public Affairs Paul Ylvisaker designed the Gray Areas Program to enable 
people within the “gray areas” to complete this transition. In 1948 Ylvisaker earned a Ph.D. from 
Harvard in political economy and government. After graduation he worked as aide to 
Philadelphia Mayor Joe Clark. By the mid-to-late 1950s Ylvisaker became disillusioned by the 
power struggles within schemes for redevelopment by metropolitan governments. When Joe 
Clark became a U.S. Senator in 1954, Ylvisaker moved on to work for the Ford Foundation and 
start a new approach to urban development. 
With little confidence in the ability to change the urban power structures, Ylvisaker 
focused on the people who lived in the “gray areas.” He believed that the best catalyst for change 
were the people themselves. To understand the people’s plight, he applied the sociological 
interpretations that had been developed in the 1950s about ways that cultural values prevented 
escape from poverty. In line with Cloward and Ohlin’s theory explaining juvenile delinquency, 
Ylvisaker believed that schools, social welfare agencies, and political institutions in gray areas 
monopolized power and blocked the opportunities for poor people to reform the slum. He 
claimed that this process caused a “crisis of metropolitanization.”266 According to Ylvisaker, the 
concentration of poor people who had little power to change the slum formed an alternative set 
of values from the adaptations made to survive in their situation. At their most basic level, 
limited opportunities sapped the motivation of people in the gray areas to fight for a better life.  
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Ylvisaker believed that the solution was to “perfect the process of assimilation and make 
these culturally backward new migrants into first-class citizens.”267 Historian O’Connor stated 
that Ylvisaker defined the problem “in terms of a very traditional philanthropic concern: 
changing the culture and behavior of the poor.”268  
To accomplish his task, Ylvisaker organized monthly sessions in New Haven and invited 
a wide range of experts on poverty. Two key officials who attended the meeting were Kermit 
Gordon, an economist with the Bureau of the Budget, and Adam Yarmolinsky, an analyst in the 
Department of Defense. Both would eventually be members of the Poverty Task Force created 
by Lyndon Johnson. Through them the methods of the Gray Areas Program were incorporated 
into the War on Poverty. Ylvisaker, staff members of the Gray Areas Program, and experts who 
attended the monthly sessions determined that a lack of coordination between residents, 
community resources, and institutions in the neighborhood created barriers to opportunity. For 
example, in New Haven the police did not coordinate with the schools, which did not coordinate 
with the social workers, who did not coordinate with the local government.  
As with MFY and the Peace Corps, policymakers of the Gray Areas Program sought a 
method that could coordinate all of the community’s resources. The project sent social workers 
to demonstrate job skills to the poor. Workers also helped to organize local poor people into 
committees that could design programs to help poverty-stricken people to improve their 
neighborhoods.
269
 However, unlike MFY and the Peace Corps, the Gray Areas’ policymakers 
followed a much more top-down approach that afforded little power to the local people. Charles 
Silberman, editor of Fortune magazine, explained that “the notion that citizens conceivably 
might want to speak for themselves obviously never occurred to the academicians, government 
officials, and ‘civic leaders.’”270 The top-down approach that limited local people’s power  
quickly compromised the program’s effectiveness among residences. One of the most 
noteworthy incidents occurred when Mitchell Sviridoff, the director of New Haven’s Gray Areas 
Project, refused to support efforts by the community to arrange a team of lawyers to defend three 
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African-American men accused of raping a white nurse. Members of the community accused the 
program of being racist and antagonistic to the grassroots leadership of African Americans.  
Despite the issues that surfaced once the Gray Areas Program began to operate, the 
overall methodology of the program would eventually be incorporated into Johnson’s War on 
Poverty—albeit with more power afforded to the locals. Ylvisaker’s attempt to coordinate locals, 
community resources, and institutions in the neighborhood and to fund the operation with local, 
state, and federal funds resonated with officials and social scientists in the War on Poverty.  
Taken together, the Mobilization for Youth, Peace Corps, and Gray Areas Program set a 
number of justifications and methodologies about poverty and how to alleviate it that would 
become incorporated into the War on Poverty. Each program was created independently for 
separate causes. Robert Kennedy, Richard Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin, and Walter Miller created 
MFY to reduce juvenile delinquency. John Kennedy, Sargent Shriver, Walt Rostow, and Max 
Millikan created the Peace Corps to develop nations in the Third World into capitalist 
democracies. Paul Ylvisaker, Kermit Gordon, and Adam Yarmolinsky intended the Gray Areas 
Program to enable locals who lived in an urban “site of deterioration” to achieve upward 
economic mobility. All three programs were the first to incorporate into governmental programs 
social scientific theories developed in the 1950s. In short, all three explained their specific issue 
as a problem of cultural values; locals lacked motivation and needed an outside intervention to 
inspire self-help. Finally, all three programs used community development as the methodology to 
resolve their issue. Community development involved orchestrating local residents and 
community services to create a broad attack on the cultural values among the locals that limited 
opportunities to economic development. The full set of methods needed in community 
development entailed securing funding from local, regional, national, and occasionally 
international sources. In all three programs, makers of policy intended community development 
to grant power to the local people so that they could independently gain confidence and 
motivation, form committees, create plans, utilize community resources, and carry out self-help 
projects.  In short, policymakers intended community development to inspire locals to carry out 
self-help projects with limited government funding. Put another way, it was supposed to help 
people help themselves.  
After reading MacDonald’s review of Harrington’s The Other America, Kennedy 
initiated a paradigm shift by bringing together governmental officials and social scientists from 
79 
 
each program. Together, they would unify the concept of foreign and domestic poverty. The men 
and women who ran the War on Poverty viewed poverty and all of its manifestations (such as 
delinquency, limited industrialization, and urban decay) as products of cultural values such as a 
propensity toward violence, political apathy, fear of change, and low valuation of education. 
Also, policymakers and social scientists in the War on Poverty incorporated elements of each 
model of community development into anti-poverty programs of the Great Society. 
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Chapter 4 -  “Absolutely Sort of Normal”: The Paradigm Shift 
As president, John F. Kennedy represented many firsts. He was the first president born in 
the twentieth century, the first Roman Catholic president, and first president to not regularly 
wear a hat. Kennedy cultivated his youthful image and portrayed his administration as 
representing a new, modern America. In his Inaugural Address, as his first message to 
Americans as president, Kennedy described his administration as “symbolizing an end, as well as 
a beginning—signifying renewal, as well as change.”271 He continued by claiming that “the torch 
has been passed to a new generation of Americans.”272 Kennedy called his administration’s 
foreign and domestic programs the New Frontier. During the Democratic Convention of 1960 he 
had explained that “beyond that frontier are uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved 
problems of peace and war, unconquered problems of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered 
questions of poverty and surplus.”273  
Kennedy consciously sought change. Dwight Eisenhower celebrated America’s 
affluence; Kennedy came to focus on its citizens’ poverty. Poverty was the 71st word Kennedy 
spoke as President, and he identified it as a major issue of the New Frontier.
274
 This chapter 
argues that Kennedy initiated a paradigm shift by bringing together those who made policy so 
that they could discuss poverty and shape a solution for the poor. Together, after discussing 
issues of poverty over the course of a year, they formed a single mentality that explained poverty 
and all of its manifestations as the result of cultural values. They came to see the psychology of 
the poor and the culture of the slum as responsible for creating and perpetuating poverty, juvenile 
delinquency, urban decay, limited industrialization, illiteracy, unemployment, political apathy, 
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bad housing, poor diets, and drug use. As Bertrand Harding, Director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity from 1968 to 1969, explained: 
Being poor today is having many problems all at once. It is not just that a man is 
unemployed temporarily. He is, let us say, the child of a broken home in a slum, a 
functional illiterate, and a despairing personality. If the Government improves his 
housing, but leaves his literacy, unemployment and pessimism where they were, then 
perhaps the housing project will become dangerous, even slum-like, or it will be found 
then a manpower training program can’t reach him because he can’t read, and that even if 
you teach him to read, the values of the slum are constantly motivating him to drop out of 
the very program which is trying to help him.
275
 
 
Although Kennedy did not live to see the full extent of the process he started, his actions 
led to the War on Poverty, one of the largest governmental efforts on behalf of the poor in 
American history. More than just a large effort by the government, in light of Kennedy’s 
openness and hope for change, the efforts to alleviate poverty were within the new mentality that 
attributed people’s financial plight to their cultural values. As Harding stated, makers of policy in 
the War on Poverty viewed the poor person’s “despairing personality” and the “values of the 
slum” as responsible for perpetuating poverty generation after generation and ensuring that all 
governmental aid was in vain.  
Accordingly, scholars should not view the renewed emphasis on poverty in the early 
1960s as just a matter of more governmental attention to the poor—although this was part of it 
—but rather as entailing a new paradigm used among those who made policy that led them to 
understand poverty as the effect of a despairing personality and as the embodiment of the values 
of the slum. Their understanding that cultural values caused and perpetuated poverty led those 
who made policy to identify distinct sources of poverty and methods to end it.  
The new paradigm and mentality had precursors. Elements of the mentality had existed 
before February 1963—the date when Kennedy read Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael 
Harrington’s The Other America and instructed the Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, Walter Heller, to investigate the problem of poverty in America. Notably, makers of 
policy for Mobilization for Youth (MFY), the Peace Corps, and the Gray Areas Program all 
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founded their programs on the logic that cultural values accounted for their respective issues—
such as juvenile delinquency, limited industrialization, and urban decay. As men and women 
from these seemingly disparate programs came together at Kennedy’s and Heller’s prompting, 
they came to believe that they had all been working on separate manifestations of the same larger 
problem, the culture of poverty. The culture of poverty included poor people’s despairing 
personalities and the values of the slum. Those who made policy concluded that the need to 
eliminate the culture of poverty unified all of their programs’ aims. Accordingly, community 
action—the method developed in MFY, the Peace Corps, and the Gray Areas Program—could 
work for every one of their programs as well as for the War on Poverty. As Sargent Shriver 
stated after speaking with domestic makers of policy about community action in America, “In 
fact, community action—which the people in community action thought was so revolutionary—
was something that we had been running in the Peace Corps for four years before it ever got into 
the War on Poverty. So I thought community action was absolutely sort of normal. To me it was 
routine; to them it was a giant revolution.”276 
Kennedy’s prompting allowed all members of the task force to see their respective efforts 
as parts of a larger process. Makers of policy experienced a gestalt shift. They came to 
reconceive their past efforts and as well as their current experiences within a new paradigm that 
explained poverty as the result of cultural values. Historian Peter Novick explained that, “with a 
new paradigm, not only what counted as an explanation but what counted as facts could change, 
along with the meaning of key terms.”277 He continued: “It was a quite unselfconscious and 
unquestioned conviction about the way things are. Paradigms were not just constitutive of 
science; they were, in an important sense, constitutive of nature as well.…The paradigm defined 
both what were relevant soluble problems and what, within the assumptions and of the paradigm, 
constituted universally satisfactory solutions.”278 Now, the programs that had seemingly been 
designed for different issues—juvenile delinquency, foreign economic development, and urban 
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revitalization—were all part of a single overarching effort to end the culture of poverty around 
the world – which meant at home as well as abroad.  
Kennedy first developed his interest in poverty during the Democratic presidential 
primary race in West Virginia. While there, Kennedy witnessed the human face of poverty. He 
spoke with people who had suffered the hardships of poverty for decades. Kennedy was struck 
by the sight of people with chronically poor health, bad diets, poorly constructed housing, little 
warm clothing, and scant education.  
Kermit Gordon, the director of the Bureau of the Budget during Kennedy’s last two years 
as President, attributed Kennedy’s concern for poverty to the weeks he spent in West Virginia. 
Gordon claimed: “Kennedy had developed a deep concern about the poverty he himself had 
observed in the hills of West Virginia during the presidential primary of 1960.”279 Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., Presidential adviser and historian, agreed with Gordon that Kennedy’s interest in 
poverty stemmed from his time in West Virginia.
280
 Kennedy’s first executive order as President 
doubled the federally provided rations of surplus food to needy people across America.
281
 
Schlesinger stated that “this was a response to his memories of West Virginia.”282  
For the first two years of his presidency Kennedy did not understand poverty to be the 
result of despairing personalities and the culture of the slum. Kennedy’s own paradigm shift did 
not occur until early 1963. Between January 1961 and February 1963, Kennedy subscribed to 
policies based on Keynesian economics, which were intended to grow aggregate national wealth 
rather than to address directly poor people’s personalities and cultural values.  
Kennedy mainly attempted to grow aggregate national wealth through tax cuts and 
training programs intended to reduce unemployment. Kennedy and the Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) designed the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 (ARA) and Manpower 
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Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA) to reduce unemployment.
283
 The Secretary of 
Labor, Arthur J. Goldberg, explained that advances in technology increasingly automated the 
process of industrial production, thereby eliminating low-skill jobs. As their jobs were 
eliminated, workers with few skills applicable to the new economy were forced to compete for 
scarcer manual-labor positions. Hundreds of thousands became “structurally unemployed.”284 
Regions of the country that had a large number of unemployed low-skill laborers became 
“depressed areas.”285 The Labor Department used the ARA and MDTA to retrain these laborers 
so that they could gain a new skill set, transition into new fields of work, and secure a job. 
Kennedy and Heller also designed a tax cut to grow national wealth. Historian Alice 
O’Connor explained that, for the Kennedy administration, the tax cut became the “centerpiece of 
its growth agenda.”286 Kennedy and Heller proposed to grow the national economy by raising 
personal incomes, increasing private consumption, and encouraging capital investment. Kennedy 
and Heller designed the bill to reduce the tax rate for the top income bracket from 91% to 65%, 
the lowest income bracket from 20% to 14%, and the rate of tax on corporations from 52% to 
47%. Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1964 after Kennedy’s assassination, including these 
provisions. 
The training programs and tax cut were based on older conceptions of how to reduce 
poverty. During the New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt had mainly created programs to put 
Americans to work and reduce unemployment. To Roosevelt, poverty was caused simply enough 
by unemployment. After WW II, Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower sought to 
increase national prosperity by stimulating consumption. As noted in Chapter Two, both 
presidents intended to increase consumption to grow the American economy and benefit all 
Americans—including the rich and poor, men and women, African Americans and whites, and 
the young and old. Kennedy’s initial policies toward poverty aligned with these older methods to 
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help poor people. He intended the ARA and MDTA to reduce unemployment. He designed the 
tax cut to spur consumption. In short, none of the policies directly or indirectly addressed 
poverty in Kennedy’s first two years concentrated on the issues of despairing personalities or of 
the values of the slum. 
Once put in practice, the ARA and MDTA—the tax cut passed through Congress only 
after Kennedy’s assignation—failed to produce the desired effect and satisfy Kennedy and his 
administration. Schlesinger explained: “The decline in joblessness from 6.7 per cent of the labor 
force in 1961 to 5.6 per cent in 1962 left the level far above the 4 per cent economists were 
willing to tolerate; and the re-employment rate was slower than in any comparable post-recession 
period since the Second World War.”287 Schlesinger also asserted that Congress appropriated too 
small of a budget for the ARA. Only 150,000 Americans were in training under the MDTA, a 
number far below what was needed to help the 4 million Americans who were out of work and 3 
million who worked only part-time.
288
  
Members of Kennedy’s administration doubted that consumption and training would help 
poor people. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith, then the U.S. Ambassador to India, told 
Kennedy that he believed that a consumption-based economy exacerbated the problem of 
poverty by neglecting public services that helped poor people.
289
 Galbraith sought to inform 
others who made policy that the U.S. government faced a “New Poverty.” Galbraith explained 
the New Poverty in a book he published in 1958 entitled The Affluent Society.
290
 Historian 
Lizabeth Cohen explains that Galbraith “blamed the voracious American pursuit of private 
consumption and the engines of corporate advertising that fed it for neglecting ‘social 
consumption’—the roads, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure needed for a humane 
society.”291 She continued that “with the overwhelming sense of economic insecurity gone from 
people’s lives, and with the truce on inequality, ‘we are left with a concern only for the 
                                                 
287
 Schlesinger, Jr., 1005. 
288
 Ibid. 
289
 O’Connor, 147. 
290
 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1958). 
291
 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2003), 10. 
86 
 
production of goods.’”292 Galbraith described the circumstances as “private opulence amid public 
squalor.”293 In short, he thought that Kennedy’s attempt to help the poor by cutting taxes, 
increasing consumption, and growing the national economy would be ineffective. Consumption 
would not help poor people; rather it would further exacerbate their situation by creating 
overcrowded schools, under-strength police, dirty streets, and inadequate public 
transportation.
294
  
In light of limited gains in training and the unchanging unemployment rate, others within 
the administration began to reevaluate their efforts. Heller came to focus on areas of the United 
States where governmental efforts proved least effective, such as Appalachia. Heller deemed 
such areas to be “pockets” of “hardcore poverty.”295 Structural policies intended to reform the 
system of taxes or retrain workers for new jobs seemed not to reach the person within hardcore 
poverty. A member of the CEA, Robert Lampman, stated in an oral interview in the late 1960s 
that Heller devoted a great deal of attention to “special problems of the people passed over, left 
out, somehow remaining in Depression-like conditions even though we’d had this great period of 
prosperity after World War II.”296 Heller’s focus made him open to new literature on poverty that 
could possibly explain the plight of people in these pocket of hardcore poverty. Charles L. 
Schultze, the assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, recorded that Heller said to 
Kennedy: “Look, the next logical step in this, since we have gone after the aggregate economy, 
is to find ways of going after the pockets of poverty, not in the depressed-area sense of rural 
areas which you can bypass—or not solely them—but rather just poor people who full 
employment will help in part but won’t fully cure.”297 Historian Scott Stossel asserted that 
“Kennedy began to think differently about poverty: Maybe rather than merely investing in 
industry and tinkering with macroeconomics through a tax cut, he should be investing in ‘public 
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services and human beings.’”298 Heller found Macdonald’s 31-page review of Harrington’s The 
Other America in the New Yorker and passed it along to Kennedy. Macdonald’s review primarily 
focused on Harrington’s work, but it also brought in relevant pieces on poverty from 
governmental studies, social scientists’ articles, and popular publications.  
In the review Kennedy learned of Harrington’s ideas. Harrington argued that blockages to 
opportunity created a structural barrier that the poor could not overcome. As a result, the poor 
adapted and developed a way of life, a culture, suited to a life of poverty. To Kennedy, 
Harrington’s ideas might have appeared new and innovative, yet still in line with policies already 
in existence. In a sense, Harrington combined the structural form of retraining and cutting taxes 
with the emphasis on cultural values within MFY, the Peace Corps, and the Gray Areas Program.  
Macdonald explained that the culture of poverty had many aspects. Not only were poor 
Americans “fatter” and less healthy, they were also psychologically different. He explained that 
the “poor now tend to lack what the sociologists call ‘motivation.’”299 Macdonald quoted 
Harrington: “The structure of the society is hostile to these people. The poor tend to become 
pessimistic and depressed; they seek immediate gratification instead of saving; they act 
out….The depression has become internalized. The poor are not like everyone else…. They think 
and feel differently; they look upon a different America than the middle class looks upon.”300 
Macdonald pointed out that Harrington also quoted researchers of a study at Cornell 
University who claimed that the poor “are rigid, suspicious, and have a fatalistic outlook on life. 
They do not plan ahead. . . .They are prone to depression, have feelings of futility, lack of 
belongingness, friendliness, and a lack of trust in others.”301 The poverty of that time was 
complex, Macdonald explained, because “these characteristics are as much the result of poverty 
as its cause.”302 In short, the poor’s cultural values and poverty were self-perpetuating. 
As that culture became increasingly entrenched and poor people passed down values to 
each succeeding generation, it became more difficult to change someone’s values in order to help 
him or her escape poverty. Macdonald explained that “those left behind tend more and more to 
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be the ones who have for so long accepted poverty as their destiny that they need outside help to 
climb out of it.”303 He lamented that “Children born into poor families today have less chance of 
‘improving themselves’ than the children of the pre-1940 poor. Rags to riches is now more likely 
to be rags to rags.”304  
 Even if economic opportunities now opened to gain upward mobility, such as a new job 
opportunity, poor people’s psychology and the values of the slum kept them from escaping 
poverty. This reveals what Bertrand Harding meant when he said that, “even if you teach him to 
read, the values of the slum are constantly motivating him to drop out of the very program which 
is trying to help him.”305 Macdonald quoted Harrington’s book, saying: “The character of 
poverty has changed, and it has become more deadly for the young. It is no longer associated 
with immigrant groups with high aspirations; it is now identified with those whose social 
existence makes it more and more difficult to break out into the larger society.”306 
Macdonald explained that the problem was greater than just the plight of the poor. He 
asserted that “every citizen has a right to become or remain part of our society because if this 
right is denied, as it is in the case of at least one-fourth of our citizens [the poor], it impoverishes 
us all.”307 Macdonald agreed with Galbraith that general prosperity did not necessarily help the 
poor. 
The numbers of poor were also frightening to Harrington and Macdonald. Macdonald 
claimed that Roosevelt had inaccurately estimated that one third of the country was ill-clad and 
ill-fed. Rather, the number had more likely been two thirds of Americans during the Depression. 
The percentage of poor people in America had decreased since the 1930s, but Harrington 
estimated that one fourth of Americans—40 to 50 million—qualified as poor in 1961.308 As the 
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overall portion of the population who were poor decreased, those who remained poor were 
increasingly more resistant to programs designed to help them. In short, although fewer 
Americans were poor in the 1960s compared with the 1930s, the poverty of the current poor was 
more tenacious. Poverty in the 1960s penetrated the poor person’s psychology. 
In the review, Macdonald quoted Harrington and several others whose studies castigated 
Kennedy for not doing enough to help poor people. Addressing Kennedy directly, Macdonald 
asserted: “The federal government is the only purposeful force—I assume wars are not 
purposeful—that can reduce the numbers of the poor and make their lives more bearable….The 
Federal Budget is the most important single instrument available to us as a free people to induce 
satisfactory economic performance, and to reduce poverty and deprivation.”309 He argued that 
the federal government needed to intervene and directly help poor people. Macdonald asserted 
that earnings, political power, and social unity should not be requirements for aid. Rather “the 
governmental obligation to provide, out of taxes, such a minimum living standard for all who 
need it should be taken as much for granted as free public schools have always been in our 
history.”310 Macdonald ended the review by stating “Until our poor can be proud to say `Civis 
Romanus sum!,’ until the act of justice that would make this possible has been performed by the 
three-quarters of Americans who are not poor—until then the shame of the Other America will 
continue.”311 
Although Kennedy never wrote down his thoughts about the many details of 
Macdonald’s review, four months later he used the same phrase “Civis Romanus sum!” as the 
centerpiece of his famous speech, “Ich bin ein Berliner.” This could have been coincidence, but 
others in the administration did directly record Kennedy’s response to Macdonald’s review. 
Lampman wrote that “Heller got a favorable response again from President Kennedy sometime 
after that, and that as they began to gear up for thinking of at least beginning to explore 
possibilities for the 1964 campaign for reelection, one of those possibilities might be something 
about poverty, something about depressed areas, something about the disadvantaged.”312 In May 
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1963, Kennedy asked Heller to form an informal group in Washington to discuss the meaning of 
an attack on poverty. Heller created the Saturday Group.
313
 
According to Lampman, Heller created the Saturday Group to “pick brains and get 
suggestions and criticism of the idea.”314 Every few Saturdays the Group met in a small 
conference room in the Executive Office Building from 12:00pm until 2:30pm or 3:00pm.  
Whereas the core members of the Group were at the level of assistant secretary, Lampman 
recalled that political scientists, statisticians, lawyers, and other Ph.D.s attended the meetings.
315
 
The setting compared to an academic seminar with long philosophical conversations where 
people freely shared their ideas. Lampman explained that 
We would get into discussions about the definition of poverty….Some people would say 
poverty obviously means lack of money income….But other people said that’s really not 
what poverty means; poverty is more or sometimes even less than money. It’s a spiritual 
concept; or it’s a participation-in-government concept; or it’s a lack of some kind of self-
esteem, sort of a psychological or image problem that people had….Still others would 
say it really has to do with lack of opportunity.
316
 
 
Based on Ted Sorensen’s and Bill Cannon’s prompting, the Group attempted to come up 
with an emphasis and work it into a possible theme for future legislation and a campaign slogan 
for 1964. Members of the CEA discussed expanding current programs to help those poor people 
who had not yet been reached by governmental aid. Others discussed whether to use the 
Agricultural Extension Service to direct aid to depressed rural areas. Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
proposed using the Department of Defense to “recover” kids from disadvantaged backgrounds 
deemed ineligible for the draft.  
Lampman recalled that an emphasis on the power of a cultural environment to shape a 
person’s behavior was one of the main themes that came out of the discussions. Bill Capron 
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explained that poverty “wasn’t a problem. It was a whole constellation of problems with very 
different sources.”317 The members meant cultural environment in the anthropological sense. 
They used it in the same way that Erik Erikson and Margaret Mead did to explain the fact that a 
person’s family and peers shaped his or her personality and values. Capron claimed that 
members of the Health, Education, and Welfare Department (HEW) had presented information 
on what came to be called the culture of poverty. Members of HEW explained during a meeting 
of the Saturday Group that poverty was neither a temporary state nor a condition of 
unemployment caused by disability or age. Poverty was a deeply-rooted affliction that spanned 
generations.
318
 There were families who had been in poverty for generations. Capron asserted 
that “Trying to break the cycle of poverty became one of the themes that some of us tried to 
build into some of the specific program suggestions.”319 Capron recalled that the group had many 
discussions about the works of Dwight Macdonald and Michael Harrington.
320
  
Lampman explained that the Group had not discussed community action or Robert 
Kennedy’s programs to combat juvenile delinquency, but they made clear to President Kennedy 
that poverty was a much larger problem than previously thought and that it was different in 
nature than it had been in the past. In late summer 1963, Kennedy directed Heller to move 
forward with the idea of a federal program to combat poverty and set up an informal task force 
comprised of governmental officials. Kennedy intended the task force to gather suggestions from 
departments and agencies for items that could be included in a possible federal anti-poverty 
program of 1964. The task force included Heller, Capron, Cannon, Kermit Gordon, and Burt 
Weisbord, staff member of CEA. Capron recalled: “The results were perhaps predictably 
disastrous. That is, Heller got a lot of junk. These were warmed-over revisions of proposals that 
had been around for a long time, coming up out of the bureaucracy, programs that had been 
already rejected by the Congress.”321 Capron also thought that the various proposals were 
completely unintegrated and piecemeal. The members of the task force hoped to develop a 
comprehensive program that could inspire the country.  
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Cannon might have been disappointed or frustrated with the piecemeal ideas that had 
been tossed in, but he was happy that at least something else – something different with other 
people – was working more positively. Cannon made a connection in October 1963 with men 
who had been designing a nation-wide program that included programs to alleviate poverty. At 
the prompting of President Kennedy—and his sister Eunice—Robert Kennedy, David Hackett, 
and Richard Boone had been attempting to create a National Service Corps since January 1963. 
Inspired in many ways by the popularity and success of the Peace Corps abroad, Kennedy, 
Hackett, and Boone attempted to design a domestic Peace Corps to help several underserved 
populations including Native Americans, the elderly, residents of tenement houses, the 
chronically sick, the maladjusted, and the mentally ill.
322
 Historian Sheyda Janhanbani explained 
that “the domestic Peace Corps program that eventually became VISTA [Volunteers in Service 
to America] looked to provide the same kind of transformative example to impoverished peoples 
at home that the Peace Corps offered to those who lived in the ‘huts and village’ across the globe 
to which John Kennedy referred in his inaugural address.”323  
Robert Kennedy had been in contact with Heller, Gordon, and Shriver and used many of 
their ideas that they had been working on when he discussed with Congress the bill to create 
National Service Corps.
324
 Kennedy explained: “This bill is a call to service. It is a challenge to 
people of all ages to follow the example of those who are in the Peace Corps—to serve their 
nation by helping other citizens to help themselves.”325 In line with Heller’s description of 
“pockets of poverty,” Kennedy declared that volunteers “would concentrate on the ‘pockets’ of 
need where there are not sufficient people or resource.”326 However, volunteers addressed more 
than only the pockets of poverty. Kennedy explained: “Abundance, we would like to think, is the 
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normal condition of our nation and, whatever poverty prevails, occurs only in little islands within 
our affluent society. This is not true.”327 He continued that volunteers needed to be willing “to 
take on the toughest kind of job in this country, whether it be in a city slum, an Indian 
reservation, or a mining town.”328 Kennedy proposed that the National Service Corps, must be 
just that, national and not regional.  
Kennedy used language directly out of Harrington’s Other America when discussing 
people in need of assistance. Kennedy claimed that “poverty is not merely an aspect of their life. 
It is their life.”329 In the Other America, Harrington wrote “Being poor is not one aspect of a 
person’s life in this country; it is his life.”330 Kennedy described those in need as the “invisible 
millions.”331 Harrington explained that “its millions [the Other America] are socially invisible to 
the rest of us.”332 Kennedy continued by explaining that “They live in a kind of prison from 
which they cannot free themselves without assistance. The impoverished American sees life not 
as an opportunity, but as his fate—as an endless cycle from which there is no relief. We be must 
bring to this problem a new and creative movement.”333 Harrington had described poverty as a 
prison and as a cycle. He also explained that poor people were fatalistic and needed a concerted 
movement to changed their psychology and values.
334
  
Kennedy used the example of six hypothetical Corpsmen on the reservation of the San 
Carlos Apache Tribal Council to explain volunteers’ tasks to Congress. Two volunteers would be 
general construction workers, constructing and maintaining the plumbing, wiring, carpentry, and 
masonry of homes. A third Corpsman who was trained in agricultural assistance would teach 
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“techniques of animal husbandry, family gardening, small machinery maintenance and repair.”335 
Two more volunteers would have teaching experience and work with adults to improve reading, 
writing, and accounting skills. The final Corpsman would “work with families on nutrition, 
infant care, preservation of food, and home medical care.”336 In time, Kennedy proposed, each 
volunteer would be able to pass the responsibility on to the tribal members and they could 
continue self-help programs.  
The contours of the paradigm started to come together as the National Service Corps was 
a nation-wide attack on poverty, created by members of MFY and the Gray Area Program, 
inspired by the Peace Corps. Social scientists came to embrace a cultural model for explaining 
differences in the 1950s. In the early 1960s that model became incorporated into the 
governmental programs of MFY, the Peace Corps, and the Gray Areas Program. Now, the 
National Service Corps began to bring together the people and ideas involved with MFY, the 
Peace Corps, and Gray Areas. Policies that had been used to alleviate foreign and domestic 
poverty, juvenile delinquency, and urban decay were coming together under a single program.  
But the fusion was not fully completed under the National Service Corps. Members of the 
international Peace Corps had not fully embraced the domestic effort. Stephen J. Pollak, a lawyer 
for Kennedy’s task force explained that “the Peace Corps was not a big booster of the domestic 
Peace Corps. I never thought that it was created out of the overseas Peace Corps. Really the idea 
was developed and launched more from the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency; and Robert 
Kennedy, Dick Boone, Dave Hackett, [were] the ones that I associate with the idea.”337  
The disconnection between members of the Peace Corps and the domestic effort came 
partly from their lack of time to devote to other programs. That is, the Peace Corps had existed 
for just over a year when Kennedy began to design the domestic program. Shriver and others in 
the Peace Corps devoted all of their time and effort into starting, expanding, and running the new 
international program. They had little time to devote to a domestic effort.
338
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 Another part of the disconnection came from a debate over whether domestic and foreign 
poverty were the same. Was a person in Guatemala poor for the same reason as a person in 
Georgia? Were the causes, manifestations, and consequences of poverty the same in Boston as in 
Botswana? Robert Kennedy equated domestic and foreign poverty. He claimed that “[poor 
Americans] may not be as poor as the poor of underdeveloped nations. But in a meaningful 
sense, they are at a disadvantage compared to those needy people.”339 Shriver disagreed. In 1964 
Shriver would experience the paradigm shift and equate foreign and domestic poverty, but not 
before. He explained that in 1963 John Kenneth Galbraith “was agitating with me that I ought to 
reach out and make . . . [a domestic corps] a part of the general Peace Corps effort. I was saying, 
‘No, it’s a different thing. The Peace Corps is working very well in the area for which it is 
structured to work, and it’s a success. What we don’t want to do,’ I said to Ken Galbraith, ‘is to 
attach to it something that looks the same but is different, and injures the success of the Peace 
Corps by attaching to it something which is not the same thing except superficially.’”340 In his 
1961 book, Harrington claimed that foreign and domestic poverty were different. Harrington 
explained that “the other American is not impoverished in the same sense as those poor nations 
where millions cling to hunger as a defense against starvation.
341
 
This debate and disagreement revealed that not all who made policy had experienced the 
paradigm shift yet in 1963. Many people in the Kennedy administration agreed that specific 
types of personalities and cultural values produced both foreign and domestic poverty, but not all 
agreed yet that foreign and domestic poverty were the same. This lack of unity partly explains 
why in 1963 the Peace Corps—widely popular among the American public—failed to become 
replicated in America. The National Service Corps passed in the Senate but failed to pass in the 
House. Pollak attributed its failure to pass to the bill’s lack of coherence. He explained that the 
bill lacked an overarching organizing principle. Instead, in different areas it emphasized attention 
to the mentally ill, Native Americans, dwellers in tenement houses, farmers, the illiterate, and 
those in depressed areas. Later, in the War on Poverty the concept of a culture of poverty unified 
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all these areas under a single concept of the culture of poverty. But in 1963 the bill for the 
National Service Corps did not state that all of these various issues resulted from deleterious 
cultural values. Pollak explained that the domestic program did not get “impressed with the 
heavy poverty input until spring of 1964, when it was added to the antipoverty bill.”342 
But John Kennedy and others did not give up the effort to create a domestic program to 
alleviate poverty. During a cabinet meeting on October 29, 1963, Schlesinger recalled peeking at 
Kennedy’s yellow-lined pad for notes and seeing “the doodles show the word ‘poverty’ half a 
dozen times, encircled and underlined.”343 Schlesinger added that, “One day in November, 
musing about the 1964 State of the Union message, he [Kennedy] remarked to me, ‘the time has 
come to organize a national assault on the causes of poverty, a comprehensive program, across 
the board.’”344 Schlesinger claimed that Kennedy planned to make poverty at home “the 
centerpiece of his 1964 campaign.”345 Heller recalled Kennedy telling him on November 19, 
1963, to “Keep your boys at work” on the plan to create a nation-wide federal program to combat 
poverty to be initiated in 1964. Two days later, Kennedy was assassinated.  
Once he became President, Lyndon Johnson continued the process started by Kennedy by 
creating a new, larger task force to study poverty and by making the topic the centerpiece of his 
administration. Kennedy’s death stunned the nation, including those in government who had 
been working on a program to deal with poverty. Bill Cannon recalled talking on November 23 
with Heller, Capron, Sorenson, Gordon, Paul Ylvisaker, and Mike Sviridoff and then deciding to 
continue to meet about poverty and community action.
346
 Later that day Heller met with Johnson 
for forty minutes. Heller explained to Johnson that “the very last substantive conversation that I 
had had with Kennedy was about a poverty program.” Heller continued that “his reaction 
immediately was, ‘That’s my kind of program. I’ll find money for it one way or another. If I 
have to, I’ll take money away from things to get money for people.’”347 In his State of the Union 
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Address on January 8, 1964, just 47 days after Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson declared that 
“This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America.”348 
Johnson had a longer concern about poverty and a more personal experience of it than 
Kennedy had had. Johnson’s father, Samuel Ealy Johnson, Jr., suffered terrible bouts of 
alcoholism that Lyndon attributed to the poverty he suffered from failed business ventures. He 
never forgot how alcoholism had strained Samuel’s relationship with the rest of the family and 
the fact that poverty forced them to suffer hardships that he believed had been unnecessary.
349
 
His family had always relied on the good will and charity of neighbors in Johnson County, Texas 
when Samuel went on alcoholic binges and disappeared for weeks at a time.  
In addition to his childhood experience, Johnson worked with poor people when he was a 
young teacher. In the summer of 1927, Johnson took a break from attending classes at Southwest 
Texas State Teachers College to teach at a school in Cortulla, Texas. Johnson wanted to get 
teaching experience. Located in Brush County, just south of San Antonio, Cortulla was a poor 
town. Historian Robert Caro claims that at Welhausen School, where Johnson taught, over 
ninety-five percent of students identified themselves as Mexican.
350
 Johnson was exposed first-
hand to the hardships experienced by Mexican-Americans. Years later, in a speech arguing for 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Johnson recalled: “They knew in their youth the pain of 
prejudice….They never seemed to know why people disliked them. But they knew it was so, 
because I saw it in their eyes….All I knew was to teach them the little I knew, hoping that it 
might help them against the hardship that lay ahead…. Somehow you never forget what poverty 
and hatred can do when you see the scars on the hopeful face of a young child.”351 The 
experience invigorated Johnson’s desire to help the less fortunate. In 1964 Vernon Alden, then 
president of Ohio University, had a conversation with Johnson in which Johnson tried to get 
Alden to head planning of the Job Corps. Alden recalled that “President Johnson reminisced 
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about his youth, his teaching experiences, and his very early concern for poor people. He said 
that he had been dirt-poor himself, that he had always wanted to do something for poor folks.”352 
Finally, from 1935 to 1937 Johnson served as the Texas Director of the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) as part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal. As Director he worked to 
provide vocational training for unemployed youth and also part-time work for needy students 
attending colleges and universities in Texas. Heller later recalled that, “In the poverty program, 
[Johnson] was extremely demanding….he kept referring time and again to his National Youth 
Administration experience in the thirties. He liked the idea of learning while doing, learning 
through doing.”353 
Kennedy started the paradigm shift, Johnson continued it, and Shriver completed it. 
Johnson created a more extensive task force on poverty than Kennedy had and appointed Sargent 
Shriver as its head.
354
 Within a year, Shriver and his task force created the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) and launched the administration’s War on Poverty. For three years Shriver 
simultaneously served as the head of the international Peace Corps and domestic War on 
Poverty. As the head of the Peace Corps, Shriver unified the concept of foreign and domestic 
poverty by bringing together, under the same task force, members who had been working 
separately on either foreign or domestic poverty. Once together and in conversation, the 
members came to believe that they had all been working on separate manifestations of the same 
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issue, the culture of poverty. Specific types of personalities and values seen in the slum also 
manifested in rural poverty in Appalachia, a stagnant national economy in Peru, juvenile 
delinquency in inner-city New York, lawlessness in Micronesia, political apathy in Chicago, low 
educational achievement in Ghana, and broken families in Oklahoma City. In short, the members 
of the task force experienced a paradigm shift that unified their previous efforts under a new 
intellectual framework. Now, juvenile delinquency was an aspect of the culture of poverty. The 
culture of poverty created urban decay. The culture of poverty led to limited development and 
industrialization. The culture of poverty unified foreign and domestic spheres and had caused all 
their respective issues.  
If the cause was the same—the culture of poverty—the cure could be the same, too. In 
1963 Shriver had told Galbraith that foreign and domestic poverty were only similar 
superficially. Within a year of becoming the head of the War on Poverty, Shriver experienced a 
change in mindset, a paradigm shift. During an oral interview in 1980, Shriver described what 
his mindset became in 1964: 
Now in fact, doing community development in Ecuador is, philosophically and 
substantially, no different than doing the same thing in some West Virginia hollow. Now 
I’m not trying to say West Virginia hollows are like Ecuador, but the concept of going 
into Ecuador to try to help people decide their own problems, and to energize them, 
motivate them, assist them to be able to handle their own problems themselves, is no 
different than the psychology you take into West Virginia or to the South Bronx. In the 
Peace Corps one called this process community development; in the war against poverty, 
we called it Community Action.
355
 
 
He continued: “when we started to organize the War on Poverty, the domestic voluntary 
movement was germane to that. It was smack dab on the point, you might say. As a part of the 
War on Poverty, it was like hitting the nail on the head with a hammer. So I didn’t have any 
inhibition whatsoever about putting it into the War on Poverty.”356  
In short, both community development in the Peace Corps and the voluntary movement 
under MFY, Gray Areas Program, and proposed National Service Corps came together as one 
concept under the War on Poverty. The paradigm shift made the two become one in both 
philosophy and action.  
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Johnson appointed Shriver over his objection. Shriver was in Pakistan on the day of 
Johnson’s State of the Union Address and declaration of an unconditional war on poverty. Three 
weeks later, when Shriver returned to Washington D.C. on January 31, he found a car waiting to 
take him to the White House. Johnson wanted to see him right away. Once he arrived at the 
White House, Shriver started to report to Johnson on the state of the Peace Corps. Johnson said: 
“That’s great, Sarge, that’s really wonderful. Let’s go for a walk.”357 Johnson took Shriver to the 
Rose Garden near the south lawn of the White House. Johnson told Shriver that he would like to 
get started on the program to alleviate poverty in the United States. Johnson explained to Shriver 
that “we are learning that the poor inhabit a nation within the nation, locked into a cycle of 
despair by lack of skills, poor health, and inadequate education.”358 He continued: “Now you 
know we’re getting this War on Poverty started, Sarge. I’d like you to think about that, because 
I’d like you to run that program for us.”359  
The next day Johnson called Shriver at home and told him, “Sarge, I’m gonna announce 
your appointment at the press conference.”360 More, Johnson said that the press conference was 
that afternoon. Shriver responded: “Oh God, I think it would be advisable, if you don’t mind, if I 
could have the weekend. I wanted to sit down with a couple of people and see what we could get 
in the way of some sort of plan.”361 Shriver told Johnson that he feared that he would be unable 
to answer reporters’ questions. Johnson informed Shriver that “I want to announce this and get it 
behind me, so I’ll quit getting all these other pressures.”362  
Shriver had two major reasons to object. First, he feared that the Peace Corps would 
suffer if Johnson appointed him as the head of the War on Poverty in America. Shriver feared 
that all his work creating, running, and expanding the Peace Corps would be at risk if the word 
got out that he was going to leave. Shriver told Johnson that “this will be a bombshell” for the 
people in the Peace Corps.
363
 In his characteristically coarse style, Johnson explained: “it’ll be a 
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promotion! You’ve got your identification with the Peace Corps. You’ve got everything you ever 
had there plus this. I don’t know why they would object to that. Unless you’ve got some women 
that you think you won’t have enough time to spend with them.”364 
Shriver’s second reason to object was that he thought that he knew nothing about poverty 
in America. He explained to Johnson that he “didn’t know beans about it, because I’ve been 
overseas.”365 Johnson demanded: “Well, you don’t need to know much….You’ll have an 
international Peace Corps—one abroad and one at home….I’m going to make it clear that you’re 
Mr. Poverty, at home and abroad.”366 
Johnson had political reasons to appoint Shriver as the head of the War on Poverty. 
Johnson believed that Kennedy’s assassination had made Congress more receptive to his 
proposals, but only for an unknown but limited amount of time. He needed to seize this window 
of opportunity to start the War on Poverty and appoint its head.  
Second, Johnson wanted to maintain a connection to the Kennedy administration while 
still creating a program that was distinctly his own. Shriver perfectly fit this criterion. The Peace 
Corps had given Shriver experience alleviating poverty. More, Shriver was not associated with 
any domestic programs to combat poverty. Therefore Americans and Congress knew him as a 
confidant of Kennedy, someone who had successfully created a program to combat poverty, but 
also as someone who was still new to poverty in America. Johnson could use this to tap into 
favor among Americans toward the deceased President, while also creating a domestic program 
separate from the past administration.  
Appointing Shriver also helped Johnson arrest the power of Robert Kennedy. Johnson 
had disliked Robert for years. Although Robert was associated with John Kennedy and had 
already created the bill for a National Service Corps, Johnson thought that appointing Robert to 
run the War on Poverty would sacrifice his own power over the program.  It would also make 
Americans look at the War on Poverty as a product of Kennedy’s administration and not 
Johnson’s. Johnson wanted power and recognition. Appointing Shriver best enabled Johnson to 
accomplish both.  
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Lastly, Johnson wanted to prevent any public criticism from Robert. Johnson believed 
that because Americans associated Shriver with the Kennedys, Robert, or any of his close 
associates, would be unable to publicly criticize the program.  
Johnson’s appointment of Shriver was important to the paradigm shift because it brought 
together people who had been working separately on foreign and domestic poverty. In short, the 
appointment intellectually unified several existing programs that had been created individually 
and run separately. Robert Kennedy, David Hackett, and Dick Boone connected juvenile 
delinquency and urban decay to nationwide poverty when developing the National Service 
Corps. Now Shriver brought in people who added input from the overseas Peace Corps. Taken 
together, a paradigm shift occurred that unified the conception of and remedy for foreign and 
domestic poverty, juvenile delinquency, and urban decay.  
Shriver’s first undertaking as the head of the War on Poverty was to create a task force to 
research the subject, create programs, and implement them. Shriver had ideas from his 
experience in the Peace Corps, but he was at first unsure whether they would be applicable to the 
domestic effort. He knew and liked community development as it had been run in the Peace 
Corps. But he did not know if community development would be a large enough program to use 
the entire $500 million that Johnson had earmarked for the War on Poverty. Shriver recalled:  
I called Dick Lee, who was the mayor of New Haven. I called him because New Haven 
had been one of the cities selected by the Ford Foundation and by the juvenile delinquency 
operation for a community action program. I said, ‘Hey, Dick, you’ve been running this 
Gray Areas Program up there in New Haven for a couple of years now. Is that right?’ He 
said yes. I said, ‘well, how much are you spending on it?’ I think he told me it was 
something like $3.5 million. So I said to him, “Dick, you’ve got a city of 150,000 people. 
Tell me, how much money could you spend in New Haven, if there were no restriction 
whatsoever, to combat poverty and you could do whatever you think is necessary?’ My 
memory is that he said, ‘Well, we could probably spend $9 or $10 million.367 
Shriver listed out all of the cities in America with 150,000 people or more (the size of 
New Haven in 1964). He then calculated that if each city spent $9 to $10 million, the total budget 
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would come to $300 million. This was far below the $500 million that Johnson had set aside for 
the program.  
In addition to the financial aspect of community development, Shriver was unsure if 
poverty in America was the same as poverty in foreign countries. So he directed his task force to 
study poverty in America. Shriver could not recruit any members of Johnson’s staff. When 
Shriver requested that Bill Moyers or Mike Feldman join the task force, Johnson yelled at him, 
“No, now don’t go raiding the White House! Go on and get your own damn talent.”368 Shriver 
did. Cut off from the Johnson’s personal staff in the White House, Shriver recruited members 
from programs all over America and the world. 
 Bertrand Harding described the process and meetings as “a beautiful hysteria.”369 Shriver 
had an ad hoc organizational style. The task force had permanent members, occasional 
contributors, and invited guests. Shriver contended that poverty defied rigid institutional 
boundaries so he cultivated an intellectual free-for-all where people could openly share and 
discuss their ideas.
370
  
First, Shriver recruited Adam Yarmolinsky as his top deputy. Yarmolinsky was the 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and had helped Paul Ylvisaker design the Gray 
Areas Program. Next, Shriver enlisted Frank Mankiewicz. Mankiewicz was the representative of 
the Peace Corps in Peru. Mankiewicz happened to be in Washington D.C. to testify before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee about the Peace Corps’ actions in Latin America. Mankiewicz 
also was friends with Michael Harrington, whom he introduced to Shriver and invited to the task 
force’s meetings.  
Shriver also spoke with Heller, Gordon, Cannon, and Charles Schultze, who informed 
him, Yarmolinsky, and Mankiewicz about what had already been done by the Bureau of the 
Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers. Stossel explained that Schultze had told Shriver 
and his task force that the War on Poverty should get at the “root causes of poverty, not simply to 
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mitigate its effects.”371 The program would be one that “sought to improve education and family 
living environments, so that residents of poor neighborhoods would develop the skills and self-
assurance to lift themselves out of poverty.”372 Schultze identified the PCJD, MFY, and the Gray 
Areas Program as examples of how community action should work. Heller and Gordon 
explained to Shriver that the entire $500 million should go to a nationwide network of agencies 
that helped local people develop their communities.  
Shriver listened to Heller’s and Gordon’s ideas, but remained unconvinced that 
community action would exhaust the entire budget. Cannon explained that “he was just not 
listening to us, as hard as we kept trying to sell him.”373 So Shriver and his team continued to 
seek out people who had studied poverty or had worked on anti-poverty programs.  
When starting the Peace Corps, Shriver had set up a suite in the Mayflower Hotel and 
hosted an on-going seminar to generate as many ideas as possible. He replicated the process for 
the War on Poverty. Starting on February 4, 1964, Shriver set up a hotel room in Washington 
D.C. and held meetings for twelve straight days. Shriver explained: “I decided that in the brief 
time we had, we would read everything that had been written about poverty; listen to anyone 
who had anything to say; accept advice from any source.”374 Shriver, Yarmolinsky, and 
Mankiewicz invited anyone whom they thought had ideas that could contribute to the War on 
Poverty. Robert Lampman provided what he thought to be a complete bibliography of every 
worthwhile book or article on poverty.
375
 It was less than two pages long.
376
 The team read the 
pieces, and, if they liked any, they would find the author, invite him or her to the headquarters 
and then discuss instituting the idea or concept in the War on Poverty. Shriver would sit the 
author down and tell him: “The president has given me an assignment to eliminate poverty in this 
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country. What would you do if you had to eliminate poverty in this country? Where would you 
start? Give me some ideas.”377 
Many people visited the room and discussed poverty in those twelve days. One person 
said: “[T]here were suddenly a lot of guys in funny shoes running around the corridors.”378 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an original member of the Saturday Group and an employee of the 
Labor Department, visited. Dave Hackett and Dick Boone from the PCJD, MFY, and National 
Service Corps discussed the concept of community action. Lloyd Ohlin, who had helped create 
MFY, discussed the work he wrote with Richard Cloward in which they argued that blockages to 
opportunities created subcultures. Shriver invited Michael Harrington and asked him how to 
abolish poverty.
379
 Activist Saul Alinsky from Chicago joined in on conversations. Heller, 
Capron, and Lane Kirkland from CEA stopped in and discussed Community Action.  Paul 
Ylvisaker, who designed and administered the Gray Areas Program, discussed the mobilization 
of the poor. John Kenneth Galbraith discussed the “New Poverty.” Others who visited included 
Louis Marin, Harris Wofford, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Under Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare Wilbur Cohen, Richard Goodwin, and dozens of other cabinet 
secretaries, undersecretaries, academics, foundation officers, business executives, college 
presidents, and mayors.
380
  
Shriver tried but failed to include Robert Kennedy. Together, Shriver, Mankiewicz, 
Harrington, Moynihan, Hackett, and Boone visited Kennedy at his house. Mankiewicz recalled 
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“He looked awful. He just sort of sat there. He was still in shock. He asked if what we were 
doing was what President Kennedy had in mind, and Hackett and Boone assured him it was.”381 
In an interview for an oral history in 1980, Shriver explained: 
The answer is nobody knows now or knew then exactly how to do that [abolish poverty]. 
The next reality was that everybody thought that some different way of dealing with 
poverty would be beneficial. Some people were devotees of giving people jobs; others of 
providing them with an education; others saying it was all a question of health; or another 
one saying it was all a question of whether they could speak English or not; another 
would say it was simply a question of “unleashing the free enterprise system. So the 
immediate reality was if you asked ten people how to go about eliminating poverty, 
you’d get ten different answers.382 
 
From these meetings Shriver created the official Task Force on Poverty within the 
Executive Office of the President.
383
 Connecting it to Shriver’s international efforts, the press 
dubbed the group the Poor Corps. Within three weeks the Task Force completed the bill to create 
the War on Poverty. The bill included two major components of the new paradigm: first, the 
cultural values of the poor created and sustained poverty, and, second, community action could 
change those values.  
Although the answers to how to eliminate poverty differed at first, the group all agreed 
that, at its core, the main problem was poor people’s cultural values and personalities—that is, 
the culture of poverty. The changing structure of the economy might have blocked poor people 
from opportunities to secure well-paying jobs, but the cultural environment created by those 
people who had to adapt to a life of poverty was now the major issue. The behaviors needed to 
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survive a life of poverty were now responsible for sustaining that poverty. Poverty was a cycle. 
When passed down to children, the culture of poverty impacted generation after generation. 
Shiver explained that “many people just blame them. They say they’re lazy, they want to take 
narcotics, they’d rather rob, they’d rather play the numbers racket, they’ve got a cultural hang-up 
especially if they’re [from the] Appalachians. It’s the easiest thing in the world to slough onto 
the poor responsibility for the fact they’re not working. But it’s much harder to say--I know it’s 
much harder to say--`Look, it’s our fault that our society is producing these people.’”384 So 
despite the fact that the structure of the economy might have originally created the situation, the 
culture of poverty was now the issue. Shriver continued: “I believed then, and I still believe, that 
a great deal of unemployment, particularly what they call structural unemployment, that is 
people who can’t hold a job, comes from the fact they’ve been in an environment, in a culture—
they used to call it the culture of poverty.”385 Mankiewicz explained: “It was a thought that we 
had had for some time. It went to the whole question of the fact that the establishment, in a sense, 
was responsible for a lot of the problems of poverty, and one of them was that people who didn’t 
fit the established culture didn’t tend to get jobs. We thought that one thing could be done: there 
should be some money for an educational program to, in effect, teach people how to apply for a 
job. If you can’t beat them, join them. We called it a ‘charm school,’ which was unfortunate.”386 
Men from the Peace Corps, MFY, Gray Areas Program, PCJD, National Service Corps, 
CEA, and Bureau of the Budget all agreed and now viewed the issue from within the same 
paradigm. They asserted that the culture of poverty created all of the various problems that each 
identified. Poor people placed little value on education, creating a work force of unskilled labor. 
Rarely attending school or even dropping out minimized young people’s chances to acquire 
verbal and oral language skills, and this was especially true of those for whom English was a 
second language. Poor people’s low-skilled, physically demanding jobs and low income led them 
to eat inexpensive foods, which were higher in fat, causing poor health. The poor lacked 
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motivation. The “free enterprise system” attracted few poor people, who pessimistically viewed 
life as disappointing and beyond their control.  
While Shriver had once thought that poverty in America and poverty in the Third World 
were separate and different, he now viewed them as the same. His view, his new paradigm, 
unified foreign and domestic poverty. When discussing the poor in America, he explained: 
“Well, the instinct of the poor people is such that they’re instinctively unable to hold the kind of 
jobs that society can offer. Now, if you took them all and put them in Somalia, they’d do just as 
well as anybody else in Somalia because it’s a rural, agricultural, nomadic existence. Therefore 
you can survive there. You can’t survive in New York or Chicago--and you sure as hell can’t get 
out of an Appalachian hollow. You’re just stuck there.”387 
Because the cultural values and personalities of the poor were now the issue, just creating 
jobs could not solve poverty.
388
 Yarmolinsky recalled that when Shriver presented to Johnson an 
idea for a program to create jobs, “the president just ignored him. It was a shocking 
demonstration of the way Johnson sometimes handled things. He didn’t even bother to respond; 
he just went on to the next item of the agenda.”389 Yarmolinsky explained that “one of the 
choices we said we had to make was whether to concentrate on preparing jobs for people or 
preparing people for jobs. We decided for the latter.”390 The latter, which Mankiewicz had 
described as “charm school,” mainly took the form of community action. Historian Alice 
O’Connor notes that “the community action idea held considerable appeal: It kept program 
responsibility out of the hands of any single one of the ‘old line’ federal agencies, it offered a 
way to cut through bureaucratic inefficiencies, it had an attractive air of localism while asserting 
a strong federal role in community change, and it would not require major new spending. It also 
seemed innovative, a major selling point as the administration tried to construct its domestic 
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program in the aftermath of President Kennedy’s assassination—and to come up with something 
distinctive for President Johnson to propose.”391 
The form of community action in the War on Poverty was created based on experiences 
of community development in the Peace Corps, Gray Areas Program, and MFY. From the Peace 
Corps, the members of the Task Force on Poverty took that the entire community should be 
involved (e.g., the community of Dallas or the community of Rochester). Members from the 
Gray Areas contended that the federal and local governments should retain a degree of power 
over the programs. Finally, from MFY, members of the Task Force thought there should be a 
wide variety of programs that on the surface might not directly appear to be related to poverty 
and that the poor should have maximum feasible participation. 
From his experience in the Peace Corps, Shriver believed that community action in the 
War on Poverty should include all members of the community. Shriver explained: “I wanted the 
local Community Action agency to be composed of distinguished people at the local level, 
private businessmen, private philanthropy people, poor people, and government people.”392 
Shriver had to convince Johnson of the merit of including all members of the community. 
Johnson imagined that community action in the War on Poverty would be like the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC) or National Youth Administration (NYA) during the New Deal. In 
both programs the local government was in control and travelled around to develop the 
communities’ resources. Shriver wanted to include all members of the community so that each 
project would be tailored to that specific region and people. In short, what would be done in 
Omaha would differ from what would be done in Atlanta, or what was done in Atlanta would 
differ from what was done in Miami, and in Miami differ from that done in Boston. 
Shriver and members of the Task Force planned to include everyone in the community in 
the planning, but, based on experiences in the Gray Areas Program, they wanted to keep the 
ultimate authority in hands of the local government. In meetings of the Task Force, Saul Alinsky 
advocated fully empowering the people while leaving the local government and business leaders 
out. Alinsky claimed that the way in which the community was structured, so that it benefited a 
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few but alienated many, was itself truly responsible for making people poor. He claimed that 
cultural values had nothing to do with poverty. Alinsky asserted that placing the power 
exclusively in the hands of the poor people to design and carry out the War on Poverty would 
alter the structure of the community and end poverty. In short, he wanted to end the master-
servant relationship by altering the capitalist system of owners, employers, and employees. 
Shriver explained: “That was Saul Alinsky’s idea. I knew Saul Alinsky very well….I was not 
opposed to his idea as part of the totality, but I was opposed to it as being the only approach; and 
I still am.”393 Shriver and other members wanted to include the poor people of the community in 
designing and carrying out neighborhood projects, but not to the extent advocated by Alinsky. To 
strike this balance, Shriver advocated using from the Gray Areas Program an administrative 
structure that retained ultimate power of decision in the hands of the local government.  
The members of the Task Force wanted to include all community members, keep power 
of decision ultimately in the hands of the local government, but include the people in planning 
and decision making as much as possible. In the phrase of the time, the members wanted to give 
the people maximum feasible participation. The term “maximum feasible participation” 
originally came from MFY. Within the War on Poverty the ambiguity of the term led to several 
charged arguments between people in government, local leaders, and people who were poor.
394
 
Harold Horowitz, a member of the Task Force, explained that maximum feasible participation 
meant “that you made all good-faith efforts to have participation of the people involved in the 
programs, and that going farther than that just wouldn’t make much sense.”395 Another member 
of the Task Force, Norbert Schlei, explained that maximum feasible participation simply meant 
that community action should include people in the community, the target population. Put in 
practice, this would mean that there would be advisory committees made up of poor people in 
the community who would alert the administrators to issues that needed to be addressed. The 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Rural Development and Conservation, John Baker, 
claimed that it meant “starting with the most downtrodden. It meant that women ought to have an 
equal say-so with men. It meant that poor black folks ought to have equal say-so with upwardly 
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mobile, upper-middle-class [people]. . . . At the community level, everybody that perceived 
themselves to have a unique concern or contribution should be geared into the decision-making 
mechanism.”396 In short, maximum feasible participation had many meanings that were not 
completely worked out prior to implementing the programs within the War on Poverty. 
In addition to the concept of maximum feasible participation from MFY, members of the 
Task Force liked the focus within MFY on having a wide diversity of programs. The same 
concept existed in the Peace Corps, so Shriver was familiar with it. In the Peace Corps, whereas 
30% of volunteers worked on community development—mostly in South America—the other 
70% worked on a projects designed for the local circumstances. For example, in Ghana—and 
most of Africa—volunteers in the Peace Corps acted as teachers in schools. They did not address 
local government, agriculture, sanitation, or infrastructure. In MFY, volunteers worked for over 
twenty different projects, including the Visiting Homemakers Program, Homework Helpers 
Program, and the Neighborhood Advocacy Center. When drafting the bill for the War on 
Poverty, the members of the Task Force wanted to create a diversity of programs to match the 
practices within MFY. Accordingly, within the bill they included Community Action, the Job 
Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Upward Bound, and Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA). The bill also included a provision to create the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO), which would administer the War on Poverty.  
Kennedy did not live to see the full extent of the process he started, but his actions led to 
a paradigm shift and to what became one of the largest governmental efforts in American history 
on behalf of the poor. After reading Dwight Macdonald’s review of Michael Harrington’s The 
Other America, Kennedy instructed Chairman of the Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, to 
investigate the problem of poverty. Heller formed an informal group of governmental officials. 
The group agreed that poverty stemmed from environmental conditions, notably the cultural 
values of the slum. The informal group grew into an official CEA-led Poverty Task Force 
charged with creating a National Service Corps to alleviate poverty in America. Men who 
planned the National Service Corps, including Bobby Kennedy, Dave Hackett, and Dick Boone, 
linked previous programs to end juvenile delinquency and urban decay to the effort to end 
poverty. Specifically, they believed, poor people’s cultural values manifested in unlawful 
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behavior. Although the National Service Corps failed to pass Congress, Lyndon Johnson 
continued the governmental effort to end poverty. He appointed Sargent Shriver, who created a 
more extensive Task Force on poverty. Shriver connected foreign programs, such as the Peace 
Corps, to domestic efforts to end poverty. In short, Shriver’s actions unified the understanding of 
poverty so that distinctions between foreign and domestic poverty were not important. This was 
the core element in a paradigm shift that led makers of policy to view a host of problems—
including juvenile delinquency, urban decay, illiteracy, high levels of violence, poor diets, child 
neglect, promiscuousness, drug use, low educational achievement, one-parent households, 
unemployment, and political apathy—as manifestations of a culture of poverty. Shriver and the 
members of his Task Force wrote the bill to create Office of Economic Opportunity, which 
launched the Administration’s War on Poverty.   
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Chapter 5 - “Whether its name is Bombay or New York”: The 
Global War on Poverty 
John Kennedy started the War on Poverty, Lyndon Johnson continued and expanded it, 
and Sargent Shriver ran it. Included in this governmental attention to poor people was a new 
paradigm. Those who subscribed to the new paradigm viewed all poverty, at home and abroad, 
as the result of cultural values. All poverty stemmed from an all-encompassing system of cultural 
values—which anthropologist Oscar Lewis called a culture of poverty—that prevented poor 
people from seizing opportunities to escape their condition. This chapter argues that a common 
paradigm about the causes of poverty and the best method to remedy it equally shaped programs 
at home and abroad.  
Officials in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) expressly created all programs in 
the War on Poverty to change the cultural environment—in an anthropological sense—of poor 
people. Those who created and ran the Job Corps, for example, attempted to help the poor by 
replacing the negative influences on them coming from people who lacked motivation, opposed 
change, and distrusted that a better future would come through education and planning. Instead, 
workers in the Job Corps sought to expose the poor to people who valued education, change, 
planning, and community.  
Another program, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), held the same goals as the 
Job Corps and tried to carry out the process through community action. Under the influence of 
the new paradigm, officials who were given the role of creating the form of community action in 
the War on Poverty relied heavily on previous programs that now, within the new paradigm, 
appeared to constitute a logical coherent set of ways to end poverty. Included among these 
programs were the Peace Corps, Mobilization for Youth (MFY), and Gray Areas Program. 
Influenced by the example of the Peace Corps, VISTA workers attempted to change the cultural 
environment of entire slum by including all members of the community in the planning of their 
future. From the Gray Areas Program, administrators in VISTA ensured that all final decisions 
would be made by governmental officials. From MFY, projects in VISTA took a variety of 
forms for a diversity of purposes. 
The program within the War on Poverty that arguably best captured the MFY’s emphasis 
on a diversity of programs was the Community Action Program known as Harlem Youth 
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Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU). HARYOU included programs to help poor children 
develop skills for school, as well as programs to expose youth to African-American theater and 
art.  
Whereas makers of policy in the domestic War on Poverty took inspiration from foreign 
programs, workers in the Peace Corps began to align their efforts with domestic programs as 
well. In short, the concept of a culture of poverty truly became global, crossing all national 
borders.  Upon the ascendency of the new paradigm, volunteers in the Peace Corps began to 
describe the cultural values of people in Third World as being equivalent to the lower-class 
culture of poor Americans. For example, volunteers viewed the cultural values of poor people in 
Manila as the same as those of poor people in Miami. The program that best exemplified the 
penetration of the new paradigm among foreign volunteers was the Reverse Peace Corps. Those 
who designed the Reverse Peace Corps asserted that if all poor people around the world shared 
the same dynamic within a culture of poverty, those outside of the culture of poverty could 
provide a positive influence, regardless of where they were from.  Accordingly, the Reverse 
Peace Corps brought middle- and upper-class men and women from Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America to work with lower-class Americans in cities such as Chicago, New York, and Los 
Angeles. The new paradigm unified the understanding of poverty at home and abroad as one 
essentially integrated problem, and the Reverse Peace Corps served as an example of a program 
inspired by the paradigm. 
Shriver experienced the paradigm shift after he became the head of the War on Poverty. 
After forming the Task Force on Poverty and discussing domestic poverty with every expert he 
could find, Shriver began to understand poverty in America and poverty around the world as the 
same. In a speech he delivered in New York on 7 December 1965, Shriver explained that it 
comes “down to three points: this is one world, the struggles in it are one war, and there is one 
way to win it….We do live in the same town, whether its name is Bombay or New York. The 
separation of rich and poor is much the same and the consequences are the same, whether the 
lack of peaceful change explodes in violence in Vietnam or the Dominican Republic or the 
district of Watts; whether outside agitators are there to compound the trouble or not.”397 He 
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continued: “So it is one continuing war, this struggle for human rights and economic opportunity 
and peace, whether it was in Nazi Germany or conquered China or colonial Africa and Asia a 
generation ago—or is in Santo Domingo, Saigon or Saint Louis today, whether it is being waged 
by the Indians in the Andes or in the United States—or on the Indian subcontinent—whether it is 
colored people seeking an end to racial discrimination or poor people seeking an end to 
poverty.”398 Shriver explained to his audience that the “phrase ‘cultural equality’ on its face 
seems to go against the facts of life. But so does the idea of human equality—until you see 
through the superficial differences to the inner spirit equally present in all men.”399  
Shriver asked the educated, upper-class Indians in attendance who lived in picturesque 
homes in Bombay on Malabar Hill and drove to modern office buildings along a beautiful ocean-
front highway, “How much of the Other American do you experience first-hand?”400 The upper-
class Indians might have been surprised to be asked about how much of the Other American they 
saw in Bombay. To them, Shriver’s statement probably made no sense. The Other American in 
Bombay, India? But to Shriver it made perfect sense. The concept was called the Other 
American, but the actual person could be anywhere. Shriver quoted Father Daniel Berrigan, who 
stated: “What if we had the courage to summon that Other America to face the Other World… 
Would not our mirror show, in comparison with the Other World of Asia or Africa or Latin 
America, not a contrast, but a horrifying and exact counterpart?”401 The Other American or Other 
World meant a person who was stuck in poverty and held a system of values that made an escape 
from scarcity difficult, if not impossible. Shriver had universalized the concept of poverty and 
applied it equally to the Other America and the Other World, the War on Poverty in America and 
the Third World.
402
  
Shriver was not alone. The Task Force on Poverty, including Frank Mankiewicz, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Bill Moyers, Paul Jacobs, and Michael Harrington, 
came to agree after 1964 that the culture of poverty shaped people’s behavior all over the world 
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and needed to be reformed if they were to succeed in eliminating poverty at home and abroad.
403
 
The Peace Corps operated outside the United States, so the members of the Task Force set out 
creating a domestic organization to help Americans who lived within the culture of poverty. 
Mankiewicz, Jacobs, and Harrington expressed to Shriver that “A real program against poverty 
cannot treat these afflictions in isolation. It must be as integrated and comprehensive as the fact 
of poverty itself.”404 Bertrand Harding explained that Americans needed  
A multi-pronged comprehensive package, [that] would provide educational opportunities 
for the millions of underprivileged young, give communities the chance to mobilize their 
own programs, enable the privileged youth of the nation to redirect the idealism of the 
Peace Corps type to domestic needs, assist in the destruction of barriers that reduce 
farmers and laborers to poverty, and combine the nation’s talents and resources under an 
agency in a concerted attack on poverty.
405
 
 
Earlier in the year, Walter Heller and the Council of Economic Advisers wrote a report 
offering similar suggestions. Heller called for “new federally-led effort” and in the report 
“recommended that government should ‘marshal already developed resources, focus already 
expressed concerns,’ and coordinate the ‘diverse attacks,’ on poverty by the myriad agencies 
engaged in health, education, housing, welfare and agriculture programs.”406 The new paradigm 
enabled policymakers to see poverty in a new light, and therefore to integrate past programs in a 
comprehensive, concerted attack on poverty that, to them, now made logical sense. Accordingly, 
the Task Force on Poverty wrote bill PL 88-452 that included the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. 
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Shriver, with overt support from Lyndon Johnson, worked hard to ensure that Congress 
passed PL 88-452, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA). Congress did. In August 1964 
the House passed the bill 226 to 185, followed by approval in the Senate with a vote of 61 to 
35.
407
 The Act included most of the ideas and programs that the Task Force and CEA had 
discussed and suggested over the previous six months. Title I of the EOA authorized the Job 
Corps, a program to build centers and rural camps where people could learn new job skills and 
work habits. Title II called for new community-action programs. Title III included loans for rural 
development and small businesses. Title IV authorized funding for work-study programs for 
college students. For youth in the inner-cities, Title V created legislation for work opportunities 
through the Neighborhood Youth Corps. Lastly, Title VI included VISTA—essentially a 
domestic Peace Corps—and set up OEO to administer all programs within the War on Poverty. 
To strengthen and protect the independence of OEO, the act stipulated that the organization was 
authorized by and operated from within the Executive Office of the President.
408
  
Historian Michael L. Gillette explained that after Congress passed the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, “The War on Poverty became synonymous with OEO.”409 Within the 
first year OEO created programs that included Head Start, Upward Bound, Legal Services, 
National Health Affairs, Older Persons Programs, American Indians, Migrant and Farm 
Workers, VISTA, HARYOU, and Job Corps. Shriver became the first director of the OEO. In the 
administrative history of the OEO, Bertrand Harding, the director after Shriver, explained that 
members of Congress noted that several of the programs created by EOA “incorporated or 
extended ‘activities that had been operated in large scale or in prototype at some point in the 
past.’”410 Many programs also had direct analogies in programs currently operating. Members of 
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Congress pointed out that “VISTA resembled the National Service Corps and the Peace Corps” 
and that “the National Defense Education Act had failed due to opposition by educators.”411 In 
1963, the House Rules Committee had killed the Youth Employment Opportunity Act, including 
a job corps and work-training project. The Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control 
Act of 1961 already contained community action provisions that were being conducted by MFY 
and the Gray Areas Program.
412
  
Opponents of the EOA identified this as a liability. The fact that many of these programs 
had either already been turned down, or were currently in operation under different legislation, 
made the bill redundant and financially wasteful. If the programs had failed to pass in the past, 
then there was no need to reconsider them. If the programs were already operating, then there 
was no need for additional programs.  
But what opponents failed to recognize was that the new paradigm among men and 
women studying poverty in 1964 placed these programs in a new light. Now, congressionally 
denied, old, and current programs could be coordinated and integrated in a novel way that made 
each make perfect sense as a way to alleviate the new poverty. If opponents of the War on 
Poverty viewed poverty as only unemployment or exclusively within the domain of 
macroeconomics in the form of tax cuts, then these programs would appropriately not make 
sense to them. However, such programs made sense to those who understood poverty from 
within the new paradigm and the emphasis on understanding poverty as the values of the slum. A 
recreation and reintegration of these programs made sense to a person who understood poverty as 
the result of a person’s cultural system.; it started with blockages to opportunity, and, through a 
person’s adaption to a life of deprivation, acquires a culture of poverty and a vicious cycle that 
limited the earning potential of generation after generation. As Johnson explained in 1964 in his 
State of the Union Address, “Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but 
the symptoms.”413 
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From the start, OEO operated according to the new paradigm. Harding wrote: “Analysts 
discovered beneath the symptoms of delinquency the deeper problems of teenage unemployment, 
slum schools, ghetto living, and broken families.”414 He continued, noting that “words like 
‘comprehensive,’ and ‘coordinated’ came to be ‘enshrined as the inviolable precepts of the 
successful poverty program.’”415 OEO conducted the War on Poverty using as many resources as 
possible. This consisted of coordinating current programs and including participation from 
federal, state, and local levels. As Johnson stated it, the war must be “won in the field, in every 
private home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the White House.”416 Harding noted 
that OEO was “not content to leave education to educators, medicine to the doctors, law to the 
lawyers, or the community to the politicians.”417 
The priority given to all-inclusiveness in OEO also dictated that staff focus on all age 
groups. Unlike the New Deal, which primarily emphasized help to people of working age, the 
War on Poverty included everyone. Johnson explained that “our joint federal-local effort must 
pursue poverty—pursue it wherever it exists—in city slums and small towns, in sharecropper 
shacks, or in migrant worker camps, on Indian reservations, among whites as well as Negroes, 
among the young as well as the aged, in the boom towns and in the depressed areas.”418 Harding 
added that “it is a program which can open for the young the opportunity to learn; for the able 
bodied, the opportunity to work; and for all, the opportunity to live in decency and dignity.”419 
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Shriver and others at OEO expressed their goal as making people economically 
independent individuals, without a need for governmental aid. Shriver, Johnson, and workers in 
OEO intended to give people opportunities to develop their capacities and share in the promise 
of the nation by putting those capacities to use in school, work, and life. This all-embracing 
effort that included all people, all areas of the United States, and all resources often led people to 
describe the process in equally all-encompassing and generalized language. The EOA stated that 
the War on Poverty aimed at “expanding choices and enlarging human freedoms” and that it 
would open the doors “into the main edifice of our economy” to everyone, regardless of skills.420 
Harding expanded by stating that “the principle (sic) hope for the poor was for them to develop 
sufficient strength and skill to maneuver themselves, largely by their own efforts, out of where 
they are and into something better.”421 
To accomplish this task, Congress approved a budget of $962.5 million for OEO. This 
$962.5 million was less than 1% of the national budget. Given the estimate from Bureau of the 
Budget that 35 million poor people lived in America, OEO’s budget allowed less than $28 per 
poor person. This prompted historian James T. Patterson to claim that “It was at best a skirmish, 
not a war.”422 
But the budget excited Shriver and fellow members of OEO. Shriver and the Task Force 
on Poverty had initially requested $1.1 billion for the budget of OEO. So Congress approved 
87% of their request. Shriver explained that “so far as I was concerned it was a colossal sum of 
money.”423 In October 1964, within a month of Congress’s approval of the EOA, Shriver 
introduced 119 OEO-funded projects to help poor Americans. By January 1965, members of 
OEO had announced more than $200 million in new spending, including projects in thirty-three 
states and Puerto Rico.
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 Johnson proclaimed that the agency had provided “nearly 400 
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transfusions of new opportunity to disadvantaged Americans in every part of the land.”425 
Included in the 400 opportunities Johnson identified were funds for Head Start, Follow Through, 
and eighteen new training centers across fifteen states for the Job Corps. 
Members of OEO originally designed the Head Start Program to provide education, 
social services, and health care to the children of low-income families. An early report pointed 
out that many poor children “never have used cut-out scissors, looked at a picture book, or 
scribbled with a crayon, been told a fairy tale, been coaxed into completing a simple task 
successfully, or been talked to as a human being.”426 It continued: “Thus they learn more slowly, 
speak later and less well, and have little curiosity and imagination. Because of this, they think of 
the outside world and school as threatening places….And so these children of poverty will start 
building a foundation of failure—and thus a pattern of poverty—which will stretch throughout 
their lives.”427 Head Start was to help poor children succeed in school, forming a foundation for 
success for life.  
Follow Through complemented Head Start. According to Harding, Follow Through was a 
program intended “to salvage the potential talents and academic abilities of youngsters from poor 
backgrounds who had been shut out from the world.”428 OEO designed the program to prevent 
high school students from dropping out of school. The program helped students who were poor 
complete high school and continue their education after graduation by applying for and enrolling 
in college.  
Members of OEO designed the Job Corps to help poor people on the job market. Because 
the Neighborhood Youth Corps functioned as a temporary public works program, and the work-
study program was for college-bound kids, Gillette explained that “the Job Corps targeted 
society’s ‘least likely to succeed’: sixteen- to twenty-one-year-old high school dropouts, most of 
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whom came from troubled homes or impoverished environments.”429 Shriver and the other 
members of OEO believed that the best way to help poor people in the Job Corps was to expose 
them to the cultural environment of the middle class. This is what Frank Mankiewicz referred to 
as “charm school.” He explained that “people who didn’t fit the established culture didn’t tend to 
get jobs. We thought that one thing could be done…if you can’t beat them, join them.”430 Shriver 
compared the process to training in the army. He claimed: 
Because what we were trying to do is exactly what they do in the army. In the army you 
try to make a soldier out of a civilian. You take him and put him into an environment 
which is totally different from what he’s been in, and you try to control that environment 
so you can make him into a different kind of a person. We were trying to do the same 
thing in the Job Corps: teach or train people to participate as job holders in an 
industrialized society. I believed then, and I still believe, that a great deal of 
unemployment, particularly what they call structural unemployment, that is people who 
can’t hold a job, comes from the fact they’ve been in an environment, in a culture--they 
used to call it the culture of poverty. You cannot cure that malady by leaving the victim 
in the middle of the area of contagion, to use a phrase out of medicine. So what you do is 
you take the person out of that environment, put them in a different environment, and you 
try to mold them into a different kind of person. Therefore, taking somebody from 
Georgia and putting them in Idaho is not harmful; it’s helpful. It’s helpful for them as an 
individual.
431
 
 
Shriver’s statement supported the idea among makers of policy in the War on Poverty 
that being poor meant more than lacking money or materials. Poverty was a culture, a set of 
values leading to destructive behaviors, a psychological disposition.  
Although members of OEO intended the Job Corps to teach skills for work—such as 
punctuality and consistent performance—to individual poor persons, the program was also 
intended to help the community by making its members more qualified and competent. In a 
sense, the Job Corps was to help the community develop members with attitudes and behaviors 
better suited to an environment of productive workers. The Job Corps was built on the idea—
started in the 1920s by Margaret Mead and fellow anthropologists—that community members 
share cultural values and acculturate younger members.  
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Shriver and Dr. Otis Singletary, the director of the Jobs Corps, developed two methods to 
break the cycle of poverty that had trapped generations in deprivation. First, they could remove 
poor people from the harmful cultural environment of the slum and place them in nearby centers 
to learn new attitudes and behaviors, thereby transforming their cultural values and destroying 
the culture of poverty that dominated the local poor community. This method was used at Job 
Corps Urban Training Centers. Often the centers were established on abandoned military bases 
so that trainees were isolated from the harmful cultural influences of people who lived in the 
nearby slum.  
Second, workers in the Job Corps could completely remove the poor person from the 
harmful cultural environment of the slum and transport him or her to rural sites, far from the city. 
Officials placed great emphasis on ensuring that participants were transferred to a new cultural 
environment without the ability to maintain contact with or return to their old neighborhoods 
until the cultural transformation was complete. William P. Kelly Jr., a member of the Poverty 
Task Force and assistant director for management at OEO, asserted: “If you’ve know anybody 
that went to college and lived at home, he has an entirely different life than the kids who are 
residents on that campus. He’s kind of an outsider, and that’s exactly what has happened in the 
Job Corps. The kid who’s a nonresident is a day-hop. He’s an outsider, and he doesn’t get 
integrated into the program. Pretty soon he just never makes it to the bus stop.”432 Shriver added 
that “the mere traveling—perhaps quite a long ways away from your previous existence—is an 
educational activity, and it has an emotional and cultural impact on the people.”433 Perfectly 
describing the dynamics of the culture of poverty and the paradigm he followed after 1964, 
Shriver noted that “a large number of the poor, unemployed teenagers in America are to some 
extent victims of their surroundings. They grow up in a certain social environment which is 
almost conducive to keeping them the way they are. I felt it was important to extract them out of 
that environment and to put them in a different environment, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a 
year, two years, a totally new environment, a new culture. Expose them to a new culture: a 
culture of work, a culture of discipline, a culture of responsibility, personal responsibility. I 
thought that to take them away from where they were and to put them into this new culture, the 
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culture of the Job Corps, would be profoundly transforming to them and beneficial to them.”434 
So officials in the Job Corps wanted to ensure that participants were isolated from their previous 
cultures in order to have the experience designed to transform them. John Baker, another 
member of the Task Force on Poverty and the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Rural 
Development and Conservation, explained: “In the way of psychology instead of logic, this got 
into the picture too: there was a deep belief on our part, which many of the urban types didn’t 
agree with, that there was something about just living out in the woods and doing hard work on 
nature things that helped to rehabilitate the human soul.”435 
Heavyweight boxer George Foreman was arguably the best known graduate of the Job 
Corps. While a young adult in Houston, Texas, Foreman lived in abject poverty. His father had 
left his mother when Foreman was a child. He explained that “the streets were my life”; he 
regularly robbed drunken people leaving bars at night. However, when he heard football star Jim 
Brown deliver an announcement on the radio about the Job Corps, Foreman signed up. Foreman 
said: “Before the Job Corps, I thought Lyndon Johnson was the president of Texas. That’s how 
ignorant I was.”436 The Job Corps flew Foreman to a camp in Oregon. Foreman explained that 
“they gave us new clothes—some for working, some from exercising, and a blazer and slacks for 
dressing up. I’d never had that many clothes in my life. But most important to me were the three 
meals a day. I’d never had that before.”437 More than material items, the Job Corps helped him 
develop skills. He explained: “The Job Corps teachers—even though I didn’t have a father, even 
though I didn’t have clothes—they embraced me like I was a rich guy. They taught me how to 
read. They taught me how to build fences. They taught me how to construct a radio. I was so 
proud of that.”438 Foreman’s experience revealed that he changed in many different ways. The 
safe, constructive, and orderly environment of the camp in Oregon helped Foreman acquire a 
familiarity with being punctual and productive. The clothes, more than garments for warmth, 
gave Foreman a feeling of being special that built his confidence and changed the way he carried 
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himself.
439
 The teachers’ positive treatment motivated Foreman to work hard for others in order 
to earn that same respect from them.  
When discussing poor people like Foremen in the Job Corps, Shriver reiterated:  
You can go back to that West Point analogy. When the army says it takes them four years 
to turn out an army officer, it doesn’t mean that it takes them four years to teach a guy 
how to shoot a gun. But what it does take is four years to get a man to the point where he 
is sufficiently disciplined, dedicated and motivated to do exactly what he is told in a 
precise way at a precise time, even if he’s going to get killed. . . . You cannot learn to do 
those things that you have to do almost by rote, you cannot learn them in three months, 
any more than Doug DeCinces can learn how to play third base in six months. When 
athletes make those unbelievable plays that they make in baseball or football, it only 
comes from having done it so damn many times and having been there so often, the job 
becomes instinctive.
440
 
 
Shriver and Singletary designed the Job Corps to develop those instincts – the instincts to 
find, secure, and hold a job. Within the paradigm, this was much more than reading newspapers, 
filling out an application, and showing up each day. It was an entire way of life, a culture of 
productivity. Singletary explained that they took a “kid who was just a dropout, not necessarily 
illiterate, but who needed to be turned into some kind of productive guy, such as a welder or an 
automobile mechanic.”441 
The program within OEO that arguably best demonstrated an attempt to find a diversity 
of methods to develop a different cultural outlook and set of behaviors was Harlem Youth 
Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU). Dr. Kenneth Clark, the director of HARYOU and an 
African American, identified the ghetto of Harlem as a self-sustaining cultural environment that 
acculturated residents to develop a personality founded on feelings of inferiority to middle-class 
Americans. In line with the new paradigm, he claimed that poverty was more than just a level of 
income or a lack of material goods; it was a personality and cultural system. He proposed that 
HARYOU could provide a solution that not only included new housing but also used methods of 
cultural and psychological counseling to inspire personal development. In Dark Ghetto (1965) he 
wrote that “in all of Harlem there is no museum, no art gallery, no art school, no sustained ‘little 
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theater’ groups; despite the stereotype of the Negro as artist, there are only five libraries—but 
hundreds of bars, hundreds of churches, and scores of fortune tellers. Everywhere there are signs 
of fantasy, decay, abandonment, and defeat. The only constant characteristic is a sense of 
inadequacy. People seem to have given up in the little things that are so often the symbol of the 
larger things.”442  
Dr. Clark identified youth as the pivotal point in which personalities formed based on 
their cultural influences, and so he designed HARYOU to focus on young people. Clark quoted 
an interview that he did with a twenty-six-year-old man in Harlem who said: “I don’t think that 
anything can be done to correct it. Me, because I’m too far gone on it, you know. But, I mean, 
for my brothers and sisters, you know, people that are coming up younger than I, you know, they 
can do something.”443 Clark asserted that both proper parenting and positive peer influence could 
solve Harlem residents’ poverty. He proposed to develop healthy personalities by having 
children participate in cultural experiences. 
Clark was a social psychologist, and his emphasis on youth as the period of personality 
development aligned perfectly with psychological studies of personality and culture that had 
become dominant in the 1950s. Notably, Clark’s description of how young people formed their 
personalities in accordance with cultural influences matched the progression set forth by Erik 
Erickson and his stages of personality development.
444
 Clark’s proposals also worked in 
accordance with the same logic of acculturation that had been proposed by Margaret Mead. 
Clark personally knew both Erikson and Mead. In 1950, Clark had discussed the topics of culture 
and personality with both Erikson and Mead during the Midcentury White House Conference on 
Children and Youth.
445
 He agreed with their research and used it as the basis of HARYOU.  
The shared understanding among Erikson, Mead, and Clark about the dynamics of 
personality development and cultural influence also aligned with the emphasis within the OEO 
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that childhood was pivotal to developing or preventing the culture of poverty. A report from the 
OEO stated: “Improving the situation of parents may be critical to providing a home 
environment in which children have the opportunities and incentives to study and learn, because 
mental and physical disabilities frequently develop early in life.”446 Next, the authors claimed, 
“cultural deprivation lies at the root of much poverty. Children brought up in broken families, 
children accustomed to living on relief, children reared in family and community environments 
in which the importance of education is deprecated and hope for escaping poverty is 
smothered—such children are prime candidates for adulthoods in poverty.”447 The report 
continued: “By the age of six to nine years, this receptivity is largely distorted by negative 
systems (bad image of self and society, discouragement and hatred) built into the personality.”448 
The authors of the report explained that “we suggest as the over-riding objective of a sustained 
attack on poverty the reduction and eventual elimination of those conditions which condemn our 
children and youth of today to a state of poverty when they become adults. In short, the principal 
focus is on the prevention of poverty—and thus on youth.”449 The authors believed that young 
people presented a window of opportunity to permanently end poverty in the future; young 
people acquired either positive or negative cultural values that would guide their outlook, 
attitudes, and behavior for the rest of their lives. Youth was a period when cultural values were 
less entrenched and more pliable, and therefore a long-term solution for poverty required that 
makers of policy impact young people.  
Clark designed and used HARYOU to accomplish this goal. He believe that the best way 
to change the economically debilitating cultural values that dominated Harlem was to have 
children participate in the arts. He thought that far too often children grew up witnessing adults 
who distrusted everyone, focused on their interests over of those of the community, caused 
broken families by abandoning children, saw no value in education, lacked motivation to strive 
for a better life, and sought immediate gratification over long-term planning. He explained: 
“Those within the ghetto who are defeated—those who accept the ‘evidence’ of their personal 
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inferiority and impotence, those who express a pervasive sense of personal failure through 
stagnation and despair, who drop out of school, who depend on marijuana and narcotics—
demonstrate a passively negative and self-destructive solution.”450 Based on his research and 
discussions with others in New York, Clark believed that the arts could change all of these 
values. Hanna T. Rose, Curator of Education at the Brooklyn Museum, wrote that the arts “may 
offer us one of the most important keys in the history of education for unlocking the doors which 
prevent the disadvantaged child from responding to the learning process—and which often block 
our best efforts to reach, to motivate, and finally, to teach him. In fact, this function may well 
turn out to be a pre-condition of the most fundamental kinds of learning needs for all 
children.”451 In line with Clark’s goals for HARYOU, she stated that the staff of the Brooklyn 
Museum “intends to examine the value of the arts as a force which can change attitudes and 
motivate people into better jobs, further education, greater civic responsibilities, and richer 
lives.”452  
At first, members of OEO hesitated to fund HARYOU because they feared that Clark had 
designed the program to lead the children of Harlem into careers in the arts. Clark convinced 
them that he had not designed HARYOU for this purpose. Clark explained that the arts within 
HARYOU were intended, as Rose pointed out, to motivate kids to study something personally 
meaningful, to connect the kids to the community of Harlem and the nation, to consider their 
lives as part of a larger process, and to improve their ability to communicate effectively. Clark 
pointed out the way in which MFY, which operated nearby at the same time as HARYOU, used 
a variety of programs to overcome the values leading to poverty. If poverty was an all-
encompassing system of values that directed behavior in an economically counterproductive 
way, then any solution would need to comprehensively address such values. Clark believed that 
the arts were a unique and effective way to reach youth in order to accomplish this task of 
changing their system of cultural values. He explained that the process was designed to “provide 
a new subculture equipped with the symbols of culture—insignia, slogans, rituals, rules—
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designed to build an esprit de corps and a tradition of effective social participation leading 
toward constructive rather than self-destructive ego satisfaction.”453 He continued: “An attractive 
and imaginative subculture enables a teen-ager to begin to think about a career and 
advancement.”454 
Project Up-Lift (PUL) was one of the primary programs within HARYOU that used a 
variety of services and the arts to transform children’s cultural values. PUL was the product of 
several community agencies working together, including HARYOU, the Urban League, the 
Harlem Neighborhood Associations, the Harlem Administrative Council, and the Associated 
Community Teams. Designed for young people between ages fourteen and twenty five, PUL was 
a ten-week-long summer program to develop in young people a number of skills, including the 
ability to identify community needs and to lead an effort to meet those needs. The students’ 
services were to “provide highly visible community improvement and [to] benefit all of 
Harlem.”455 Frank L. Stanley Jr., a project coordinator for HARYOU, explained that “the 
program will serve as a basis for the development of work skills and work habits which will 
increase the future employability of many participants. Others are expected to become better 
achievers in school as a result of this employment and service program.”456 A cartoon in a 
newspaper about PUL had an image of a boy who was smoking, saying “I quit school when I 
were sixteen.” A clean-cut boy and girl standing next to him and holding books responded, “We 
did too, but Project Up-Lift convinced us to go back.”457  
Although school attendance and steady employment were always the goals, activities in 
PUL took a variety of forms. PUL included neighborhood development, remedial reading, public 
information, day camps, residential camps, emergency homemaker services, and recreational and 
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cultural programs.
458
 Although on a smaller scale, the residential camps operated on the same 
logic as the rural camps in the Job Corps. The emergency homemaker services in PUL operated 
using the same logic as the Visiting Homemakers Program in MFY. Notably, it was to teach 
mothers to create a positive, supportive environment for their children.  
Also like MFY, the recreational and cultural programs included a variety of services. 
During the summer of 1965 staff at PUL invited children in Harlem to create pieces of art and 
either display or perform them at local festivals. For example, on July 20, 1965, PUL hosted a 
music festival on 114
th
 St. and Madison Ave.; a drama festival at 131
st
 St. and 7
th
 Ave; a creative 
dance festival at 138
th
 St. and Lenox Ave; and an art festival at 139
th
 and Lenox Ave. The 
following day, PUL hosted another round of music, drama, and art festivals, and added a poetry 
festival. For the next five days—July 22 through July 26—PUL continued to host each festival, 
moving the location every day to give all children an opportunity to participate in events near 
their homes.
459
  
The staff at PUL found other ways to give children cultural experiences while teaching 
about the history of their community. Concurrently with the festivals, PUL hosted the Afra-Arts 
Gallery at the Cultural Center at 47 West 125
th
 Street in Harlem to offer the opportunity for the 
public to view works of art by African-American artists. Stanley explained: “Harlem has a long 
and varied history, but most children (and adults) are unaware of the heritage of Harlem and of 
the important events which had their beginnings in this crowed neighborhood. Familiarization 
with the history of the Negro in America and with the history of Harlem are (sic) important 
elements in the development of neighborhood pride of identity.”460 In short, the program used a 
variety of methods to help break down the every-one-for-himself mentality of the culture of 
poverty and connect residents to other members of the community and to their shared history.  
Members of PUL believed that they impacted not only kids but the entire cultural system 
of Harlem. By the end of the ten-week program, the staff at PUL estimated, the program 
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employed 500 professional staff members and 4,000 volunteers from Harlem between the ages of 
fourteen and twenty-five. The program had over 20,000 youths participating and impacted an 
additional 25,000 residents. Stanley asserted that “there is a definite agreement in Social Science 
literature that the cultural gap existing between the middle and lower class cultures interferes 
with success.”461 However, he claimed, “Our boys no longer ‘bop’ to the payroll line; the girls 
are more concerned with helping a ‘kid’ learn to read than being ‘hip.’’ Harlem street corners are 
noticeably empty of gangs of boys—the gang boys are now working. This is a definite indication 
of a break in the psychological barrier.”462 In other words, PUL was enabling young people to 
break out of the culture of poverty.  
The Job Corps emphasized the cultural environment of poverty, HARYOU developed a 
variety of ways to help children break out of its cycle, and VISTA used the method of 
community action to transform community members’ values in order to make them economically 
independent. Like HARYOU, Shriver explained, “the Job Corps, just as an example, and all the 
other programs we had, VISTA or Peace Corps, had the philosophy of trying to develop people 
so that they could take care of themselves. That’s much harder, of course, and it’s much longer 
term.”463 Because the new paradigm convinced makers of policy that all poverty around the 
world was the result of deleterious cultural values, the solution of transforming those values 
could be used equally in all programs. VISTA was a Community Action Program that operated 
in a way very similar to the method of changing cultural values used in MFY, Gray Areas 
Program, the Peace Corps, and the proposed National Service Corps. Shriver explained that 
VISTA operated just as the Peace Corps did:  
Well, you have to understand that in the Peace Corps, which I was running at the same 
time as OEO, we had a large, large number of volunteers engaged in what we called 
community development. Now community development is no different than community 
action. So I had spent the previous five years, 1961-65, trying to get community spirit, 
community action, community development going in Lima, Peru, or up in the Andes 
Mountains or in the slums outside of Rio de Janeiro or Jakarta or wherever it might be. 
So the work we did in community development for five years with the Peace Corps was a 
complete preparation, so far as I was concerned, for the same kind of work which would 
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be done by VISTA volunteers within the United States. So if a VISTA volunteer were 
sent to an Indian reservation or sent to Phoenix, Arizona, I’d expect him to go out there 
and become a social action worker. We were not training caseworkers; we were training 
people who would go out there and assist the people, mobilize the people, encourage, 
inspire, kick them in the fanny, do whatever was necessary to get them into action to help 
themselves.
464
 
 
Shriver’s reference to mobilizing the people demonstrated his belief in the impact of the 
culture of poverty around the world and a way to help people overcome it. It also revealed how 
he could draw inspiration from previous and current programs that operated on this basis, such as 
Mobilization for Youth and the Peace Corps.  
VISTA projects would take a slightly different form at each location, but the volunteers 
at each always had the goal of motivating the local people to carry on self-help projects, the very 
undertaking of which would transform their cultural values from apathy to self-motivated 
productivity. Glenn Ferguson, director of VISTA, explained: “The volunteer was a conduit. The 
volunteer was an instrument, bringing commitment and skills and maybe insight, but certainly 
time and concern, to help people make their own judgments with regard to the direction in which 
they wanted to go in every community, whether it was a migrant camp or an urban complex.”465  
Steve Girton, a volunteer in VISTA whose assignment was in the South End of Boston, 
explained that “our task is to put the residents in touch with each other.”466 Girton attempted to 
accomplish this task by creating a newspaper—printed in Spanish, Chinese, and English—to 
create a denominator of a common language, make all residents aware of each other, and inform 
people of the services offered at the nearby Shawmut Center. Sandy Anderson, another volunteer 
in Boston’s South End, created a system of tutors for local children. She remembered: “I found 
that even those who were ten and eleven years old couldn’t read or tell time. And no one cared 
about teaching them. Now when you see them learning, it’s beautiful.”467 A third volunteer in the 
South End, Norman Olshansky, helped to improve the living conditions of the area’s residents by 
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pressing for strict enforcement of the state’s housing codes. He detailed how, “in one of [the 
houses], I had to scare away the rats to see the basement. In another basement, the people there 
complained that the rats had killed three tough cats.”468 Olshansky spoke to the tenants and the 
landlords, ensuring that both knew that the law required specific living conditions for rentals, and 
therefore the situation must be addressed to meet legal codes. Olshansky asserted that “the most 
important thing I do is to explain the alternative situations to each problem; then I leave the 
decision up to them. That way, the landlords themselves will come up with alternative solutions 
in the future.”469 In short, Olshansky motivated landlords and tenants to work together for a 
common solution that also improved conditions in the community. Harding wrote that “VISTA’s 
experience proved to be remarkably parallel to the communication achieved by Peace Corps 
Volunteers in foreign lands.”470 
Like Shriver, Ferguson directly linked the Peace Corps and VISTA. Ferguson worked as 
Shriver’s director of training for volunteers in the Peace Corps for three years before becoming 
the director of VISTA. Shriver was also not the only person who concurrently worked on the 
domestic War on Poverty and the Peace Corps. For Ferguson’s first three months as director of 
VISTA, he continued to serve as director of training for the Peace Corps. Ferguson explained 
that, “because I was interested in the potential of creating a domestic counterpart of the Peace 
Corps, I volunteered to assist with the War on Poverty Task Force. Training, selection, and 
volunteer support were functions germane to a domestic volunteer program, and I had been 
responsible for those functions at the Peace Corps.”471  
Ferguson stated that both programs addressed the “poverty syndrome” and were 
“complementary and not competitive.”472 Recruiters for the Peace Corps and VISTA worked 
together on campuses of colleges around the country. While the Peace Corps attracted more 
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volunteers in 1964 and 1965, by 1966 more people were volunteering with VISTA. Edgar May, 
the author of the Wasted Americans, member of the Task Force on Poverty, and deputy director 
of VISTA, contended that in the same way that service in an exotic foreign country attracted the 
youth, “the Indian reservations, migrant worker camps, the hollows of Appalachia, Harlem, and 
the South Side of Chicago, and Watts, all became exciting to American young people.”473 
VISTA was modeled on the widely popular Peace Corps, and a key part of the evidence 
for the ascendency of the new paradigm among policymakers was that Congress, although it had 
rejected the National Service Corps in 1963, approved VISTA in 1964.
474
 Robert Kennedy had 
designed the National Service Corps to end poverty in the United States, and he had based the 
design on the Peace Corps. Thus VISTA was in effect the National Service Corps with a 
different name. Harding wrote that “the essential structure of Volunteers in Service to America 
was outlined almost step by step in a program prepared by the administration of President 
Kennedy under the title of the National Service Corps.”475  
The changed conditions and paradigm shift facilitated Congress’s approval of VISTA. 
The old way of seeing things had many policymakers still reluctant to accept a transformation of 
culture as the key to solving unemployment and many other problems. As Harding put it, “Under 
the stimulus of the Johnson Administration . . . and the increased awareness of the facts of 
poverty in the country, the situation, only a year later, was entirely different.”476 Pollack claimed 
that the bill for the National Service Corps was at times directed toward mental hospitals, 
juvenile delinquents, the maladjusted, Indian reservations, and depressed areas. Now, the culture 
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of poverty placed all of these phenomena in a new light. Now, all were seen as separate 
manifestations of same underlying issue, the culture of poverty. So, given the paradigm shift 
among them, policymakers were able to justify the domestic program by explaining that the 
highly popular Peace Corps was already addressing the culture of poverty in foreign countries. 
Harding recorded that VISTA “went through the House of Representatives and the Senate with 
virtually no disagreement.”477 
If Americans came to view VISTA as addressing the same issue as the Peace Corps did, 
volunteers in the Peace Corps after 1964 came to view their task in light of domestic efforts. The 
paradigm shift among Americans made people see the culture of poverty as global. Explaining 
how cultural values shaped behavior and attitudes, resulting in either affluence or poverty, 
became common practice at home and abroad.  
Social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s often described the way of life in foreign 
countries as stemming from traditional culture rather than a culture of poverty. However, both 
terms described a culture that came from blockages to opportunity that forced people to adapt to 
a life of poverty. Each was a way of life with a series of attitudes and values that prevented 
people in the Third World from escaping poverty. In the 1960s, programs to develop the Third 
World, such as the Peace Corps, were directed at more than the introduction of a modern 
industrialized economy. The people who ran the programs aimed at changing the people’s 
cultural values in each nation. Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser to Johnson, contended: 
“Capital formation is not merely a matter of profit maximization: it is a matter of a society’s 
effective attitude towards and response to basic science, applied science, and the risk-taking of 
innovation and innovational lending.”478  A modern country could introduce industrialization 
into a Third World country by building structures such as factories, roads, railroads, harbors, and 
dams. But the people of that country might nonetheless retain values from a culture of poverty. If 
this happened, experts such as Rostow explained, industrialization would fail to take root and 
could never be self-sustaining. Therefore industrialization was measured by people, not factories 
– how they acted, what values they had toward education, planning, work, money, and saving. 
                                                 
477
 Ibid., 417. Harding’s estimate of the amount of disagreement was sanguine. As stated in footnote 470, the Senate 
passed the bill for VISTA with a vote of 61 to 35 and the House passed the bill by a margin of 226 to 185. In short, 
disagreement existed. 
478
 W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), vii. 
136 
 
The paradigm shift unified the conception of traditional culture and the culture of 
poverty, making them synonymous. All of the components of the culture of poverty had 
equivalents in traditional culture. Once the paradigm shift occurred in 1964, a single mentality 
about poverty came to exist among the administrators who ran program to address poverty at 
home and abroad, not separate explanations of domestic poverty and poverty in foreign lands.  
Jack Vaughn, the director of the Peace Corps from 1966 to 1969, demonstrated the shift 
in his address to the members of the Public Affairs Forum of the Harvard Business School. He 
explained: 
A realistic definition of “deprivation” does not begin with material want—although 
hundreds of millions of people are in dire material want. It does not begin with lack of 
learning—although hundreds of millions of people lack the merest rudiments of learning. 
At bottom, what the deprived of the world have been deprived of by the conditions of 
their lives are things of the spirit. They have been deprived of initiative and self-reliance; 
of courage and hope. Until they can begin to believe in the possibility of improvement, 
begin to trust the usefulness of innovation, the most and best that America—or 
anybody—offers them in the way of technical assistance, of hardware and the skill to use 
it, will avail them little.
479
 
 
Vaughn described the culture of poverty. The dynamic of poverty and escaping that life 
were identical to others’ explanations of poverty in the Job Corps, Head Start, Follow Through, 
HARYOU, and VISTA.  
Lawrence H. Fuchs, the director of the Peace Corps in the Philippines from September 
1961 to June 1963, demonstrated the way in which the concept of local culture became equated 
with the culture of poverty. In a book he published in 1967—after the paradigm shift—Fuchs 
explained that “most of them [volunteers in the Peace Corp] were pleased with the natural beauty 
of the Filipino countryside, and were gratified at the personal cleanliness of many Filipinos. But 
many were truly shocked by living in a culture of poverty for the first time.”480 It is important to 
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note that, rather than describing the culture among poor Filipinos as traditional, he explained it as 
the culture of poverty. 
Fuchs went on to explain elements of Filipino culture as parts of the culture of poverty. 
Fuchs discussed the Filipino cultural value known as bahala na. He explained that bahala na 
means “it doesn’t matter, never mind” or that “the conditions of life are unchanging and 
unchangeable.”481 He directly contrasted bahala na to the value of achievement in the culture of 
industrialized nations that led people to try to accomplish something tangible and meaningful in 
both their personal and professional lives.  
 Fuchs explained that volunteers in the Peace Corps went out into Filipino villages and 
discussed measures to solve Filipinos’ most pressing problems. Volunteers noticed that Filipinos 
denounced poverty, illiteracy, disease, and low agricultural production while admiring higher 
standards of living in countries such as America.
482
 Volunteers believed that Filipinos wanted to 
change their lives and their communities. Accordingly, volunteers offered to help Filipinos by 
providing access to resources from the Peace Corps, including health care services, food, and 
educational materials and instruction. However, despite their denunciations of hardships in the 
country, Filipinos deeply resisted volunteers’ offers. Bahala na led Filipinos to fundamentally 
accept of the basic conditions of life and death as they knew them.  Fuchs asserted that “Bahala 
na could be a helpful response to the minor annoyances of daily life—a missed bus, no fish in 
the market, a sudden storm—but it also appeared to be a chief obstacle to progress in health, 
education, and economic development.”483 Frustrated by the fatalism of bahala na in Filipino 
culture, volunteers sought to instill a will to achieve into Filipinos and Filipino culture, thereby 
creating the preconditions for improved education, agricultural production, and health care. 
Rather than an absence of food, medicine, or books, poverty was the lack of will to change and 
fight to improve those areas. Poverty, at heart, was both personal and cultural 
Fuchs explained that values described as bahala na in Filipino culture existed in all 
countries. He connected the concept of bahala na to poor people in the United States. Fuchs 
described the unified and universal concept as the “other culture.” He claimed:  
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Many actions stemming from those values ascribed to Filipino culture could also be 
found in immigrant subcultures in the United States as well as on the continents of Asia, 
South America, and Africa. Peace Corps volunteers who have served in other countries or 
VISTA volunteers who have worked on Indian reservations or in urban ghettos will 
recognize in Filipinos many of the same values and attitudes which they found their hosts 
and friends from the “other-culture.” They will be struck particularly by the relative 
absence of achievement motivation.
484
 
 
Fuchs perfectly described the dynamic of the culture of poverty when blockages to 
opportunity forced people to adapt to a life of poverty. Then, that culture of poverty became the 
main obstacle to helping people value education, attain and hold a job, and become economically 
independent. He asserted: “Those qualities usually are present where people are terribly poor and 
see no way of becoming richer, whether they live in a culture where traditions are powerful, as in 
Thailand, or in the Negro ghettos of our big cities. So in large measure the Filipino setting in this 
book is interchangeable with other settings, because the cultural baggage that middle-class 
American Peace Corps volunteers carry and their reactions to and their ways of coping with the 
other-culture are the same in all the counties in which they live.”485 In short, Fuchs argued that 
the culture of poverty caused all poverty around the world. 
The program that best exemplified the way in which the paradigm shift unified the 
conception of poverty at home and abroad was the Reverse Peace Corps (RPC). Sometimes 
called the Exchange Peace Corps or Volunteers to America, the program brought middle- and 
upper-class men and women from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to work in American 
neighborhoods and schools in order to help the poor. The logic behind the program was that, if 
middle-class Americans could alleviate the poverty of foreign people, middle-class foreign 
people could help the American poor. On February 2, 1966, Johnson enthusiastically endorsed an 
“Exchange Peace Corps” in his message to Congress. He claimed: “Our nation has no better 
ambassadors than the young volunteers who serve in 46 countries in the Peace Corps. I propose 
that we welcome similar ambassadors to our shores. We need their special skills and 
understanding just as they need ours.”486 
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Because makers of policy viewed all poverty as the result of cultural values that could 
negatively impact poor people around the world equally, people with middle- or upper-class 
values could help instill a more productive set of behavior and attitudes—regardless of the 
country from which they came.  
As evidence of the way in which the new paradigm among policymakers made the 
program possible, the idea of a Peace Corps in reverse was rejected when Shriver first informally 
proposed it to members of Congress in 1961. The idea suffered the same fate as the National 
Service Corps when both were proposed before the paradigm shift unified the conception of 
foreign and domestic poverty.  
The initial idea of a Peace Corp in reverse came from Kwame Nkrumah, the President of 
Ghana. In 1961, on Shriver’s first visit to Accra for the Peace Corps, Nkrumah asked Shriver 
“Why the one-way traffic? Did he want some young Ghanaians to volunteer for service to 
America?”487 Caught off guard, Shriver responded “yes.” But when he brought the idea up to 
members of Congress, Shriver was met with rejection.  
Undeterred, Shriver brought the idea up again in 1965. In the same address when he 
asked upper-class Indians about the “Other American” in Bombay, Shriver declared that “tonight 
I want to propose a new move in this war—a Reverse Peace Corps—under which foreign 
volunteers would work in our communities or teach in our schools. This idea of an Exchange 
Peace Corps to America is in the air now the way the Peace Corps was in 1960. It is a natural 
application, in reverse, of everything we have learned in the Peace Corps . . . they will contribute 
new ideas and be a source of stimulation, as our Volunteers are abroad.”488 With Shriver’s drive 
and Johnson’s support, Congress passed the Reverse Peace Corps in 1967. Just as the National 
Service Corps had failed 1963 but passed as VISTA in 1964, the Reverse Peace Corps met 
opposition in 1961 but approval in 1967.  
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The Reverse Peace Corps operated from 1967 to 1970. In the first summer 34 men and 30 
women from foreign countries came to America to work with the poor. The men and women 
came from countries including Argentina, Ghana, Nepal, the Philippines, Iran, and Israel.  
One volunteer, a thirty-year-old man name Renato from the Philippines, volunteered in 
East Harlem. An author of an article in the New York Times explained that Renato worked with 
VISTA and was assigned to Block Communities Incorporated, which “trains and sends workers 
to live on New York City blocks to help people organize to help themselves.”489 Giving support 
to the idea of a universal culture of poverty, Renato said that “the poverty, apathy and attitudes 
are the same” on West 111th Street and Lenox Avenue as problems he encountered in the barrios 
of Manila.
 490
  
Renato’s experience was a prime example of the way in which a common paradigm—
started by Kennedy, continued by Johnson, and completed by Shriver—equally shaped programs 
to end poverty at home and abroad. Renato connected the variety of programs and ideas within 
the paradigm of the War on Poverty, including working with VISTA, concentrating on the same 
area as HARYOU, confirming Fuchs’s characterization of the “other culture” in Manila and New 
York, and Shriver’s belief in the shared culture of poverty assumed by the logic of Reverse 
Peace Corps. In short, the paradigm shift in the understanding of poverty at home and abroad 
equally shaped all programs and people in the War on Poverty in the United States and in foreign 
lands. The paradigm allowed all people and programs to be integrated into a single effort to end 
global poverty.  
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Chapter 6 - “All of the Negativism Piled Up”: The Paradigm 
Disintegrates 
By 1964 the paradigm that attributed all poverty around the world to the same set of 
cultural values had fully come together. Sargent Shriver and others who made policy based the 
design of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) within the War on Poverty and all of its 
programs in accordance with their notion of a culture of poverty. By 1980 intellectual, social, 
and political movements had caused the paradigm to fall apart. Some aspects of the thinking that 
had been behind the paradigm were integrated into succeeding paradigms—such as the 
explanatory power of culture—while other aspects lost intellectual credibility—such as cultural 
universalism. Several reasons accounted for the paradigm’s loss of credibility among makers of 
policy.  
Because Shriver and others had used the paradigm to design the War on Poverty—a 
major federal initiative—all challenges to programs within the War on Poverty also challenged 
the underlying paradigm. Between 1964 and 1980 a wide variety of groups and individuals 
within the United States contested that the programs of the War on Poverty afforded too little 
power to the poor; gave too much power directly to the poor, were too costly, and lacked funding 
because of the Vietnam War; misused federal funds, incited violence and riots, increased 
dependency, made poor people feel entitled, failed to create jobs, or made too little progress in 
solving poor people’s problems. As the War on Poverty increasingly lost popular and political 
support in the late 1960s and 1970s, the credibility of the paradigm declined.  
However, the paradigm was a worldview that was bigger than a series of domestic 
programs. The paradigm could have still existed without the domestic War on Poverty. Therefore 
the most important reason for the paradigm’s collapse was the challenge from conservatives and 
liberals over its logic. Taken together, they challenged several tenets of the paradigm. 
 Conservatives such as Republican politician Ronald Reagan, urbanologist Edward 
Banfield, and political scientist Charles Murray questioned the assumption that people could 
intentionally and purposefully improve cultural values. Each claimed that it was poor people’s 
fault for not being able to escape poverty and— perhaps aside from authoritarian measures —the 
government had little power to help them overcome their deleterious cultural values. They 
challenged the tenet that the federal government could best produce change. Conservatives did 
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not object to using the idea of culture to explain how poverty arose, but they inverted the logic of 
the paradigm by claiming that governmental programs to end poverty caused dependency rather 
than created self-sufficiency. As Reagan proclaimed in his State of the Union Address in 1988: 
“My friends, some years ago, the Federal Government declared war on poverty, and poverty 
won.”491 
Liberals, including civil rights leaders and activists Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, 
Stokely Carmichael, Betty Friedan, and Cesar Chavez discredited claims that marginalized 
groups suffered from cultural values that enervated their will to fight for a better future. Social 
and political movements showed the power of marginalized groups who suffered poverty. Rather 
than victims of blocked opportunities who needed help to change, they were powerful people 
who fought against the system despite their oppression.  
The works of liberal scholars challenged the paradigm from many angles. Some lent 
support to the social movements. Historians Jules Rawick, Lawrence Levine, and Eugene 
Genovese demonstrated the power of the historically poor African-American community, not its 
weakness.
492
 Given that subscribers to the paradigm often blamed women and their style of 
childrearing for passing down the culture of poverty to succeeding generations, scholars of 
women stressed the positive influence of the group despite their repeated oppression by men.
493
  
Liberal anthropologists, such as Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, and Mary Douglas, 
challenged the assumption that a single universal culture of poverty existed by emphasizing 
cultural relativism. In short, the world’s diverse environment obligated humans to adapt their 
cultural attitudes and behaviors to survive in areas as different as the Australian Outback and the 
Alps of Switzerland. Geertz helped shift the focus of anthropology from behavior to meanings 
and symbols. Culture determined meaning and was relative to time and setting. It mattered less 
                                                 
491
 Quoted in Annelise Orleck, “The War on the War on Poverty and American Politics since the 1960s,” in The War 
on Poverty: A New Grassroots History: 1964-1980, eds. Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian (Athens, 
Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2011), 437.  
492
 Jules Rawick, From Sunup to Sundown: The Making of the Black Community (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1973); 
Lawrence Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New 
York: Vintage, 1976).  
493
 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 497. 
143 
 
how the poor in Ghana acted, and more what they understood to be the meaning of their actions 
within their local context. The experience of poverty by people in different cultures did not 
conform to any one universal standard.  
Americans in the 1970s would come to celebrate diversity, multiculturalism, and ethnic 
subcultures–not any single American identity. Historian Bruce Schulman explained, when 
discussing governmental programs, that “the justification for them shifted from integration—
including disadvantaged minorities so they could become like everyone else—to diversity—
welcoming racial and cultural differences into institutions so that they would reflect the 
multicultural nature of American society.”494 
Conservatives first major criticism of the War on Poverty and its underlying paradigm 
was that poor people’s cultural values could be reformed. Conservatives accepted that the poor 
had distinct cultural values. In contrast to liberals who believed that the poor were trapped by 
their cultural values and wanted help to change, conservatives held that the poor deserved their 
fate in poverty because of their bad life choices and that they had no desire to change. In short, 
poor people could not be helped by others; they could only help themselves. 
In The Unheavenly City (1970), conservative urbanologist Edward Banfield claimed that 
“the lower-class individual lives from moment to moment . . . impulse governs his behavior. . . . 
He is therefore radically improvident: whatever he cannot consume immediately he considers 
valueless…. [He] has a feeble, attenuated sense of self.”495 Banfield eventually became an 
adviser to Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Conservative Senator Barry Goldwater claimed that “the 
fact is that most people who have no skill have had no education for the same reason—low 
intelligence or low ambition.”496 The conservative description of the culture of poverty reached 
its full maturity in Charles Murray’s Losing Ground (1984). Murray argued that people were not 
inherently moral, hardworking, or responsible. The poor avoided work and were amoral because 
they tried to escape responsibility for their actions. According to writer Barbara Ehrenreich, 
Murray argued that “poverty was caused not by low wages or a lack of jobs but by bad attitudes 
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and faulty lifestyles. The poor were dissolute, promiscuous, prone to addiction and crime, unable 
to defer gratification or possibly even set an alarm clock. The last thing they could be trusted 
with was money.”497 
Conservatives’ second major criticism of the War on Poverty and its supporting paradigm 
was that governmental programs designed to alleviate poverty were harmful to the American 
economy and to poor people. Conservatives including Banfield, Murray, and Goldwater argued 
that governmental programs created and sustained the culture of poverty. This stood in direct 
contrast to policymakers in the 1960s who claimed that the government was the best instrument 
to address and end poverty in America.  
Makers of policy in the War on Poverty held that limited opportunities, combined with 
poor childrearing styles and negative peer influence, accounted for the propagation of the culture 
of poverty. Conservatives held a fundamentally different belief about how the culture of poverty 
formed and was sustained. They argued that governmental programs only exacerbated the 
dependency of the poor and therefore must be terminated. Conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s 
argued that poor people’s situations had been improving in the 1950s and would have continued 
to get better if the liberals and OEO had not intervened and made things worse.
498
 Murray 
explained that all governmental attempts to help the poor only resulted in deepening their 
dependency and depravity. In his speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination in 
1968, Nixon declared: “For the past five years, we have been deluged by government programs 
for the unemployed; programs for the cities; programs for the poor. And we have reaped from 
these programs an ugly harvest of frustration, violence, and failure across the land.”499 Nixon 
believed that all governmental programs for the poor stagnated free enterprise and perpetuated 
poor people’s dependency on the government. In 1982 President Reagan blamed the Great 
Society for aggravating the problems of the poor, trapping them in a cycle of poverty and 
dependence on welfare, encouraging illegitimacy, and inspiring hopelessness. He claimed: “With 
the coming of the Great Society, government began eating away at the underpinnings of the 
private enterprise system. The big tasters and big spenders in the Congress had started a binge 
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that would slowly change the nature of our society and, even worse, it threatened the character of 
our people….By the time the full weight of Great Society programs was felt, economic progress 
for America’s poor had come to a tragic halt.”500 
In addition to creating and sustaining the culture of poverty, conservatives argued that 
governmental programs wasted taxpayers’ money and thereby hurt the American economy. In 
1964 Charlie Bartlett of the Chattanooga Times—who had been a good friend of John Kennedy 
during his presidency—wrote a column saying that it cost more to send a person through the Job 
Corps than it did to send him or her through Harvard.
501
 Johnson already knew about the 
purportedly high cost of the Jobs Corps. He had had several conversations with Bill Moyers, 
William P. Kelly Jr., and Shriver while they were designing the Job Corps. On August 7, 1964 
Johnson asked Moyers, “Can anybody explain to me why the hell it costs $4,600 a year for a 
boy?”502 Moyers responded that “You’ve got to have more instructors for this, because these 
boys are more undisciplined. So, per ten boys, you’ve got to have at least one instructor, until 
they test it and see whether or not it goes. That adds to the cost. The others things are food and so 
forth. It’s on a twelve-month basis, rather than on a nine-month, basis, which a college education 
is figured at.”503 Johnson demanded that Moyers and Shriver reduce the cost per enrollee. They 
did not. From 1964 through 1968 the annual cost per enrollee of the Job Corps stood at $6,000.  
In his article, Bartlett claimed that it cost $6,900 per enrollee per year. That number made 
it more expensive than a year at Harvard. Although Bartlett’s estimate was higher than the actual 
cost, his article received much public attention. The article angered Shriver. He said: “That’s one 
of those facile, completely empty comparisons which catch the public attention and are 
worthless, really.”504 He continued that tuition at Harvard “does not include taking care of him, 
so to speak, or monitoring or working with him twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for 
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a year at a time. It doesn’t take into consideration anything about the son or daughter who goes 
to Harvard and his or her capacity to take care of themselves, their own independent capacity as 
a human being versus the dependent, pitifully weak—by comparison—condition of the person 
who joins the Job Corps…. It’s completely irrelevant. But the superficial comparison caught on. 
It was a catchy thing.”505 Many conservatives seized on the dollar amount to claim that the Job 
Corps inefficiently spent federal money, hurt the national economy, and needed to be terminated.  
More than inefficiently spending too much of the taxpayers’ money, conservatives 
asserted that the programs of OEO violated the typical American system of political and 
financial authority. The programs distributed money directly to the poor, and poor people 
misused it. Elected officials thought that their authority to make decisions was being 
circumvented. The OEO directly empowered local poor people without enabling elected 
politicians to check that power. Edgar May, member of the Task Force on Poverty and deputy 
director of VISTA, claimed: “The older we got, the worse we were politically, because they 
began to understand what the hell we were really about, and what we were about was to make 
change. And the one thing that scares the living hell out a politician, whether he’s a state 
representative in little Vermont or in Texas or anyplace else, is a lot of unknowns…change.”506  
Money went directly from Washington to the community agencies and the local poor 
people. Money did not go along the traditional route from Washington D.C. to the state 
government, to the city government, and then to a local elected board. Shriver explained that “the 
money gets more quickly and directly from the source of the money to the victim who needs the 
help which the money can give. That’s efficiency, but it’s not in accord with the traditional way 
in which public monies are distributed in our American system.”507 He continued: “when you cut 
through the state government bureaucracy, and then you cut through the city government 
bureaucracy, and money—federal taxpayers’ money—goes directly from Washington, zip, right 
smack down to the Community Action agency on the West Side of Chicago or to East St. Louis, 
and there’s no intervening bureaucratic group passing on it, that’s somewhat revolutionary. It’s 
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efficient, but revolutionary.”508 The revolutionary concept inspired fear in elected officials who 
thought that they were losing control of their region; this caused many to object to the programs 
of OEO. Shriver asserted: “It doesn’t make any difference whether the politicians were 
Democrats or Republicans or whether they were governors or mayors, a huge proportion of them 
were against OEO for doing that.”509 
Politicians feared that giving money and power directly to the poor could end up 
empowering radicals and creating potentially violent outbursts. In short, critics claimed that the 
programs of OEO funded violence and radicalism. Even President Lyndon Johnson lost a degree 
of faith in the programs when he heard about the ways some poor communities used the money. 
Historian Michael Gillette has observed that, “when the beneficiaries of his efforts actually 
denounced the system instead of joining it, Johnson angrily disavowed the excesses of 
community action. He undoubtedly felt that their radicalism and the backlash it would arouse 
made it more difficult for him to achieve his liberal agenda.”510  
The best example of the radicalism came from the Black Arts Repertory Theatre, part of 
Project Uplift under HARYOU. Some of the artistic demonstrations went in directions 
unforeseen by those with OEO. LeRoi Jones (who changed his name to Amiri Baraka in 1968) 
started the group in 1965 with money from a grant issued by HARYOU. The group’s charter 
statement read: “To explore, develop, extend, propagate, and preserve the dramatic arts and 
talents of the Afro-Americans, with particular emphasis on linking such expressions to the 
African past and present in order that the black community may realize and protect and nourish 
distinctive aspects of its own historical culture.”511 In the summer of 1965 the group produced 
five plays and performed at least one every night on a portable stage that they moved around 
Harlem.
512
 Although the group’s charter appeared non-threatening to the peace of New York, the 
plays were not. Critics claimed that the plays largely amounted to “anti-whitey” protests. A 
prepared statement released by an official with OEO in November 1965 detailed that the plays 
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collectively “denounced Martin Luther King’s philosophy of nonviolence, advocated rebellion 
by black people, challenged the liberal rhetoric as hypocritical, exposed white capitalist 
exploitation of the ghetto, and invoked a quasi-Marxist form of political and social 
revolution.”513  
An investigator for OEO later mentioned that the people of Harlem seemed to quite enjoy 
the plays and taunting the “whitey” of the black-face-in-reverse portrayals. The press reacted 
differently. James Harris, a local critic, described the plays as “crude and racist…preaching 
hatred of the white race.”514 He said the plays portrayed “whitey” as “bungling fools with a 
monopoly of the human defects of avarice, ignorance, cowardice, and stupidity.”515 Members of 
the press seized on the story of the “anti-whitey” activities funded by OEO.516 Investigations 
revealed that the OEO had directly given the Black Arts Repertory Theatre $115,200 to create 
and conduct their plays. Shriver released his own statement in November 1965 stressing that “it 
is unfortunate that the Harlem antipoverty program was disgraced this way….It obviously never 
should have been permitted to occur at all. It will not occur again in the war on poverty.”517 
For conservatives, it came down to the facts that governmental programs to alleviate 
poverty actually hurt the national economy by misusing funds, financed radical and violent 
demonstrations, led poor people to be dependent on governmental aid, and subverted Americans’ 
system of authority over money and decision making. Because the governmental programs 
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actually made poverty worse, conservatives claimed, they needed to be terminated. Nixon was 
determined to shut down OEO and end the War on Poverty. Schulman explained that Nixon 
“sought to dismantle the welfare system and the agencies and programs that administered it, 
eliminate the social workers who ran them, and starve the liberal networks they nourished. . . . 
He meant to reverse the Great Society, call for the abolition of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, the vanguard of Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty.”518 In his second inaugural 
address, Nixon reversed Kennedy’s well-known call for collective sacrifice, declaring: “Let us 
remember that America was built not by government, but by people; not by welfare, but by 
work; not by shirking responsibility, but by seeking responsibility. In our own lives, let each of 
us ask, not just what will government do for me, but what can I do for myself?”519  
Nixon intended to transfer authority for programs from the federal to the local 
government and from the public to the private sector. Nixon made large cuts in the federal 
budget for compensatory education for poor students, urban renewal, the construction of 
hospitals, aid for school districts located near military bases, money to farmers for soil 
management, and funding for mental hospitals. Administrators in OEO lost authority over 
several programs while Nixon occupied the Oval Office. Nixon oversaw the transfer of the Job 
Corps to the Labor Department, where it turned from a program to reform cultural values into 
one that mainly located jobs for the unemployed. During Nixon’s administration Head Start 
moved to the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Nixon signed the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, transferring the manpower 
training programs of OEO to local governments. Together the transfers and new departments 
took away the more sweeping aims embodied in OEO, notably the expressed intention to change 
the cultural values of the poor.  
Reagan ended the War on Poverty.
520
 Reagan made dramatic cuts in the budget for food 
stamps, loans for student, jobs in public service, welfare, lunches for schoolchildren, mass transit 
in urban centers, and training programs.
521
 Large numbers of poor people lost governmental 
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assistance: three and a half million children were cut from programs that supplied lunch at 
school; one million people lost food stamps; three-quarters of a million had their access to 
Medicaid denied; and three hundred thousand families were pushed out of public housing.
522
 
During Reagan’s presidencies another five hundred thousand people lost funding under Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—the largest federal welfare program. Under 
pressure from Reagan, Congress repealed CETA in 1982, ending the training of nearly three 
hundred and fifty thousand people.  
Citing Charles Murray’s Losing Ground, Reagan asserted that governmental programs to 
alleviate poverty compromised free enterprise. More, Reagan warned Americans that 
governmental aid came at the expense of freedom. He stated that “our natural, unalienable rights 
are now considered to be a dispensation of government, and freedom has never been so fragile, 
so close to slipping from our grasp as it is at this moment.”523 He claimed that all programs 
entailed a degree of coercion and therefore were dangerous to American democracy and 
capitalism. Reagan proclaimed: “The Founding Fathers knew a government can’t control the 
economy without controlling people. And they knew when a government sets out to do that, it 
must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. So we have come to a time for choosing.”524 
For Reagan, the choice was to end governmental programs to alleviate poverty.  
Liberals challenged the paradigm that supported the War on Poverty as well. While 
conservatives argued that governmental programs could not solve poverty, liberal critics claimed 
that the culture of the poor represented strength, not apathy, and that culture was not universal 
but relative.  
A major nation-wide movement that challenged the specific aspect of the paradigm that 
proposed that poverty was cultural weakness was the Civil Rights Movement. It is important to 
recognize that the Civil Rights Movement was concerned not only with race but also with 
poverty. In November 1967 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. started the Poor People’s Campaign, 
directly allying with the poor and their plight. The African-American community suffered the 
highest rates of poverty in America. King acknowledged that the non-African-American poor 
suffered similar hardships of discrimination and oppression. On April 4, 1967 King delivered “A 
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Time to Break the Silence,” a speech explaining his inspiration to start the campaign. The 
principal purpose of the speech was to announce his opposition to the Vietnam War. Among the 
many reasons for his opposition, he discussed the way in which the war took money and energy 
away from helping the poor. He stated:  
A few years ago there was a shining moment in that struggle. It seemed as if there was a 
real promise of hope for the poor—both black and white—through the poverty program. 
There were experiments, hopes, new beginnings. Then came the buildup in Vietnam, and 
I watched this program broken and eviscerated, as if it were some idle political plaything 
of a society gone mad on war, and I knew that America would never invest the necessary 
funds or energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as adventures like Vietnam 
continued to draw men and skills and money like some demonic destructive suction tube. 
So, I was increasingly compelled to see the war as an enemy of the poor and to attack it 
as such.
525
 
 
In the Poor People’s Campaign King sought jobs for the poor. He allied with leaders from 
communities primarily inhabited by Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and 
poor whites. King stated: “This is a highly signiﬁcant event [and] the beginning of a new co-
operation, understanding, and a determination by poor people of all colors and backgrounds to 
assert and win their right to a decent life and respect for their culture and dignity.”526 
Other leaders of the Civil Rights Movement did not ally with poor whites, but still fought 
to demonstrate the power and ability of African Americans. Malcolm X advocated the separation 
of the races until the African-American community could stand on equal social and economic 
footing with the white community. Leader of the Black Panther Party Stokely Carmichael 
proclaimed “black power” to emphasize the strength of African Americans.  
The major point of the Civil Rights Movement that challenged the paradigm that 
explained poverty was that marginalized groups were not weak, apathetic, fatalistic, or apolitical. 
African-American protesters who endured the spray of high-pressure fire hoses in Birmingham, 
Alabama in 1963 were not resigned to a life of marginalization and poverty. Rather, they showed 
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the will to fight for rights and power. Historian Michael Latham explained: “When American 
cities burned in urban riots and a more radical civil rights movement pushed beyond 
desegregation and equal rights toward demands for socioeconomic equality and calls for 
redistribution, the ‘traditionals’ at home also seemed far from passive or apolitical.”527 
 In 1965 Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan published a report 
entitled “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.” The highly publicized report 
inspired liberal scholars to join with Civil Rights activists in challenging the assumption that 
marginalized groups, notably African Americans, women, and the poor, had a weak, apathetic, 
and damaged culture. Moynihan incorporated into the report the logic and assumptions of the 
paradigm, including the paradigm with the cultural explanation of poverty that served as the 
foundation for the War on Poverty. Historian Alice O’Connor noted that “The more immediate 
impact of the Moynihan Report was to politicize the idea of culture and to shatter any sense of 
consensus that cultural theorists might have had.”528 In short, the report inspired challengers who 
helped break apart the paradigm. 
Moynihan claimed that broken and matriarchal African-American families 
psychologically damaged their children and created a “tangle of pathology.”529 Begun by 
discriminatory treatment under slavery, the psychological damage done by the breakdown of the 
family was “capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world.”530 
Moynihan explained that psychological damage to African Americans gave them cultural values 
that led to an inability to hold jobs, a desire for immediate gratification, and a proneness to 
violence and delinquency. Psychologist William Ryan explained: “We’re told the Negro’s 
condition is due to his ‘pathology,’ his values, the way he lives, the kind of family life he 
leads.”531 Nearly all of the logic and assumptions of the paradigm explaining poverty existed in 
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Moynihan’s report including that family and peers inflicted psychological damage on children, 
the poor had a culture with values and attitudes that bred failure, and that the culture of poverty 
was a self-perpetuating system.  
Moynihan’s intention was not to disparage African Americans, women, or the poor. 
Rather it was to advocate for a new governmental program that would create jobs, which he 
thought would help end the tangle of pathology.
532
 However, historian Alice O’Connor explained 
that “Moynihan’s was far more than a flawed strategy for a good cause; it was an expression of a 
deeply flawed, and for a time anyway, a shared social scientific vision of the dynamics of 
gender, race, and poverty.”533 She continued: “Moynihan’s analysis of the internal ‘pathology’ 
gripping the lower-class black family sparked a wide-ranging reaction that served to question if 
not undermine the much older, liberal sociological tradition it drew from.”534 
 Although Moynihan focused primarily on historical causes, his report inspired a highly 
charged debate about contemporary social policy, including the War on Poverty and paradigm 
that supported it. A study that appeared before Moynihan’s report but inspired several scholars 
who would challenge the paradigm was British historian E.P. Thompson’s 1964 The Making of 
the English Working Class. Thompson emphasized the strength and collective unity of the lower 
class, a direct challenge to argument within the paradigm that the poor were disorganized and 
apathetic. Thompson, using a Marxist interpretation, argued that class was not a static category 
but a process. Not a stationary machine but “the way the machine works once it is set in 
motion—not this interest and that interest, but the friction of interests—the movement itself, the 
heat, the thundering noise”535 (emphasis in original). To understand the upper class one had to 
understand the lower, the masters as well as the slaves, and “the ways in which subordinate 
classes forged their own oppositional postures.”536 In short, the upper class’s oppression of the 
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lower class did not result in cultural deficiencies; rather it unified and strengthened the lower 
class in opposition to the upper class. 
Thompson’s focus on the working class and oppositional postures aligned perfectly with 
the interpretations offered by African-American historians who studied slavery and sought to 
support civil rights leaders and challenge Moynihan’s thesis that African Americans had 
“damaged” families with values that led to the abandonment of children and life-long poverty. 
Historians looked for characteristics of personal and social power outside the white people’s 
control or influence—in short, forms of resistance to white people’s hegemony. They studied the 
African-American community and argued for its collective strength, not the weakness of its 
individuals. Such studies challenged the paradigm that supported the War on Poverty and its 
emphasis on dependency, apathy, and social disorganization. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s studies of the slaves’ power and strength became dominant. 
Novelist Ralph Ellison explained that “any people who could endure all of that brutalization and 
keep together, who could undergo such dismemberment and resuscitate itself, and endure until it 
could take the initiative in achieving its own freedom is obviously more than the sum of its 
brutalization. Seen in this perspective, theirs has been one of the great human experiences and 
one of the great triumphs of the human spirit in modern times.”537 
 In 1974 Eugene Genovese published Roll Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made, 
written primarily from black sources. Genovese, like Thompson, offered a Marxist interpretation 
and focused on the marginalized class. The world the slaves made revealed Genovese’s 
interpretation of class as an action like the making of the English working class. Genovese 
argued for the strength and positive aspects of the black experience over Moynihan’s argument 
for damage. He also countered the interpretation that slaves were dependent on their masters by 
revealing the resistance and autonomous aspects of slaves’ lives. He pointed out that slaves did 
resist, often in cunning ways including breaking shovels and feigning sickness. Genovese 
acknowledged a degree of dependence and stressed re-humanization, meaning that, although 
slaves accepted paternalism, they did so on their own terms.
538
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Lawrence Levine also covered resistance by slaves in Black Culture and Black 
Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom. Levine tapped into 
slaves’ oral tradition and examined “spirituals, folktales, legends, anecdotes, sayings, proverbs, 
jokes, field hollers, shouts, cries, and calls.”539 Levine contended that through the oral tradition 
slaves created an alternative world, outside the whites’ control, that transcended “the temporal 
bonds of slavery.”540 He claimed that slaves’ music revealed a strong communal consciousness, 
not disorganization. Although legal slavery existed slaves actively resisted spiritual slavery. 
Levine’s work demonstrates that the forces that eventually broke the paradigm apart came from 
several angles. Together, politicians, protesters, and social scientists challenged the logic of the 
paradigm. 
If African-American historians of slavery challenged the assumptions of the paradigm 
that the culture of the poor had values of dependency, apathy, and social disorganization, liberal 
white scholars challenged the assumption that any single culture could be universal. Those who 
designed and administered the War on Poverty, including Shriver, Adam Yarmolinsky, and 
Lawrence Fuchs, claimed that the culture of poverty was universal; the same deleterious cultural 
values sacrificed the economic success of people in Africa, Asia, South America, and North 
America. Social scientists started to reconsider their use of this cultural framework. Sociologist 
Hylan Lewis challenged the assumption of a separate, unified, and universal culture of poverty 
by emphasizing the tremendous diversity among families living in poor neighborhoods.
541
  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz arguably did the most to discredit the assumption of 
cultural universalism. Novick claimed that Geertz was “more influential than any other single 
figure within the discipline, [and that] he is also the anthropologist best known and most cited 
outside of it.”542 Geertz’s most influential work was The Interpretation of Cultures (1973). He 
claimed that Western scholars since the Enlightenment had operated under a paradigm that 
sought universals. This desire became particularly strong among anthropologists of the 1950s 
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and 1960s as they searched for elements of worldwide cultural unity. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
makers of policy in the War on Poverty were directly under the influence of such scholars. 
Geertz directly challenged the idea that a universal criterion to evaluate cultural values could 
exist. He remained skeptical of any cross-cultural generalization because he thought humans had 
no universal culture; rather, human culture varied based on local context. All values and behavior 
depended on local symbols and meaning, not on any universal objective analysis. He wrote that 
“man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, [and] I take culture to 
be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”543 Cultures around the world cannot be evaluated 
using Western equivalents, because he claimed that there are no Western equivalents. He argued 
that “every people has its own sort of depth.”544 Geertz described the Balinese cockfight and 
naming customs, North African tribal law, and Azande witchcraft to demonstrate that each had to 
be understood only by its own signs, symbols, and customs. Each had no exact counterpart in the 
West. Geertz believed that life consisted of vivid vernaculars rather than “forceless generalities.”  
Geertz’s studies held great significance in overturning the paradigm that supported the 
War on Poverty for several reasons. First, he shifted the study of culture from behavior to 
meaning. Makers of policy in the War on Poverty detailed the way in which cultural values 
directed behavior; Geertz challenged that. It mattered less how the Balinese acted, and more 
what they understood to be the meaning of their actions within their local context. Second, his 
theories were international in focus and implication. Although challenges to the programs of the 
War on Poverty largely remained local, the paradigm was a worldview that included people and 
countries around the globe. Breaking apart the paradigm would require a challenger with an 
international focus because the paradigm applied to people all over the world. Geertz offered 
that. Third, Geertz discredited the notion of purposeful cultural change directed from abroad. In 
short, all aims of the Peace Corps could never be achieved because Western cultural values could 
never be introduced into a Third World nation where they were completely foreign and 
incompatible to the local context. The terms, meanings, symbols, and customs differed, so it was 
impossible for people from one culture to purposely transform others from another country into  
                                                 
543
 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in Interpretation of Cultures 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. 
544
 Quoted inWatson, 675. 
157 
 
completely adopting their values. The two cultures could never come together as one. Geertz 
wrote: “For our time and forward, the image of a general orientation, perspective, 
Weltanschauung, growing out of humanistic studies (or, for that matter, out of scientific ones) 
and shaping the direction of culture is a chimera.”545 Lastly, as Novick noted, his work was 
widely read, cited, and highly influential.  
The shift away from cultural universalism and toward cultural relativism existed outside 
of academia as well. Schulman wrote: “From World War II until the early 1970s, liberal 
universalism—a belief in the fundamental unity and sameness of all humanity—had undergirded 
social activism and political reform in the United States….Beliefs that blacks or Latinos or 
women possessed distinctive natures or cultures were dismissed as prejudiced.”546 Integration 
stood as the principal ideal and objective in the 1950s and 1960s. In the War on Poverty, 
reformers attempted to integrate the poor from the culture of poverty into the affluent culture. 
This attempt to transform poor people’s values is what Frank Mankiewicz called OEO’s “charm 
school.” However, by the early 1970s diversity and multiculturalism had replaced the 
integrationist ideal.  
Some Americans proclaimed difference to make a statement. Frustrated with the lack of 
social progress made by African Americans, the Black Panthers started the Black Power 
Movement and emphasized an African-American cultural connection with black Africans, 
separate from white Americans. However most emphasized the differences between peoples and 
their cultural values as an advantage from which all could benefit. In this view, unassimilable 
groups such as the poor appeared to have value. By the late 1980s nearly half of the Fortune 500 
companies employed full-time staffs to cultivate and manage diversity. Schulman explained: 
“The ideological shift to diversity led to a reconception of the very nature of America—to see the 
nation not as a melting pot where many different peoples and cultures contributed to one 
common stew, but as discrete people and culture sharing the same places—a tapestry, salad 
bowl, or rainbow….In this view, which became the dominant way of conceiving of race relations 
in the 1970s and 1980s, there was no such thing as American culture. Instead, there were many 
American cultures.”547 Each cultural group had value and should not be forced to assimilate to a 
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single overarching, universalizing, American culture. Americans in the 1960s did not realize how 
powerful the notion would become of distinct groups, each with its own unique culture, politics, 
objectives, and destiny.
548
 The shift toward diversity and multiculturalism in American culture 
challenged the paradigm’s ideal of universalism; Americans’ celebration of diversity also made it 
no longer seem advantageous to fully eliminate poverty and the culture of the poor.  
Liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith described the conservative movement in the 
1970s and 1980s as “a mini-Dark Age of selfishness, greed, and sanctimony,” with the goal of 
getting “the poor off the federal budget, tax system, and the consciousness of the 
comfortable.”549 But liberals and conservative did not need to agree. Together, their separate 
challenges from a multitude of perspectives broke apart the paradigm that Kennedy had brought 
together. Nixon and Reagan ended the War on Poverty politically. More importantly, liberal and 
conservative causes of the 1970 and 1980s challenged and fragmented the paradigm. 
Conservative argued that the government was not an instrument capable of changing poor 
people’s culture. Liberals argued that marginalized groups’ values were not only very diverse, 
they also represented the people’s strength. However, the elements that comprised the paradigm 
did not disappear. Many became incorporated in new paradigms. Since the 1960s every scholar 
creating a theory in the social sciences has had to address the impact of culture and cultural 
values. Despite its successes and challenges, Kennedy’s paradigm first brought the concept of 
cultural values to the attention of Americans of all backgrounds and educational levels. Cultural 
considerations moved beyond academia and from being exclusively matters of argument among 
intellectuals. Americans living in cities all around the country came to dispute matters such as 
residential zoning, busing, and employment in cultural terms. In the 1970s and 1980s white 
conservatives living in the suburbs claimed their rights to live among people with similar values, 
and therefore blocked African-Americans from moving into their neighborhoods, attending their 
schools, and working at their place of employment. Although by the 1970s scholars accepted that 
cultural values were not universal, all agreed that cultural concepts were vital to understanding 
the world and its people.  
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Conclusion - The Paradigm after the War on Poverty 
 Most scholars who have studied the War on Poverty since the 1960s have done so to 
debate the success or failure of the original programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO). Historian Annelise Orleck contended that “Historians’ writing about the War on Poverty 
focused largely on its failures.”550 Allen J. Matusow, in The Unraveling of America: A History of 
Liberalism in the 1960s, argued that the programs of OEO failed to accomplish liberal 
politicians’ promises to end poverty.551 Sociologist Jill Quadagno, in The Color of Welfare: How 
Racism Undermined the War on Poverty, claimed that racism and sexism compromised the 
potential effectiveness of the War on Poverty.
552
 Historian Bruce Schulman considered the 
programs more successful, contending that the “ series of federal programs essentially eliminated 
want among previously hard-hit populations, like the elderly, and reduced the overall poverty 
rate from more than 20 percent in the late 1950s to 12 percent by the early 1970s.”553 Historian 
Michael Gillette measured the success of the War on Poverty by the fact that most of the 
programs continue to exist today.
554
 The Jobs Corps, Head Start, Upward Bound, Community 
Action Program (operating as the Community Development Corporation), Volunteers in Service 
to America (VISTA), and the Peace Corps all currently operate in the twenty-first century and 
continue to help millions of people in America and around the world.  
Studying the paradigm that explained poverty in the 1960s offers ways to not only 
evaluate the success of the War on Poverty, it also provides new ways to understand a variety of 
phenomena in postwar America, including the popular and academic embrace of the explanatory 
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power of culture, the fragmentation of America in the 1960s into different cultural groups, and 
the emergence of the fields of “History and Memory” and “World History.”  
The intellectual movements of the Sixties and the paradigm shift initiated by John 
Kennedy embodied a key moment that has remained part of American thought and culture. In the 
twenty-first century the term “Sixties” still provokes strong feelings and opinions for nearly all 
Americans. People typically describe the graceful John F. Kennedy, malevolent Lyndon 
Johnson, tricky Richard Nixon, the terrible Vietnam War, the inspiring Civil Rights and 
Women’s Liberation movements, sobering environmentalism, charismatic youth at Berkeley, 
tuned-out hippies in the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood, the treasonous Weatherman 
Underground, and the iconic Beatles. In June 2004 former President Bill Clinton mused that, “if 
you look back on the Sixties and think there was more good than bad, you’re probably a 
Democrat. If you think there was more harm than good, you’re probably a Republican.”555  
The theory of universalism embedded in the paradigm has impacted and still impacts 
Americans’ collective memories of the 1950s and 1960s as described by Clinton. Historians in 
the field of “History and Memory” may find it useful to explore the way in which the paradigm 
sanitized the collective memory of the 1950s and early 1960s. When asked of their memory of 
the 1950s, most Americans describe a scenario that could have come directly out of an episode 
of Leave It to Beaver or Father Knows Best. They explain the decade as a simpler time when 
nuclear families dominated, everyone could afford quality suburban homes, and a more coherent 
“moral order” made the difference between good and bad immediately obvious. Former 
president of Harvard Derek Bok commented that “There is nostalgia for the fifties because it was 
stable and we were trying to get back to normalcy. There is something comforting about it, that it 
wasn’t unsettling in the way that the sixties were.”556 Historians title chapters on the 1950s in 
their textbooks “The Golden Age,” “The Affluent Society,” “Grand Expectation,” and “The 
                                                 
555
 M. J. Heale, “The Sixties as History: A Review of the Political Historiography,” Reviews in American History 33, 
no. 1 (March 2005): 134. 
556
 Quoted in Bernard von Bothermer, Framing the Sixties: The Use and Abuse of a Decade from Ronald Reagan to 
George W. Bush (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), 19. 
161 
 
Biggest Boom Yet.”557 An ongoing Gallup poll asks Americans: “what decade would you most 
like to relive and in what decade would you most like to raise your kids?”558 More people choose 
the 1950s than any other decade.
559
  
A person’s perspective on the 1960s has more impact on the way in which Americans 
view the 1950s than any other factor. The paradigm that explained poverty in the 1960s 
contributed to the sanitized view of the 1950s. Those who purported and promulgated the 
paradigm homogenized the world population into a single group seeking a single set of cultural 
values and a single, middle-class lifestyle. The paradigm contained ideas that a “normal” family 
was nuclear. It consisted of a father, mother, and two children. They lived in a suburb in a single-
family house with four rooms. The father was able to buy the house by working in a profession 
or in a stable occupation within a market economy. The mother worked part-time at an hourly-
rate but primarily devoted her life to emotionally supporting her husband and raising the 
children. The paradigm supports those who remember the 1950s and 1960s as a stable, peaceful 
time while muting those, such as civil rights activist Roy Wilkins, who viewed those years as full 
of oppression and sarcastically stated that in the 1950s “there was order, and you didn’t have to 
live with uppity blacks, or Hispanics, or uppity women, and if those other people did those ‘nasty 
things,’ well, damn it, they should do it in secret in dark closets and not talk to reasonable people 
about. And for God’s sake…our boys are good and the other boys are bad.”560 In short, the social 
movements of the 1960s and the seemingly new cultural, social, and ethnic identities appeared to 
ruin the paradigm’s sanitized image of the “normal” family and the “normal” person’s life 
experience.  
Also, despite his or her memories or political views, nearly every American has been 
influenced by the intellectual movement in the 1960s to consider the impact of cultural values. 
The paradigm shift started by Kennedy first brought the concept of cultural values to the 
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attention of Americans of all backgrounds and educational levels. The War on Poverty ended, 
but many of the terms on which it was fought remained part of American public and intellectual 
debates up to the present. Since the 1960s, people and groups have often defined themselves in 
cultural opposition rather than political opposition. Categories of Republican, Democrat, and 
Independent now exist alongside of free-thinker, yuppie, hippie, preppy, redneck, 
environmentalist, bohemian, and non-conformist. Arguably the best-known group of the 1960s 
and 1970s was the counterculture. The fact that they were known as the counterculture revealed 
that they defined themselves more in cultural opposition than in any other way. Members of the 
counterculture rejected the mainstream values of the dominant culture. They practiced an 
alternative lifestyle that included drugs to open consciousness, freer sexual mores, a more open 
living experience of co- and multi-habitation, harmony with nature, rejection of materialism and 
capitalistic accumulation, communal sharing of food, establishment of free clinics, and an 
alternative work schedule.
561
 A member of the counterculture explained that,“if you could not 
convince the older generation to change its beliefs, to stop the war, you could refuse to 
participate.”562 In short, living an alternative lifestyle was a form of political protest. Schulman 
explained that “political protest and countercultural sensibilities went hand in hand.”563 Political 
categories had been replaced by cultural categories.  
Since the 1960s most Americans have agreed that cultural values determine a person’s 
attitudes, behavior, actions, and account for the conditions of the world. An American today may 
claim that cultural values account for high levels of drug addiction in Brooklyn, the prevalence 
of technology in Japan, French people’s smug treatment of tourists, political instability in Chile, 
and even British people’s misaligned teeth. Although liberals’ and conservatives’ challenges to 
the paradigm’s logic broke the paradigm apart, many of its components have remained 
by becoming integrated into succeeding paradigms. Since the 1960s, scholars creating theories, 
trainers in human resources departments, teachers in classrooms, and educators designing 
national standardized tests—such as the ACT— have had to address the impact of culture and 
cultural values.  
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The “breaking up” of America into a diversity of cultural groups, starting in the 1960s, 
can also be contextualized by studying the paradigm that explained poverty. The paradigm 
provides a useful way to explain the diverse cultural groups excluded from the ideal image of 
people in the 1960s and why marginalized people fought to establish their distinct identities.  
The disintegration of America in the 1960s has been the dominant historical 
interpretation since William L. O’Neill’s Coming Apart (1971).564 O’Neill viewed America’s 
fragmentation into competing social and cultural groups in the 1960s as detrimental to national 
unity, solidarity, and power. Other historians have followed O’Neill’s lead. John M. Blum’s 
Years of Discord (1991) organized his synthesis of the 1960s around fracture and dissolution.
565
 
David Burner, in Making Peace with the 60s (1998), contended that the splitting apart of liberals 
and radicals caused destructive effects that compromised the possibility of the two groups 
working together on progressive causes.
566
 Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb argued that in the 
1960s American society split into two competing cultures, one moral and the other permissive.
567
  
Understanding the paradigm that explained poverty and theoretically unified all people 
around the world in a single category of a culture of poverty can place this fragmentation in a 
new light. Rather than a sudden proliferation of cultural and ethnic groups that fragmented 
American society, the paradigm supports that these groups always existed, but were glossed over 
in an attempt to unify the understanding of poverty around the world. The fragmentation 
therefore might have been a realization of the groups that already existed, not the creation of new 
categories and groups.  
The universalism within the paradigm explaining poverty in the 1960s also helps to 
understand the beginning of World History as a discipline in the 1960s. Historians of World 
History sought to place all of the people and nations of the world within a single metanarrative. 
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A single metanarrative requires a single set of criteria that could evaluate all countries in every 
historical epoch. Arguably the most important first book with the new field of World History was 
William McNeill’s The Rise of the West (1963).568 McNeill details the West’s rise to power by 
discussing the way in which the diffusion of ideas and technology has benefited the West while 
holding back the historically more isolationist East. This approach aligned with Shriver’s, 
Fuchs’, and Harrington’s attempts to evaluate all poor people of the world by a single set of 
cultural values that they accepted as universal. The fact that both the paradigm that explained 
poverty existed and World History was emerging at that specific moment in the early 1960s 
reveals insight into the way in which people in that time period thought about the world and how 
to organize it. 
Historians who did not accept the main assumptions behind world history also began to 
use the concept of culture in the early 1960s to evaluate people in the past. A large 
transformation in historical interpretation occurred from the fifties to the eighties. Consensus 
historians of the forties and fifties who emphasized universalism and the “end of ideology” were 
challenged by scholars of class, race, and gender. Historian David Blight explained that 
“somewhere back in the seventies and eighties everyone wanted to be a social historians.”569 
Scholars in the sixties, seventies, and eighties exposed the supposedly nonexistent ideology for 
what it really was: elitist, white, and male. Social and cultural history won the methodological 
struggle over how to study and explain history. Scholars of class emphasized antagonistic 
relationships between those in power and those marginalized. Scholars of race stressed minority 
autonomy and strength. Scholars of gender described the previously ignored dynamic women 
added to all historical events. Intellectual, economic, and religious historians shattered 
established truths as well. The deluge of attacks on the status quo fragmented the historical 
profession.  
Despite the increasingly nuanced and complex understanding of culture, the study of 
cultural values has remained and unified various scholars’ work. Scholars continued to examine 
the ways in which values determine attitude, behavior, and outlook on the world. Historians have 
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studied the distinctive culture, identity, aspirations, and objectives of African Americans in the 
South, upper class women living in Los Angeles, East-Coast vacationers traveling to Yosemite 
National Park, white men working in factories in Rochester, and the elders of nomadic tribes in 
the Himalayas. All people and groups were to be studied on their own cultural terms to 
understand elements such as their fears, aspirations, assumptions, values, ideas, sense of 
manhood, and ideas of courage. 
The paradigm that Kennedy helped propel forward brought the concept of cultural values 
to the attention of Americans of all backgrounds and educational levels. Liberals and 
conservatives have challenged the paradigm; but, cultural explanations continue to dominate 
academia and conversations in coffeehouses. Lest one get too confident that the critical elements 
of belief about a supposed culture of poverty have disappeared and that moment in American 
thought and culture is over, sociologist Craig Calhoun explains, most Americans still think poor 
countries and their people are “irrational, corrupt, inefficient, excessively fecund, technologically 
inadequate, incompetent, disease-ridden, superstitious, mired in age-old ways of doing things, 
and so on—always in implicit contrast to the happy success of our own country.”570 
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